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Foreword
The end of the Cold War seemed to mark a milestone in in-
ternational relations: the end of history. In an increasingly 
globalised world, a new era of international cooperation built 
upon interdependence should have put an end to the logic of 
competition and confrontation of the bipolar system. Twenty-
five years later, history proved such assumptions to be flawed. 
Quite on the contrary, power relations seem still to dominate 
international relations. The traditional factors of state security 
– sovereignty and territorial integrity – still ranks high in the 
agenda of political leaders. At the same time, the international 
system looks profoundly different from the one of the bipolar 
period as it is increasingly marked by fragmentation into highly 
differentiated – yet interconnected – regional and sub-regional 
arenas.
Against this backdrop, the volume “Cooperation in Eurasia: 
Linking Identity, Security, and Development” is a timely and 
useful tool to shed light on the drivers and on the rationale 
behind regional cooperation in Eurasia. In particular, it inves-
tigates and ponders the weight of identity issues, security per-
ceptions, and economic development needs for interstate co-
operation in the Eurasian context, by taking into account both 
supra-national frameworks and regional scenarios.
The volume is the result of the latest research project jointly 
carried out by the Institute for International Political Studies 
(ISPI) and the Center for Strategic Studies under the President 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SAM), entering their 7th year 
of cooperation in 2018. It follows two previous research pro-
jects and publications focused respectively, on the EU Eastern 
Partnership (2012) and Caspian Sea regional dynamics (2014). 
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Thanks to the contribution of a qualified research team, this 
volume aims at contributing to the debate concerning regional-
ization and area studies, while providing political and economic 
national decision makers with insights and inputs on the evolv-
ing dynamics shaping the Eurasian region.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice-President and Director
Farhad Mammadov
SAM Director
Introduction
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the contextual end 
of the Cold War represented a major watershed in modern in-
ternational relations, whose ramifications would affect world 
politics for decades. The shift to the post-bipolar international 
system gave rise to a series of complex, interconnected transi-
tion-related issues that have being manifesting on every level 
– domestic, sub-regional, regional and systemic – and across 
virtually every policy domain. The magnitude of the processes 
involved – e.g. the state-building of post-communist countries, 
or the re-invention of Cold War era international and regional 
mechanisms for cooperation – was such as to attract an atten-
tion from practitioners and experts that has not diminished af-
ter more than twenty-five years.
Besides its enormous purview, the systemic 1991 transfor-
mation was exceptional in that, unlike most post-conflict sce-
narios, it did not ensue from, nor afterwards implied, a major 
upheaval in the material conditions of the international system. 
This is not to play down the importance of aspects like security 
and economics – in fact, they were at least as crucial as idea-
tional factors in the transition towards the international sys-
tem’s new structure. Actually, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
may well be regarded as the effect of the incremental pressures 
put on the country’s economic and security systems by a com-
bination of domestic decline and aggressive competition from 
abroad. What is argued here is that the material component 
did play a pivotal role, but for the most part in a cumulative 
manner. Certainly, a number of specific factors come to mind 
that have given momentum to this progressive effect – e.g. the 
economic and political impact of the war in Afghanistan on 
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the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, or the strain put on 
the Soviet armament system by the Reagan administration’s 
“second Cold War”. Nevertheless, none of these circumstances 
seem to have dealt a proper deathblow to the Soviet system – 
whose timing had hardly been predicted by anyone. After all, 
until the “fall”, a largely non-resistant population seemed to 
have come up with paradoxically efficient ways to cope with 
the flaws of the economic system. Analogously, the massive size 
of conventional and nuclear arsenals, combined with the bloc’s 
favorable geopolitical position, suggested the persistence of a 
strong “material” base. Thus, the sudden demise of a system 
that had hitherto relied on a somewhat stable – if very subop-
timal – equilibrium indicates a relentless and undramatic shift 
in its structural premises. This continuity, at least in the short 
period, set the stage not only for the “implosion” of the Soviet 
power, but also the (apparently) smooth transition of the in-
ternational liberal order from an eminently Western scope to a 
virtually global one. 
Nevertheless, this cumulative effect could not have played 
out the way it did if it had not involved a corresponding adjust-
ment in the ideational component of the international system’s 
(and in the main actors’) internal structure. The change in the 
economic and military domain that led to the end of the Cold 
War also happened through a major re-elaboration of the actors’ 
self-images, their perception by partners and interlocutors, and 
the way to conceive the international system as a whole. This 
“identity challenge” would in many cases help shape – or even 
determine – the foreign policy of the international actors of 
the time, engaged in the arduous task of coming to terms with 
a systemic transformation that had altered their very material 
foundations and overturned their ideological boundaries.  
The present volume is premised on the assumption that the 
filter provided by ideational factors like identities and values 
does not make cooperation a more likely condition than com-
petition in international politics. As the case studies will show, 
the significance of non-material aspects – e.g. the self-image 
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and the raison d’être of regional organisations like the EU, the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) or NATO, or the “role” (self )as-
signed to certain countries as “federators” – does not rule out 
the (possibly dominant) role played by interests and selfish con-
siderations in determining foreign policies’ priorities and strat-
egies. Therefore, the work is going to focus on more traditional 
economic and security issues – such as trade, infrastructures, 
border protection, ethno-territorial conflicts, etc. – and will ex-
amine them also factoring in identity-related aspects as far as 
they may provide a finer rationale for the variations that can 
be observed in each actor’s behavior and to identify more accu-
rately the cultural model – e.g. enmity, rivalry, friendship, inte-
gration, merely systemic interaction – that each bi/multilateral 
relation or system tends to inform. 
Book structure and chapters
On this backdrop the present work aims at analysing the nexus 
between identity, security and development in the post-bipo-
lar Eurasian landmass, focusing on multilateral organisations 
and regional complexes. Accordingly, the book has been divid-
ed into two parts, focusing respectively on “Cooperation and 
Competition at the Multilateral Level” and on “Regional Case 
Studies”.
The first part of the book starts from the assumption that a 
remarkable upshot of the collapse of the bipolar international 
order was the more or less automatic “scaling up” of originally 
regional/Western institutions like the European Union, NATO 
and the Bretton Woods system. These institutions, each based 
on its own rationale, stepped up to spread on an interregion-
al-to-global scale the declaredly universal values and proceed-
ings of the (Western) liberal order. While this increase in scope 
went largely uncontested in the Washington Consensus years, 
the current shift towards an increasingly complex and mul-
ti-centric international system has been laying bare a number of 
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under-addressed issues concerning the identity, security and de-
velopment of those regional actors that, over the last twenty-five 
years, have come to be under the sway of the EU, NATO and 
other institutions of the Bretton Woods system. Noticeably, the 
latter have witnessed the surfacing of roughly equivalent group-
ings – i.e. the EAEU, the CSTO, the New Development Bank 
(NDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – of-
ten promoted by emerging and/or regional powers, that pose 
a more or less direct challenge to their authority and legitima-
cy. The development of these alternative fora, in line with the 
de-centering effect generated by the emergence of the BRICS, 
can be regarded as a crucial factor in the definition of new major 
trends in (inter)regional cooperation and competition – espe-
cially in the area addressed by this book. The Eurasian context is 
the locus of crucial, long-standing identity questions, regarding 
for instance Russia’s and Eastern countries’ European-ness (not 
only in cultural but also in political and institutional terms) or 
the extent and the reasons according to which Europe’s identity 
can be conflated with the EU’s. Security issues are also central 
as the quasi-global reach that the Western Alliance had built up 
until the early 2000s has been scaled down to a more regional 
scope also as a result of regional actors’ new assertiveness and 
the development of institutional arrangements like the CSTO. 
Finally, as far as the development aspect is concerned, regional 
trends have been key in bringing to the fore the imbalances 
and inertia permeating the Bretton Woods system, and have 
led to the formation of institutions aimed at recalibrating pri-
orities and practices in regional (and global) development pol-
icies. Therefore, a focus on supranational integration projects, 
security alliances and financial organisations seem all the more 
necessary to understand current dynamics, both at the global 
and regional level.  
In this view, the first chapter compares the EU’s European 
Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership (ENP/EaP) and 
the EAEU not just in institutional and political terms, but also 
as identity/normative projects. The goal of Enrico Fassi and 
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Antonio Zotti is to deconstruct the usual narrative of the EU 
as a “normative actor” – driven by values – opposed to Russia, 
considered as a classical “geopolitical actor” driven by rational 
calculation of interests.  A more critical understanding of the 
differences and relations between norm-driven policies and in-
terest-driven policies seems crucial to analyse those areas that 
both the EU and Russia consider their “neighbourhood” – and 
especially their respective integration projects. To the extent that 
the ENP/EaP can still be reasonably regarded as an effort by the 
EU to act as a normative power (although in its implementation 
a number of provisos and compromises with alternative ration-
ales and targets may have to be made), Russia’s (re)engagement 
in Eurasian regionalism appears not only motivated by “realist” 
considerations about power distribution, but also informed by 
normative elements – though of a very specific kind.
The process of incremental construction of consistent ver-
sus conflicting identities is addressed in chapter 2 by Gulshan 
Pashayeva, who engages in an historical analysis in order to ad-
dress the current prospects and limits of security alliances in 
Eurasia. Starting from the analysis of the establishment and 
evolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, 
the author uses the lens of identity to detect the specific fac-
tors that in the post-bipolar context impeded the creation of a 
pan-European security system involving all countries of Greater 
Europe, including Russia. Developments in the Kremlin, US 
positions within NATO, as well as European aspirations to 
both sustain a meaningful transatlantic relationship and create 
a distinctly European defence identity under the EU – with 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/Common 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) processes – are considered 
to explain how NATO and Russia ended up trapped in a classic 
security dilemma, where each side sees the other side’s efforts to 
improve security as coming at its own expense. 
The failure of the process of automatically “scaling up” the 
Bretton Woods system to encompass former communist and less 
developed countries is the main focus of the chapter authored by 
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Orkhan Baghirov. Here the author shows how liberal economic 
ideas advocated by the “champions” of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem – i.e. the IMF and the WB – fell short in adapting to the 
complex reality of the target countries, generating imbalances 
within economic and social structures which were not ready 
for a rapid transition towards a free market. Such shortcomings 
spawned a creeping contestation of the Washington Consensus, 
which surfaced along with the steady development of new poles 
of economic power, i.e. new economic “gravitational centres” 
for less developed countries at the regional level – the BRICS 
grouping being the most evident case. Here emerge the linkages 
between the economic dimension of the competition among 
IFIs, on the one hand, and the security and ideational ones, on 
the other. While the traditional security needs and perceptions 
of less developed countries’ leaderships stood as a key hurdle for 
the neoliberal policies to settle in, at the same time the rise of 
new regional economic powerhouses came with the rupture of 
the traditional binomial between economic growth and liberal 
system, providing the competition among IFIs with a substan-
tial normative dimension.
The second section of the book looks at how the post-bipolar 
“identity challenge” also concerned specific regions. As a matter 
of fact, in the wider Eurasian context the need to build a post-bi-
polar and post-ideological order among partners, allies or simply 
geopolitical neighbours naturally implied an important identity 
dimension which cut across membership in the supranational 
institutions seen in the first section. This approach moves from 
the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) advanced by 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever in their 2003 work Regions and 
Powers: The Structure of International Security, adding a specific 
focus on the identity dimension. In its original formulation, the 
concept of Regional Security Complexes starts from the recog-
nition that there is an often intense security interdependence 
within a region, but not between regions: security concerns do 
not travel over distances and threats are therefore most likely to 
occur within a region, where the security of each regional actor 
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interacts with the security of the others. This dynamic involves 
an important process of identity-building: the way threats are 
conceived and perceived, how neighbouring states compete or 
cooperate to respond to these threats are all important aspects 
that contribute to defining a region and make regional security 
complexes an interesting area of study also in terms of identi-
ty. Therefore, the second part of the book shifts the focus to 
Central Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asian areas 
to investigate the concrete interplay of material and ideational 
elements, and their variance, within different regional contexts.
The idea of a “light and ancillary” regionalism proposed by 
Serena Giusti with respect to the Central-European integration 
path to the West, sheds a different light on the interplay be-
tween interests and identities. Indeed, for Central European 
countries (CECs) regionalism was mainly intended as the pos-
sibility to join the European Union, a powerful regional or-
ganisation, rather than as the opportunity to engage in the re-
gionalisation process, understood as an active process of change 
towards increased cooperation, integration, convergence, co-
herence, and identity. Nonetheless, identity mechanisms were 
not absent, as the CECs emphasised their geographical and on-
tological “centrality” as a distinctive feature from other coun-
tries (e.g., Eastern Europe and the Balkans) in order to gain a 
rapid inclusion into the EU. Accordingly, the Visegrad Group, 
created in 1991 by Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, was 
exactly conceived as a format where the CECs could discuss 
EU- related issues and align positions in order to smooth their 
accession to the organisation. In this view, the phenomenon of 
regionalisation in Central Europe remains ancillary to the pro-
cess of European integration either when the first was meant as 
“propaedeutic” to the latter or when the CECs have used strate-
gically their regional convergence – and its related identity – as 
a tool to count more in the EU or to play a critical role within 
it, or to impose a certain vision.
Farhad Mammadov and Azad Garibov’s article on the 
South Caucasus, interestingly, rejects the label of “region” for 
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the area in terms of identity, security and development. As a 
matter of fact, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as the South 
Caucasian states have different foreign policy orientations. 
While Azerbaijan has a strategic partnership with Georgia, it 
is embroiled in a war with neighbouring Armenia due to the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. As a 
result, neither common and inclusive economic and security 
cooperation, nor any kind of regional integration framework 
has been built up in this “broken region” for the moment. At 
the same time, due to its aggression towards Azerbaijan, and 
informally held territorial claims against Georgia and Turkey, 
Armenia has been excluded from strategic multilateral part-
nerships (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey; Azerbaijan-Iran-Russia 
trilateral cooperation frameworks) which have been developed 
within the South Caucasus and beyond
Finally, Carlo Frappi’s chapter aims to demonstrate how the 
peculiar conception of security of the Central Asian players (i.e. 
security of the regimes) and the related logic of competition 
between them, have prevented the formation of effective co-
operation mechanisms and any functioning regional structure 
“from within”. The only forms of cooperation that are vaguely 
effective come from outside the region: however, the perception 
of the latter as instruments of interference in the internal affairs 
of the countries is inversely correlated to their likelihood to take 
root. For this reason, the “Western” recipes (EU and US) have 
failed and the Russian tends to be not very effective, fostering a 
“virtual regionalism” scheme. The Chinese cooperation recipes, 
on the contrary, show great effectiveness, not only in deepen-
ing bilateral relations, but also in linking together the actors 
of the Central Asian area and, not secondarily, the area itself 
with the surrounding regions. As a result, the “most de-politi-
cised” of the regional cooperation recipes (the Chinese) is the 
one that paradoxically advocates the most effective recipe for 
“regionalisation from above” and, together with it, a new “mod-
el” of development far from Western schemes and new forms 
of dependency.
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All together, these chapters offer a wide and in-depth look at 
the security and development dynamics in the wider Eurasian 
region, though the lenses provided by identity and Regional 
Security Complexes. Particularly in light of the predicament 
of the current US administration, these distinctive dynamics 
do not appear isolated, but are better understood as part of a 
wider change in the international system, which seems to have 
abandoned the goal of globally expanding a relatively princi-
pled liberal order – and therefore to a certain extent homoge-
neous – and to be directed towards a “multiplex order” where 
regional contexts (re)gain importance and relative autonomy, 
also at the normative level.
Carlo Frappi and Gulshan Pashayeva

PART I 
 
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 
AT MULTILATERAL LEVEL

1.  The EU and EAEU: 
     Normative Power and Geopolitics 
     in EU-Russia “Shared Neighbourhood”
Enrico Fassi, Antonio Zotti 
A point frequently raised in the debates that accompanied the 
formulation of the 2016 European Union Global Strategy 
(EUGS) was the need for the EU to finally come to terms with 
the harsh evidence that, outside of its pacified remit, “geopoli-
tics still matter”1. On that account, the document presented by 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR) has been frequently assessed in terms of 
its “realist adequateness” – that is, in order to ascertain whether 
the usual emphasis on value-laden goals and preventive, com-
prehensive and multilateral means had been effectively comple-
mented by a robust geopolitical analysis of the EU’s regional 
and global environment and a set of corresponding strategic 
decisions2. In this sense, the EUGS was particularly welcomed 
by those who saw in it a salutary downsizing on democracy pro-
motion and transformative goals, and a “return to Realpolitik” 
(though “with European characteristics”). 
This new analytical approach to the EU’s strategy is repre-
sentative of a more general trend emerged over the last few 
years in foreign policy analysis and international relations – one 
that has been frequently addressed as “resurgence of geopoli-
tics”. This take on the EU’s strategic role and identity defies, at 
1 S. Biscop, The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics, Egemont 
Security Policy Brief, no. 75, June 2016.   
2 D. Zandae, EU Global Strategy: From design to implementation, Cligendael Analysis 
no. 3, April 2016; B. Ujvari, The EU Global Strategy: going beyond effective multilateral-
ism?, European Policy Centre (EPC), June 2016.
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least in principle, the very notion of “normative power”, which 
had once been saluted as a distinguishing new way of conceiv-
ing and managing foreign affairs. Today, the concept is widely 
dismissed as fuzzy and behind its time or, at best, a rhetorical 
instrument designed to conceal the harsh realities of power pol-
itics – and the Union’s related frustrations.
Despite its faltering reputation and several undeniable con-
ceptual inconveniencies, we argue that the notion of norma-
tive power – appropriately construed – may prove still useful 
to grasp some EU foreign policy’s specific features and ambi-
tions, even in an era when the reasons of geopolitics seem to 
be at an advantage. Actually, one of the aims of this chapter is 
to argue that the relationship between the geopolitical and the 
normative rationales is not (only) one of mutual exclusion. As 
a matter of fact, even the crucial distinction between interests 
and norms – upon which the usual opposition is built – appears 
problematic and conditional on very strong assumptions if not 
taken at face value3. 
A more critical understanding of the differences and rela-
tions between norm- and interest-driven policies seems crucial 
to analyse those areas that both the EU and Russia consider 
their “neighbourhood” –  and whose countries are therefore 
regarded as “natural” partners and designated participants of 
their respective integration projects. The overlap between the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)/Eastern Partnership 
(EaP)4 promoted by the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) advanced by Russia is particularly interesting because 
the “helpless-ness” and the alleged geopolitical “inconsistencies” 
of the former are played out by contrast with the alternative 
3 T. Diez, “Normative Power as Hegemony”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 48, no. 
2, 2013, pp. 194-210. 
4 Although there are significant differences between the two initiatives, the 
Eastern Partnership is conceived in this paper as inextricably linked to the frame-
work of  the European Neighbourhood Policy, from which the former is born. 
From here on we will use the acronym “ENP/EaP” to refer to this specific 
understanding. See section 3 for further details. 
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approach of Russia’s project, which seems quite comfortable 
on its part to comply with the “spatial conditions” of power 
politics. Without downplaying the differences between the two 
approaches, what we argue is that the ENP/EaP and the EAEU 
cannot be adequately grasped as long as they are analysed and 
assessed based on the degree to which they strictly abide by the 
principles they are assumed to embody – normativity as selfless 
implementation of general rules on the one hand, and strategy 
as pursuit of interests through a purely instrumental rationality 
on the other. If that proves to be the case, the ENP/EaP can still 
be reasonably regarded as an advanced effort by the EU to act as 
a normative power although in its implementation a number of 
provisos and compromises with alternative rationales and tar-
gets may have to be made. Correspondingly, we also argue that 
Russia’s (re)engagement in Eurasian regionalism can be regard-
ed as being not only motivated by material factors and “realist” 
considerations about power distribution. In fact, normative el-
ements – though of a very specific kind – seem to inform its 
actions too: ideas about Russian identity, as well as the effort 
to maintain “normative pluralism” in its near aboard – if not to 
promote a veritable “Russian model” – shape the progress and 
content of regionalisation in Eurasia and the prospect of the 
EAEU alongside strategic calculations. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the first part, an ac-
count of the revived relevance of the notion of geopolitics is 
provided, with reference to the theoretical premises and the 
conceptual difficulties inherent to it. The second section builds 
on Ian Manners’s seminal definition of Normative Power 
Europe and reviews the ensuing debate in order to single out 
conceptualisations and arguments relative to “the normative”, 
and present an analytical framework that set the path for the 
empirical analysis. Tensions and overlaps of normative and stra-
tegic behaviour in the EU foreign policy are then explored in 
the third part, focused on the ENP/EaP. The fourth section ap-
plies the same analytical framework to the Eurasian Economic 
Union, highlighting the normative elements that seem to 
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inform Russian approach towards it. In doing so, we aim to see 
whether and to what extent the two institutional experiments 
of regional integration of their common “near abroad” signal 
not only a strategic rationale oriented to maximising their in-
fluence in neighbouring areas, but also to pursue two equally 
veritable – although diverging a and under several aspects in-
consistent – normative logics and ambitions. 
The geopolitical challenge 
and the call for a more nuanced notion 
of normative power 
Over the last few years, public and academic discourses have 
frequently been dwelling upon the notion of a surge of geo-
political competition in current world affairs5. From the terri-
torial squabbles in the South China Sea to the rush on Africa’s 
natural resources, form the involvement of “great powers” in 
the Syrian conflict to the repercussions of a prospective pro-
tectionist stance of the US’s commercial policy, a number of 
world politics issues have been deemed to be the expression of 
a revived geopolitical rationale. Since its “resurgence” in public 
debates and common parlance, experts have been extensively 
debating on the meaning of “geopolitics” and its actual impact 
on current international politics. This discussion signalled a re-
newed interest of the Western academic world in the spatial 
aspects of power, which had rekindled starting in the 1970s6. 
In very rough terms, contemporary geopolitics may be present-
ed as consisting of two major strands. On the one hand, the 
“neoclassical” theory aims at exploring the “factual” empirical 
5  W.R. Mead, “The Return of  Geopolitics. The Revenge of  the Revisionist 
Powers”, Foreign Affairs, May/June, vol. 93, no. 3, 2014. J. Mearsheimer, “Why 
the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 93, no. 5, September/
October 2014. 
6 T. Klin, “Conducting the Study of  Geopolitics: Three Approaches”, Political 
Studies Review, 29 March 2016.
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relationship between geographic factors and state politics, that 
is, the material spatial setting within which agents make their 
decisions – often with an explicit prescriptive goal as regards 
foreign policymaking. This component appears to be the most 
popular today not only within the media and policy-oriented 
circles, but is also gaining relative visibility, if not scientific sa-
lience, in more sophisticated international politics analysis. On 
the other hand, there is “critical geopolitics”, which focuses on 
the politics and ideologies of spatial representation of power, 
i.e. how geographical imagination and/or politics influence the 
understanding and practice of world politics and foreign poli-
cies7. Without going any deeper into disciplinary debates, it can 
be pointed out that criticism directed against certain foreign 
policies – included the EU’s action in the Eastern neighbour-
hood – usually comes from the “neoclassical” geopolitical front8. 
The systematic pre-eminence granted to certain physical and 
human geographic factors – “the ‘objective necessities’ within 
which states compete for power and rank” – create a bias in 
the geopolitical analysis of actors like the EU9. The Union is an 
obvious object of geopolitical attention – and reproval – given 
its alleged attempt to subvert the “factual” realities of the space 
within which it operates10. The breaking point of this process 
has been the implementation of policies, such as the ENP, pur-
posed to design experimental relations with bordering countries 
that would reshape the spatial rationale of the EU’s frontiers. 
This reading sees the advance of the EU in Central and Eastern 
Europe as a subtle encroachment into Russia’s legitimate sphere 
7 S. Guzzini, Which geopolitics, in S. Guzzini (Ed.), The Return of  Geopolitics in 
Europe? Social mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crisis, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012.
8 N. Nováky, “Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine”, Contemporary 
Security Policy, vol. 36, no. 2, 2015; G. Pridham, “EU/Ukraine Relations and the 
Crisis with Russia, 2013-14: A Turning Point”, The International Spectator, vol. 49, 
no. 4, 2014, pp. 53-61.
9 S. Guzzini (2012), p. 43.
10 S. Auer, “Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: the Ukraine crisis and the return of  
geopolitics”, International Affairs, vol. 91, no. 5, 2015, pp. 953-968.
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of influence. It was only a matter of time before the security 
threat posed by the trespass brought to an end the fortuitous 
suspension of “normal” geopolitical competition in Eurasia – 
something the European states should have seen coming, had 
they known their “geopolitics 101”, as Mearsheimer has it11. 
According to this view, the European integration process is but 
an over-elaboration of a process of mere international integra-
tion, one that generated “the illusion” of strategic actorness, 
coupled by the “delusion” of a strategic culture characterised 
by non-competition and the harmonised behaviour of states 
deferential to international institutions, supported by the ab-
normal weakness of potential rivals12. Rule-based EU is actually 
a short-sighted bureaucratic hulk that has lived in a (geo)polit-
ical vacuum until (Putin’s) Russia “made us blink our eyes” and 
showed that “geopolitics matter and power politics is going on 
everywhere around us” through its intervention in Ukraine13. 
In order to respond to this line of reasoning, addressing the 
question of what “strategic” means as far as the EU is concerned 
is crucial14. For the sake of the argument, “strategic” is going to 
be referred as the ability of the Union – both as its own insti-
tutional system, and a multilevel governance system – to apply 
instrumental rationality in the pursuit of a set of objectives, 
including “power politics” interests. The latter encompass, for 
instance, the goals listed in the EU Global Strategy, as well as 
the interests that can be deduced from the major challenges 
facing European societies as well as the EU’s profile within ma-
jor international organisations15. Rather than on the objectives, 
11 J. Mearsheimer (2014).
12 J. Grygiel, “The Geopolitics of  Europe: Europe’s Illusions and Delusions”, 
Orbis, vol. 59, no. 4, 2015, pp. 505-517.
13 S. Biscop (2016), p. 3.
14 The subject has been indirectly explored, among others, through the intensive 
debates about the hypothesis of  the EU having been acquiring a strategic culture. 
See A. Biava, M. Drent and G.P. Herd, “Characterizing the European Union’s 
Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework”, JCMS-Journal of  Common Market 
Studies, vol. 49, no. 6, 2011, pp. 1227-1248.
15 P. Vimont, The strategic Interests of  the European Union, Carnegie Europe, 20 April 2016.
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however, the emphasis here is put on the rationalist logic that 
may inform the EU external action – albeit in coexistence with 
a normative, ideational rationale16. Also based on this concep-
tion of strategy, we propose  to review some the usual terms 
of today’s discourse on normative power – in particular, the 
opposition between “postmodern/normative Europe/EU” and 
“neo-sovereign/pragmatic” Russia as embodied in the ENP and 
the EAEU respectively. 
The multifaceted relevance of normative power
Since it was first defined by Ian Manners in his 2002 seminal 
article, the concept of normative power has been at the cen-
tre of a lively debate concerning the visions, ideations, values 
and principles of the EU17. Manners came up with the idea 
of Normative Power Europe (NPE) in order to overcome the 
longstanding discussion concerning the EU’s role as a civilian 
vs military actor, focussing instead on its ideological power 
or – as he famously put it – “the ability to shape conceptions 
16 R. Youngs, “Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External 
Identity”, JCMS-Journal of  Common Market Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, 2004, pp. 415-
435; R. Youngs, The European Union: Inclusion as geopolitics, in K. Kausch (Ed.), 
Geopolitics and Democracy in the Middle East, Fride, Madrid, 2015.  
17 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal 
of  Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258; H. Sjursen, “The 
EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?”, Journal of  European Public Policy, 
vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, pp. 235-251; R. Whitman (Ed.), Normative Power Europe. 
Empirical and Theoretical Perspective, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; T. Diez, 
“Normative power as hegemony”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 194-
210, 2013; T. Forsberg, “Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual 
Analysis of  an Ideal Type”, JCMS Journal of  Common Market Studies, vol. 49, no. 
6, pp. 1183-1204, 2011; I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: 
Beyond the Crossroads”, Journal of  European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 182-
199, 2006; N. Tocci (Ed.), Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European 
Union and its Global Partners, Centre for European Policy Studies, Bruxelles, 2008; 
S. Lucarelli and I. Manners (Eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign 
Policy, London, Routledge, 2006.  
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of the normal”. In his view, unlike most other actors, the EU 
has a normative quality stemming from “its historical context, 
hybrid polity and political-legal constitution”. That being so, 
Manners’s original concept of NPE encapsulated both an onto-
logical dimension (what the EU is), a positivistic one (what it 
does) and a normative horizon (what it should do)18. Ever since, 
scholars have discussed and redefined the idea of NPE, which 
also received some enthusiastic endorsements among EU policy 
circles19. This success transformed NPE into a “contested con-
cept”, to the point that a recent review of the literature has iden-
tified as many as five different criteria (identity, interests, behav-
iour, means of influence, achievements) and four mechanisms 
(persuasion, activation of international norms, shaping the dis-
course, setting an example) associated with normative power20. 
On the other hand, NPE has also been dismissed as a “polit-
ical more than analytical concept”, a “suspicious camouflage 
for European imperialism”, or as “idealistic”, “indiscriminate”, 
“empty signifier”21. Overall, even supporters of this approach 
have admitted that the “oversupply of conceptual definitions af-
filiated with NPE” sometimes “resembles dissonant ‘a cappella’ 
singing of a chorus lacking operationalisation of the actual role 
that the EU plays through actions and impact”22. 
Nonetheless, a number of attempts have been made to op-
erationalize the concept and make it a more feasible analytical 
instrument of empirical research, not necessarily on the EU 
alone. One of the most fruitful efforts in this direction is pro-
vided in Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?, a volume 
18 I. Manners, The European Union’s Normative Power: Critical Perspectives and 
Perspectives on the Critical, in R. Whitman (Ed.), Normative Power Europe. Empirical 
and Theoretical Perspectives, London,  Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
19 C. Carta, “The EU’s International Image as Seen by the Commission’s 
Diplomats”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 13, no. 4, 2008, pp. 473-491.
20 T. Forsberg (2011), pp. 1183-1204.
21 Ibid.
22 R. Whitman, Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of  the EU and 
International Relations, in Whitman (Ed.) Normative power Europe: empirical and theo-
retical perspectives, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 3.
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edited by Nathalie Tocci in 200823. In order to identify what 
a “normative foreign policy” consist of, the authors focus on 
three questions: what an actor wants (its goals), how it acts (the 
deployment of its policy means), and what it achieves (its policy 
impact)24. Starting from Worlfer’s definition (1962) of “milieu 
goals” – as opposed to “possession” ones – normative goals are 
defined as those goals which, while indirectly related to a par-
ticular actor’s specific interests, are “essentially concerned with 
the wider environment within which international relations 
unfold”25. Moreover, normative goals are characterised by their 
aim to shape the milieu “by regulating it through international 
regimes, organisations and law”, in a way that “binds the be-
haviour of all parties”, including that of the actor itself26. As for 
the definition of normative means, the authors suggest to shift 
the attention from the question of which policy instruments 
are used, to how they are employed. Normative foreign policy 
means are thus defined as “instruments (regardless of their na-
ture) that are deployed within the confines of the law”, where 
the concept of “legality” refers to both the respect of internal 
legal standards of democracy, transparency and accountability, 
and external legal commitments – that is, acting respecting in-
ternational law, and with UN authorisation or multilaterally as 
far as possible. Finally, the analysis of an actor’s normative impact 
should tell how effective its foreign policy is in fulfilling its nor-
mative intents. Taking into consideration foreign policy actions 
and in-actions, a normative impact is defined as “one where a 
traceable path can be drawn between an international player’s 
direct or indirect actions and inactions […] and the effective 
building and entrenchment of an international rule-bound 
23 N. Tocci, Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and Its Global 
Partners, in N. Tocci (ed.) Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European 
Union and Its Global Partners. Bruxelles, Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS), 2008, pp. 1-23.
24 Ibid., p. 5.  
25 Ibid., p. 7.
26 Ibid., p. 8.
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environment”27. In the next section, this analytical framework 
is used to explore the relationship between “strategic” and 
“normative” approaches within the European Neighbourhood 
Policy/Eastern Partnership (ENP/EaP). In particular, following 
Manners’ original formulation, for each dimension we are con-
sidering both the promotion of specific norms – in our case: 
democracy – and the broader idea of “shaping conceptions of 
the normal”, in order to highlight potential misinterpretation 
as well as the heuristic opportunities that the normative power 
concept opens up to.     
The EU European Neighbourhood Policy 
and the Eastern Partnership (ENP/EaP) 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), officially launched 
in March 2003, can be argued to be  a prototypical product of 
the arrangement of the international system of the early 2000s’, 
with the EU’s international engagement shifting (if tentatively) 
from a uniquely economic to a political one too, and a grow-
ing emphasis on its inter-regional/global scope. The “big en-
largement” to seven former Eastern Bloc countries, plus one 
former member of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and two former British Mediterranean colonies can be certainly 
ascribed among the distinctive features of the time, one that 
was to mark the successful conclusion of a very delicate phase of 
the post-Cold War era transition. At the same time, the geopo-
litical accomplishment presented the EU with the inescapable 
need to come to terms with the challenges – and opportunities 
– arising from the deeply new political circumstances the new 
common borders were going to come into contact with. The 
European Security Strategy, drafted in 2003, already acknowl-
edged how new threats, such as illegal immigration, organised 
crime, state failure and terrorism, would become more pressing 
as a result of the new conditions created by the enlargement, 
27 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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and therefore demanded a “comprehensive approach”, capable 
of addressing the root causes of these issues by linking the se-
curity, economic and political dimensions28. The ENP was a 
central component of the document, and very much imbued 
of the transformative intents of the time. The policy was de-
signed “to create an area of shared prosperity and values”, based 
on deeper economic integration, intensified political relations, 
enhanced cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility 
for conflict prevention between the EU and its neighbours. 
The policy involves 16 countries at the EU’s borders: Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine eastwards; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
in the South Caucasus; and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Syria and Tunisia southwards. Coming up with the “neighbour-
hood” concept, the Union was devising a policy that was not 
to be entirely “foreign”, as its governance model drew heavily 
from the enlargement policy, and its primary aim was exactly to 
prevent that the relationships with bordering countries would 
be defined based on a clear-cut within/without distinction. At 
the same time, the ENP was to bring to an end the process 
of unlimited “internalisation” that had thus far characterised 
so much of the Union’s relationship with its near abroad. The 
enlargement policy would be continued – for instance in the 
Western Balkan region – but it would no longer be considered 
as the default approach to issues emerging beyond the borders 
of the Union. Bordering countries would remain an “Other” 
relative to the EU, but a very significant one, which would (be 
made to) share in an enlarged policy space based on common 
interests and values. Accordingly, the policy was designed to en-
compass both a relational dimension – aimed at directly influ-
encing the behaviour of neighbouring countries’ governments 
and other actors – and a structural one – which seeks to sustain-
ably influence/shape political, legal, economic, social security 
28 European Council, 12-13 December 2003, European Security Strategy - A 
Secure Europe in a Better World. 
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or other structure in the “neighbourhood space”29. Even as far 
as sole security issues are concerned, the basic objective of cre-
ating a multiplex, fluid “non-dividing” line in Europe between 
“insiders” and “outsiders” was premised on a dual concept: on 
the one hand, the EU set out to create new spaces of amicabili-
ty through socialisation and the participated transformation of 
the very interests and identities of the countries involved; on 
the other hand, the partially integrated neighbouring countries 
were also to serve as a “buffer zone” between the EU and the 
issue arising from farther contexts, according to a much more 
“traditional” security rationale.30 
In practice, the equilibrium between the diverging dimen-
sions encompassed by the ENP proved to be very demanding 
and prone to the more or less deliberate misunderstanding 
about the both final goal and the day-to-day functioning of the 
polity. One-sidedness by part of the EU, and limited engage-
ment in the ENP system of governance by the neighbouring 
countries are among the more conspicuous shortcomings of the 
original arrangement31. Admittedly, the steps made so far by 
the EU to amend these weaknesses have proved to be effective 
only to a certain extent. Nevertheless, after only a few years, 
the EU did make an effort to address the problem, among 
others by adjusting the weight that the external governance 
model, derived from the enlargement experience, had on the 
ENP. Though aimed at overcome the “transformation of ex-
ternal problems into domestic issue” modus operandi, the ENP 
had ended up inhering much of the asymmetry built in the en-
largement policy, the EU just disseminating – if not imposing 
– its rules, practices and views. As a way to counter this unbal-
anced relation, in May 2009, under the auspices of Poland and 
29 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of  the European Union, London, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 27-30 
30 K. Smith, “The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy”, International 
Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, 2005, pp. 757-773.
31 E.A. Korosteleva, The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours Towards a more 
ambitious partnership?, London, Routledge, 2012.
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Sweden, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched, directed 
specifically at the six countries of Eastern Europe and the South 
Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine. Its goal was to tighten the relationship between 
the EU and Eastern partners by deepening their political co-
operation and economic integration, in an effort to “regional-
ise” the ENP and focus it on specific issues (regional stability, 
governance and development) – therefore de-emphasising the 
“hub and spoke” framework emerging from the set of bilateral 
agreements between the EU and each neighbouring country32. 
The EaP was premised on a new rationale for cooperation with 
countries that lacked the (immediate) prospect of EU mem-
bership. Implicit in the idea of partnership was the purpose for 
compliance to no longer be unquestionable in the process of 
top-down transference of EU rules and norms, but rather nego-
tiated, affording some forums for discussion, opportunities of 
joint actions and a more conspicuous exercise of reciprocity. As 
a result, the “significant others” that are neighbouring country 
would have a great impact in constructing the EU’s self, but 
remaining nonetheless “others”, entitled to their own priori-
ties and views33. Based on functional and sector-based cooper-
ation (e.g. energy, security, mobility), the EaP was perceived by 
both parties as an opportunity for a relaunch of the ENP on 
more pragmatic premises. Although it initially produced lim-
ited result, in 2014 the EaP emerged as an important turning 
point with the signing of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – despite all 
the difficulties incurred by the latter in securing the transition 
toward democracy and market economy34. 
32  P. Manoli, “A structural foreign policy perspective on the European neigh-
bourhood policy”, in S. Gstöhl and S. Schunz (Eds.), Theorizing the Europan 
Neighbourhood Policy, London, Routledge, 2017, pp. 124-142. 
33 E.A. Korosteleva (2012).
34 T. Penkova, EU Eastern Partnership Policy: a Second Chance for the EU Transformative 
Power?, in C. Frappi and G. Pashayeva (Eds.), EU Eastern Partnership: Common 
Framework or Wider Opportunity?, Milano, Egea, 2012, pp. 19-41.
Cooperation in Eurasia. Linking Identity, Security, and Development34
ENP/EaP: normative goals
As it is often the case in policy analysis, a number of reasons can 
be identified behind the creation and implementation of the 
ENP/EaP. On the one hand, there is the specific concern, going 
back to the very beginning of the policy, with the new security 
challenges resulting from the enlargement – illegal migration, 
organised crime, terrorism, the thawing of “frozen conflicts” in 
particular35. More generally, the launch of the ENP was seen 
as an initiative aimed at the geopolitical goal of stabilising the 
areas surrounding the Union, especially its new eastern flank36. 
On the other hand, the promotion of the EU’s principles and 
normative standards, as well as the establishment of relation-
ships with neighbouring countries based on “shared values” like 
“liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law” also comes out as a major goal of 
the EU’s approach to the region37. In fact, the promotion of de-
mocracy has been largely recognised as a defining feature of the 
ENP, which marked a significant development compared to the 
previous relationships the EU developed with these same coun-
tries38. Especially in the East, the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs) established in the 1990s have defined the 
EU’s relationships with these countries almost exclusively in 
terms of economic cooperation. The political and norm-driv-
en dimension brought in by the ENP, on the other hand, can 
be regarded as “an explicit attempt to structure the immediate 
neighbourhood along the dominant principles and norms of 
35 M. Ceccorulli, Eastern Partnership Framework: Border Security, in C. Frappi and 
G. Pashayeva (Eds.), The EU Eastern Partnership: Common Framework or Wider 
Opportunity, Milano, Egea, 2012, pp. 89-104.
36 R. Aliboni, “The Geopolitical implications of  the ENP”, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 2005, pp. 1-16.
37 European Commission, COM (2004) 373 final, Bruxelles, 12 May 2004.
38 E. Baracani, The EU and Democracy Promotion: A Strategy of  Democratization in 
the Framework of  Neighbourhood Policy?, in F. Attinà and R. Rossi (Eds.), European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Centro Jean Monnet “Euro-Med”, Dipartimento di Studi 
Politici, Catania, 2004, pp. 37-57.
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the EU”39.
The idea, epitomised by then president of the Europen 
Commission Romano Prodi, was precisely to re-shape the 
European neighbourhood aiming at the creation of “a circle 
of friends”, with which the EU was ready to “share everything, 
but the institutions”. Echoing the logic of the enlargement, the 
ENP was expected to promote a convergence towards EU val-
ues in the countries of the neighbourhood trough a similar pro-
cess of legal, economic and political approximation40.
The ENP’s normative agenda is often seen in stark contrast 
with the pragmatic approach embraced by the EaP41. While 
differences between the two policies are undeniable, their simi-
larities and overlapping should also be recognised: not only the 
EaP is born and is still developing within the ENP framework 
– funds channelled through the ENP are three times more that 
those devoted to the Eap agenda – but the Eap itself shows 
a normative horizon. So, for example, in the EaP democracy 
promotion does not completely disappear from the picture, 
but becomes one of the four thematic platforms (“Platform 
1. Democracy, good governance & stability”) that constitutes 
the bulk of the multilateral dimension of the EaP - Platform 2 
being, significantly, “Economic integration & convergence with 
EU policies”42. 
In this view, the ENP, and its latest relaunch in the eastern re-
gion through the EaP, can be considered the best embodiment 
of the EU’s “structural approach”, i.e. the effort to influence or 
shape structures – “relatively permanent organising principles, 
39 T. Casier, The European Neighbourhood Policy, Assessing the EU policy towards the 
Region, in F. Bindi (Ed.) The Foreign Policy of  the EU, The Brookings Institutions, 
2010, pp. 101-102. Quoted in T. Penkova (2012), p. 20.
40 E. Fassi, Which Friends? The Content of  EU’s Democracy Promotion in its Neighbourhood, 
in F. Demier and E. Musiani (Eds.) La démocratie européenne à l’épreuve des changements 
économiques et sociaux XIXe, XXe siècle, Bologna, Bonomia University Press, 2011, 
pp. 287-304.
41 T. Penkova, (2012).
42 European Union, External Action, http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/platforms/
index_en.htm
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institutions and norms that shape and order the various inter-
related sectors” – in a “permanent”, “sustainable” way in a giv-
en area, region or space43. Thus, according to Tocci’s definition 
previously proposed, to the extent that ENP/EaP aim was to 
transform “the international environment” (in this case, specif-
ically the regional one), particularly “by regulating it through 
international regimes, organisations and law”, ENP/EaP can 
thus be considered to pursue normative goals both in general 
and specific terms.  
ENP/EaP: normative means
The ENP draws on both the instruments and the logic of en-
largement – i.e. “conditionality”. Accordingly, norm transfer 
and democracy promotion in particular were originally con-
ceived as the result of “a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by 
reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a 
target government to comply with its conditions”44. The crucial 
difference with the enlargement policy, though, is that the ENP 
lacks those powerful incentives that had so effectively induced 
compliance in the candidate countries – especially the prospect 
of full EU membership. With that motivation off the table, the 
Commission has been trying to set off demanding reforms and 
the convergence towards EU standards offering as a reward “the 
deepening of trade relations” and the rather vague formula of “a 
stake in the internal market”, which so far have not proved to be 
very attractive goals to the neighbouring countries45. That be-
ing so, conditionality appears to be a blunted instrument, and 
“the level of ambition of the relationship” – also in normative 
terms – depends almost completely on the neighbour’s govern-
ment choice and commitment, leaving little room to the EU for 
43 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux, “Competing structural powers and challenges for 
the EU’s structural foreign policy”, Global Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015, pp. 44-45.
44 F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier, “Governance by conditionality: EU rule 
transfer to the candidate countries of  Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of  
European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, 2004, p. 662. 
45 European Commission, COM (2004)..., cit., pp. 12-13.
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concrete action: if the “carrot” is not tremendously appealing, 
the “stick” in not so effective either. On the other hand, in order 
to make conditionality more compelling, the EU has often cou-
pled it with a general commitment by the EU to advance polit-
ical dialogue and norm socialisation as complementary forms of 
democracy assistance, based on a long-term approach. 
Whether and to what extent the ENP approach to democracy 
promotion can be actually be regarded as resting on normative 
premises is open to debate. On the one hand, “soft methods” 
based on joint ownership, engagement, persuasion and coop-
eration have been classified as more “normative” than coercive 
methods such as conditionality, sanctions or military action46. 
Accordingly, even the “conditionality-lite” approach character-
ising the ENP – based on limited incentives and limited de-
mands – might be regarded as non-normative47. On the other 
hand, although a distinction between “positive conditionality” 
– based on incentives – and “negative conditionality” – based 
on the threat of sanctions – has often been made, it has also 
been noted that, in practice, positive and negative incentives 
hinge upon similar coercive logics; moreover, whether or not 
they can be viewed as normative often depends to a large extent 
on the context in which they are applied rather than their na-
ture48. Based on a definition of normative foreign policy means 
as those instruments “that are deployed within the confines of 
the law”, where legality relates both to the respect of internal 
legal standards and respecting international law, then the ENP 
process, based on legal acts such as the Association Agreements 
and the National Action Plans, and implemented though de-
tailed bureaucratic and legal measures, can reasonably be re-
garded as normative means. 
46 N. Tocci (2008), p. 9.
47 G. Sasse, “‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
EU’s Eastern Neighbours”, in N. Casarini and C. Musu (Eds.), European Foreign 
Policy in an Evolving International System, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
48 D. Ethier, “Is democracy promotion effective? Comparing conditionality and 
incentives”, Democratization, vol. 10, no. 1, 2003, pp. 99-120; N. Tocci (2008).
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As mentioned, the limited effects of conditionality-lite in 
promoting of structural change among neighbours were ad-
dressed through the creation of the EaP, which emphasised “re-
forms” through “the establishment of a network of free trade 
agreements that can grow into a Neighbourhood Economic 
Community, the progressive liberalisation in a secure environ-
ment, the deeper cooperation to enhance energy security of 
both the partners and of the EU; and the support for economic 
and social policies designed to reduce disparities within each 
partner country and across border”49. Transformation was also 
planned to be achieved in the domain of non-universal norms 
through a “structured approximation process” with EU rules. 
Accordingly, convergence on technical issues and standardisa-
tion were also devised as instrument of implementation of the 
transformative purposes of the Union, together with the en-
gagement of partner countries’ bureaucracies and civil societies, 
inclusion of stakeholders (public or otherwise) and enhanced 
access to EU institutions. Whether and the extent to which the 
“complement” provided by the EaP has enhanced the effective-
ness of neighbourhood policy’s tools is still open to debate. 
ENP/EaP: normative impact (?)
According to some scholars, the “open-ended nature” of the 
ENP itself, built on a weak conditionality, rules out the possi-
bility of achieving clear-cut effects50. Given the constellation of 
the EU’s and neighbouring countries’ varying interests, condi-
tions and commitments, the scope for policy, institutional and 
normative change under ENP conditionality appear to have 
been limited from the outset. Any lasting institutional, policy 
or behavioural “lock-in” effect would have probably required a 
deeper grounding in domestic politics than the one provided 
49 P. Manoli (2017).
50 G. Sasse, The ENP and the EU’s Eastern Neighbours: Ukraine and Moldova as Test 
Cases, in R. Whitman and S. Wolff  (Eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy in 
Perspective, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 200.
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under the current framework. Perhaps not surprisingly, me-
dium term analyses also signal that, almost 15 years into the 
ENP/EaP, not much has changed in Eastern countries in terms 
of democratic scores51.
As for the mechanisms involved, it is clear that in this con-
text, the “democratisation through integration model” of the 
enlargement could not work. In fact, the model risked to be det-
rimental, at least in some cases, since the imposition of bench-
marks and the strict monitoring of reforms necessary to make 
full use of the conditionality mechanism, summed to a scarce 
sense of ownership, may provoke anger and resentment more 
easily than compliance and commitment. In this context, the 
EU was not in position to “demand democracy with strident 
voice”52. On the other hand, the long-term process of socialisa-
tion of ENP/EaP countries to EU norms has proved to be rela-
tively more effective. The “net outcome”, though, is somewhat 
hazy, as socialisation is not a unidirectional process, and may 
in fact weaken as much as strengthen EU-oriented foreign and 
domestic policies and produce unintended consequences, as ar-
gued, among others, by Gwendolyn Sasse with reference to the 
relationships with Ukraine and Moldova. Even though the EU 
is committed to avoiding the “rhetorical entrapment” ensuing 
(weak) enlargement promises, it is still prone to a “procedural 
entrapment”, originating in the functionalist underpinnings of 
the ENP process: the more the latter proves effective and sets 
off a process of approximation to the EU standards, the more 
difficult it becomes to rule out future enlargements vis-à-vis the 
aspiration of the neighbours53. Consequently, both parties have 
tried to redefine the ENP/EaP as a step toward membership, 
thus signalling that in the process of being projected outwards, 
EU policies and norms are constantly reinterpreted by different 
actors across the “wider EU”. Far from being the alleged passive 
51 Freedom House, Freedom in Transit, 2017.
52 R. Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of  Democracy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001.
53 G. Sasse (2010), pp. 200-201.
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recipient of EU value promotion efforts, social and political ac-
tors in ENP/EaP countries thus emerge as constitutive element 
of Normative Power Europe – an expression of the “power of 
the local” as Gordon and Pardo put it54. While the normative 
impact of the ENP appears rather limited in terms of democra-
tisation – at least in its mainstream meaning – these unintended 
consequences need to be taken into account for an overall eval-
uation of the policy. 
On the other hand, any attempt at measuring the effects of 
the EU’s efforts to exert its normative pull in the region should 
take into account that, starting with the establishment of the 
EaP up to the 2015 review, the Union’s structural power has 
been conceived ever less as a leverage to instrumentally generate 
specific outcomes. In other words, the EaP is not regarded as 
a “robotic arm”, much less the functional equivalent “sphere of 
influence”55. The EaP is handled by the EU – conceptually and 
in terms of policy-making – as a slow and long-term process, 
consisting of a progressive and monitored approximation of EU 
benchmarks, which can be oriented, but not micro-managed. 
Accordingly, the EaP’s result are highly contingent on the spe-
cific condition of each policy area, responding differently across 
policy (sub)domains and through time to internal factors like 
the role of local governments and elites, or external ones like 
the impact of Russia’s pressure. Having acknowledged that its 
practice and policy had been regarded by other partners as too 
prescriptive, and not sufficiently reflecting the partner coun-
tries’ aspirations, the Commission has expectedly proposed that 
“differentiation and mutual ownership will be the hallmarks of 
the new ENP”, and recognised that “the new ENP will now seek 
to involve other regional actors, beyond the neighbourhood, 
54 N. Gordon and S. Pardo, “Normative Power Europe and the Power of  the 
Local”, JCMS Journal of  Common Market Studies, vol. 53, no. 2, 2015, pp. 416-427. 
55 D. Cadier, “Eastern Partnership vs Eurasian Union? The EU–Russia 
Competition in the Shared Neighbourhood and the Ukraine Crisis”, Global Policy, 
vol. 5, Supplement 1, October 2014.
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where appropriate, in addressing the regional challenges”56. 
As emerged in EaP 2015 summit in Riga, and reaffirmed by 
the EaP 2017 summit in Brussel, this approach has led to a 
de facto differentiation between the three EaP countries which 
already have agreed an Association Agreement and the creation 
of DCFTAs with the EU (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia), and 
“the others” (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus) for which this 
perspective is unlikely in the short/medium term – but with 
which cooperation is nonetheless developing through a case-
by-case approach57. As a result, Armenia and the EU signed a 
Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 
in 2017, while Azerbaijan is currently in the process of nego-
tiations with the EU a comprehensive Partnership Agreement 
based on specific Partnership Priorities58; in addition, both 
countries have established visa facilitation regimes with the 
EU. Negotiation on visa facilitation started in 2014 also with 
Belarus, but enhanced cooperation with Minsk appears more 
challenging, as highlighted by the fact that EU restrictive meas-
ures (including arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban) have 
been prolonged until 28 February 201859. 
The Eurasian Economic Union
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was established in 
January 2015 by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, swiftly joined 
by Armenia (January 2015) and Kyrgyzstan (August 2015). 
According to its promoters, the initiative was aimed at the de-
velopment of a functional, rules-based framework to encourage 
56  E.A. Korosteleva, “Eastern partnership and the Eurasian Union: bringing ‘the 
political’ back in the eastern region”, European Politics and Society, vol. 17, no. 1, 
2016, pp. 67-81.
57 H. Kostanyan, The Fifth Eastern Partnership Summit: Between hyperbole and under-
statement, CEPS commentary, 8 November 2017.
58 EC/EEAS, Report on EU – Azerbaijan relations in the framework of  the revised ENP, 
Joint Staff  Working Document Brussels, 19.12.2017, SWD(2017) 485 final.
59 European Council, EU relations with Belarus.
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the development of deeper economic ties between its members, 
which would integrate into a new cohesive economic entity – 
the first such body in the post-Soviet region60.
The EAEU can be argued to be the culmination of a mul-
ti-step project in deep economic integration that dates back 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in so far 
as it was also designed to create an institutional framework 
promoting economic cooperation and integration after the 
collapse of the USSR. More specifically, the EAEU’s roots can 
be traced back to the Customs Union agreement that Russia, 
Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan signed in 1995, but 
that never really came into being, and the more recent Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC), a fully-fledged regional or-
ganisation established in 2000 by the same five countries plus 
Tajikistan, planned to step from mere zone of economic co-
operation to a customs union, a single market and possibly a 
currency union61. In January 2010, EurAsEC effectively created 
a customs union including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, 
later renamed the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), and in 
2012 the Single Economic Space (SES), established to guaran-
tee the “four freedoms”, that is, free circulation of goods, capi-
tal, services and people across the three countries. The common 
market envisaged by the EAEU entails policy coordination, re-
moval of non-tariff trade barriers, and an ambitious regulatory 
harmonisation agenda. This integration is to be delivered by a 
common, rules-based regime, grounded on the principle of the 
formal equality among member states, as well as an institution-
al architecture closely resembling that of the European Union62. 
The EAEU is conceived by some of its proponents as a 
60 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk, The Eurasian Economic Union. Deals, Rules and the 
Exercise of  Power, Chatham House Research paper, May 2017.
61 A. Libman, Commonwealth of  Independent States and Eurasian Economic Community, 
Center for the Study of  Federalism, 2011, pp. 10-12. See also Y. Vymyatnina and 
D. Antonova, Creating a Eurasian Union. Economic Integration of  the Former Soviet 
Republics, London, Palgrave, 2014.
62 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk (2017).
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“functional alternative” to the EU in the Balkan area (with 
Serbia as a bridgehead) and the “shared neighbourhood” area – 
containing all the EaP member countries, but also a platform for 
structuring relations with other regional groupings (EU, Asean) 
or single countries (Vietnam, Israel, Egypt, Iran). A closer scru-
tiny of this initiative reveal other integration drivers apart from 
those included in the “grand narrative” of a functional, rules-
based economic integration project – among which the “geo-
political” factor has been largely identified as one of the most 
relevant. Accordingly,  the EAEU ought to be regarded as an-
other instrument though which assertive Russia has been trying 
to establish its hegemony on the region, also in order to reaf-
firm its status on the wider international stage63. Compelling 
as this reading of the EAEU-centred integration process may 
be, it seems to have almost completely overlooked the norma-
tive dimension of the project, arguably on the assumption that 
Russia’s hegemonic purpose per se rules out the possibility of 
such a dimension to exist. Contesting the idea that hegemony is 
necessarily incompatible with normativity – although it is quite 
clear that the manifestation of this dimension are bound to be 
at variance with the mainstream conception of international/
global justice – in what follows the framework applied to the 
analysis of the ENP is used to investigate whether and under 
what conditions normative goals, means and impact can also 
be identified in the EAEU integration project of the “shared 
neighbourhood”.
EAEU: normative goals
The concept of a Eurasian Union was first mentioned by 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev during a speech at a 
Moscow University in May 1994, less than three years after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. The declared goal was not the res-
toration of a Russia-dominated system of regional dominance, 
63 H.  Zahorka and O.  Sargsyan, “The  Eurasian  Customs  Union: an  alternative 
to  the  EU’s  Association Agreements?”, European View, vol. 13, 2014, pp. 89-96.
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but a closer economic integration with Russia and other former 
USSR members through “a mutually beneficial union of mu-
tually respectful partners”64. A better understanding the goals 
scope and ambitions of the initiative are to be searched for in 
the positions expressed by the actual promoter and pre-emi-
nent member of Union, i.e. Russia. In fact, it is only with the 
switch from the post-URSS collapse to path that would lead to 
today’s “assertive attitude” that the Russian government shift-
ed from “declaratory regionalism” to an effective commitment 
to the project – in line with the idea, shared by a large share 
of the observers, that the latter is better understood as a way 
to exert power over the Eurasian space. As it has been argued, 
“neo-imperial Russia” would seek power, security and wealth by 
exercising its supremacy over the former soviet states, gaining 
both regional hegemony and a position of strength vis-à-vis the 
West and other powers such as Iran and China65.
Russia’s decision to (re-)engage in Eurasian regionalism, 
however, appears to be motivated not only by material fac-
tors and power distribution, but also by normative elements 
– despite remaining hegemonic in nature. Ideas about Russian 
identity, and the willingness to maintain a “normative plural-
ism” in its near aboard – through the (more or less forcible) 
promotion of a veritable “Russian model” against the “homog-
enising” western normative agenda – seem to shape the actual 
content, progress and prospect of the EAEU. As with the con-
cept of Normative Power Europe before, the social construc-
tivism approach help draw a link between Russia’s goals and 
its identity. Russian identity, like any other polity’s, it is not a 
given, but has changed significantly over time due to domestic 
developments and variations in the international scenario. This 
is particularly true of Russia, much as it was of the EU as well as 
64 J. Kilner, “Kazakhstan welcomes Putin’s Eurasian Union concept”, The 
Telegraph, 6 October 2011.
65 L. Delcour, “Between the Eastern Partnership and Eurasian Integration: 
Explaining Post-Soviet Countries’ Engagement in (Competing) Region-Building 
Projects”, Problems of  Post-Communism, vol. 62, no. 6, 2015.
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other “regional entities” such as the “(shared) neighbourhood”. 
According to Kairat Moldashev and Mohamed Aslam in par-
ticular, Russian identity in the post-bipolar system can be better 
understood by looking at the domestic debate and the three 
positions dominating at the same time the politico-institution-
al and intellectual spheres: the “Westernist”, the “Statist” and 
the “Civilisationalist” approaches66. These intellectual develop-
ments had a major impact on Russia’s policy-making, and were 
able to influence the orientations of the country’s relationship 
with the post-soviet region, especially through the Eurasian pro-
ject. Based on these approaches, three major phases of Russia’s 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War period can be singled out. 
The first half of the 1990s can be identified with a “Westernist 
momentum”. This phase was characterised by the preponder-
ance of westernizers within the Russian political system, espe-
cially in the executive. Significantly, this was also the period 
in which Yegor Gaidar and his team of neoliberals were ap-
plying their “shock therapy” to national economy. In terms of 
foreign policy, Westernist ideas translated into Russia’s efforts 
to integrate as much as possible into the global institutions de-
rived from the Cold-war period’s western liberal order, without 
ruling out the possibility of re-joining the great powers of the 
time – US, Europe and Japan – also through the adoption of a 
democratic political regime. At the same time, Russia showed 
much less interest in the economic integration of the post-sovi-
et states, perceived for the most part as too taxing a “burden”.
Starting with the Russian parliamentary election of December 
1993 until the mid-2000s, a shift towards a more “Statist” and 
civilisational approach to Russian identity can be detected. 
Supporters of this view advocated for a strong centralised state 
that would revive Russia’s great power status in the international 
arena; accordingly, integration with post-soviet countries was 
seen as a necessary step to reinforce Russia’s hegemonic role 
66 K. Moldashev and M. Aslam, Russia in the Pursuit of  Eurasian Integration: 
Developmental Regionalism or Identity Project?, paper presented at the ISA Global 
South Conference, 8-10 January 2015, Singapore.
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within the region and the establishment of a genuinely multipo-
lar world order. While at first this view, hinging on Russia’s 
dominance and embodied in the Primakov’s Doctrine, trou-
bled post-soviet counties, the shift toward the more pragmatic 
language of “multi-speed integration” in Putin first presidential 
term (2000-2004) paved the way to the (partial) success of the 
Eurasian integration process in the early 2000s.
The growing influence of the civilisational approach to 
Russian identity provides a compelling understanding of the 
relaunch of the process and the path towards the creation of the 
EAEU. Civilisationalists viewed Russia as a distinct civilisation 
whose borders exceed those of the current Russian state, and 
thus argue for an expansionist foreign policy agenda, and the 
ensuing creation of wider polity along the lines of the former 
Soviet Union. These theoretical and political outlook, usually 
defined in opposition to “the West”, found new strength af-
ter the mid 2000s’ wave of “coloured revolutions” – a series of 
attempted democratic transitions that took place in Ukraine, 
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan – which civilisationists held to be the 
upshot of a Western aggressive agenda of democracy promo-
tion. Putin resolution to provide economic, security and nor-
mative alternatives to the ever extending sway of the EU and 
NATO on the one hand, and China’s growing influence on the 
other dovetailed with the relaunch of the Eurasian integration 
process, so that the creation of the EAEU became “a call for 
close integration based on new values and a new political and 
economic foundation”67. 
EAEU: normative means
The EAEU can be regarded as the outcome of a process of in-
stitutionalisation and juridicalisation of economic and political 
cooperation in the Eurasian space; if that is true, the organisa-
tion can be reasonably considered as belonging to the category 
67 M. Elder, “Putin’s grand vision: a new Eurasian bloc with old Soviet neigh-
bours”, The Guardian,  4 October 2011.
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of ‘normative means’, according to the least demanding notion 
identified before – i.e. “instruments deployed within the con-
fines of the law”.
The Treaty establishing the EAEU (signed on 29 May 2014) 
codifies the hitherto fragmented and messy legal basis of the 
EACU and the SES and introduces the “ambitious” concept 
of “the law of the Union”, premised on the principle of formal 
(institutionalised) equality of all member states68. This regime 
is underpinned by a comparatively sophisticated institutional 
architecture, where common regulatory and judicial bodies – 
e.g. the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) as a techno-
cratic, permanent regulator of the integration process (based in 
Moscow) and a Court of the Eurasian Economic Union (based 
in Minsk) – hold a certain degree of independence from the 
member countries. The similarities with the EU system are 
quite evident and, compared to the merely quasi-legal system 
of the ENP/EaP, the EAEU might even appear to be more ad-
vanced as a normative tool. Nonetheless, a closer scrutiny re-
veals a number of weaknesses at the level of the organisation’s 
institutional structure, organising principles and actualisation. 
As argued by De Gregorio, the imitation of the EU model is 
quite “selective” and contradictory, and a careful analysis of the 
EAEU Treaty and Annexes reveals a typical structure of econom-
ic organisations, more similar to the World Trade Organisation 
than the EU. The main deficiency of the EAEU pertains its de-
cision-making mechanism and the implementation of the deci-
sions: exceptions to the unanimity rule are very limited, and no 
mechanisms are in place to ensure implementation or penalize 
the non-implementation, neither at the discretion of suprana-
tional or the intergovernmental “political” bodies.  Expectedly, 
with no infringement proceedings, the incentive to respect 
basic principles is very weak. The real masters of the treaties 
thus remain the member states through their presidents; and in 
such a context a genuine transition from an intergovernmental 
68 R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk (2017).
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decision-making approach to a supranational one is doubtful, 
as is the free and conscious delegation of sovereignty by mem-
ber states.
On the other hand, the institutionalisation of the EAEU’s 
legal order seem to be better understood as part of the wider 
agenda pursued by Russia in the region. Regardless of the spe-
cific goals of the organisation, the project signals Russia’s effort 
to not accept passively Western initiatives – notably European 
and the EU’s ones. In line with this view, Russia has deployed 
the EAEU (primarily) as an alternative project of integration 
that is an item of a wider array of instruments: diplomatic pres-
sures, economic incentives, sanctions, military threats and also 
competing institutional projects. This “counter-balancing” en-
deavour has gone through several phases, which has signalled 
a progressive intolerance of European perceived interference 
by Russia, culminated in the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014. 
Already in 2008, the Russian-Georgian War had sent a rather 
explicit signal of Russia’s capacity – and willingness – to use the 
full spectrum of available means, including the military option, 
and the complete lack of remorse in making use of it when 
other instruments turn out to be inadequate. In this view, the 
EAEU emerges as one of the manifold tools incorporated in 
a Russian grand strategy developed on different levels and ac-
cording to different logics.
EAEU: normative impacts (?)
Russia’s international behaviour has generated a debate about 
whether, how and under what conditions autocratic powers can 
export their political model as democracies do. To this regard, 
Russia, together with China and Saudi Arabia have been re-
garded as the champions of international “authoritarian coop-
eration”69. This projection can be argued to signal the willing-
ness of non-democratic great powers to pursue a specific agenda 
– that is normative, despite being linked to “power politics” 
69 D. Kalingaert, Exporting Repression, Freedom House blog, 26 march 2013.
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because aimed at contrasting the liberal-democratic model 
with a viable alternative that includes values, (self-)images and 
ideas. Moreover, the literature has often considered the pres-
ence of great autocratic power in a region as a potential obsta-
cle to democratic dissemination, thus suggesting the presence 
of explicit or implicit effects of that model on neighbouring 
countries’ domestic political development – no matter what its 
causes, normative or merely tactical70. As for Russia, it has been 
pointed out that the country’s democratic stagnation has gone 
hand in hand with that of its neighbourhood, showing a trend 
of autocratic resilience – if not entrenchment – that seems to 
have a marked regional dimension71. Furthermore, through the 
concept of “sovereign democracy”, Moscow seems to claim its 
own definite identity and a specific political model, while at the 
same time contending the Western monopoly of the democracy 
concept72. According to Nelly Babayan, there is in fact a model, 
a Russian style of government – therefore dubbed “Putinism” – 
which has several followers in the post-Soviet area and even in 
the same EU (think of the project of the illiberal democracy of 
Viktor Orban in Hungary). That being the case, Russia is not 
so much interested in promoting a specific type of political re-
gime, as in defending its own interests – particularly in terms of 
status – and for this purpose it has opposed the Western agen-
da of democratic promotion, perceived as attempts to intrude 
into its “near abroad”73. According to the thesis of this article, 
though, the normative and the “strategic” aspects, are not to be 
seen as (strictly) mutually exclusive. As showed with the ENP/
EaP case, there is not always a perfect coincidence between 
70 T. Ambrosio, The Authoritarian Backlash. Russian Resistance to Democratization in the 
Former Soviet Union, Burlington, Ashgate, 2009.
71 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2017, www.freedomhouse.org.
72 J. Tolstrup, “Studying a negative external actor: Russia’s management of  sta-
bility and instability in the ‘Near Abroad’”, Democratization, vol. 16, no. 5, 2014, 
pp. 922-944.
73 N. Babayan, “The return of  the empire? Russia’s counteraction to transatlantic 
democracy promotion in its near abroad”, Democratization, vol. 22, no. 3, 2015, 
pp. 438-458.
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normative goals and normative impact, and the lack of the latter 
does not entail the absence of the normative dimension at large. 
Russia’s effectiveness in contrasting western normative agenda – 
evident in the Russia-induced U-turn of Armenia and Ukraine 
on the signature of the Association Agreement with the EU in 
2013 – has certainly increased the credibility of the country, 
showing its readiness to use any means necessary to maintain 
a “normative pluralism” in the Eurasian region. Consequently, 
the political élites of the area are likely to be even more willing 
to engage – even just in “declaratory” terms – in Russia-led 
regionalism in order to secure their regimes and oppose pos-
sibly destabilising western agendas of good governance and 
democratisation74. On the other hand, the institutionalisation 
of this “alternative to the Western way” – in economic, security 
and normative terms – embodied by the creation of the EAEU 
might actually end up leading to that “close integration based 
on new values and a new political and economic foundation” 
invoked by Putin, thus altering the “conceptions of the normal” 
not only at the regional but also at the global level: a normative 
impact by definition, which may well go beyond the goals of 
its creator.
Conclusion
The critical conditions of today’s EU-Russia relations and the 
limited achievements of the Eastern Neighbourhood policy in 
terms of diffusion of the EU’s values and norms (democracy 
and good governance above all) call for a critical assessment of 
the very idea of normative power, all the more urgent in light of 
today’s “geopolitical turn”. The competing integration projects 
directed to the Eastern European and South Caucasian regions 
– EU’s ENP/EaP and Russia-sponsored EAEU – offer a re-
markable opportunity to review the concept, especially in light 
of its descriptive and prescriptive nature and its relationship 
74 K. Moldashev and M. Aslam (2015), pp. 1-23.
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between values and interests. The classification of normative 
foreign policy here adopted allows for an accurate account of 
whether the EU lives up to its vocation of shaping conceptions 
of the normal – i.e. whether its foreign policy actually conforms 
with the rules, norms and practices assumed to be at its core, 
while also achieving its normative goals and being able to act as 
a “normative leader” – while at the same time shading new light 
on Russia’s actions and motivations75.
In fact, the qualification as normative of the UE foreign poli-
cy may appear an outdated concern, seeing how many observers 
have greeted the contents of the 2015 review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy by the European Commission as a (long 
overdue) realisation of the need to overhaul the EU’s idealist 
strategic paradigm. Reflecting the increased importance of in-
terests in contemporary foreign policy-making, the document 
states that “the EU will pursue its interests which include the 
promotion of universal values”, with the significant specifica-
tion that “not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards”. As 
a consequence, stabilisation is elevated to the new ENP political 
priority, while more traditional goals like the promotion of dem-
ocratic, accountable and good governance are made conditional 
on an explicit and negotiated shared commitment by the part-
ners. It remains to be seen whether on the longer term the more 
“political” (i.e. “negotiable”) EaP – compared to the more “tech-
nocratic” (based on rigid compliance) ENP – will enable the EU 
to strike a new balance between its two ingrained objectives. On 
the one hand, there is the Union’s traditional aspiration – which 
has evolved in a bona fide practice, almost a reflex – to external-
ise the interests and rules underpinning its established internal 
order. On the other, there is the prospect of a more “discerning” 
approach to the EaP partner countries, and Russia, in order to 
understand their needs and prospective difficulties, and to send 
the right signal to the eastern neighbourhood. 
75 N. Tocci (2008).
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The analysis of EAEU, on the other hand, shows that Russia 
too can be viewed as a normative power – despite the common 
depiction of the country as a paradigmatic “geopolitical inter-
est-driven” actor. In this sense, the pluralistic logic underlying 
the integration project advanced by Russia can be regarded as 
part and parcel of a more general process of transformation of 
the universalistic traits of the international global order, which 
seems under many aspects to be making way to a “multiplex” 
world76. Within this new emerging arrangement of power and 
values, single regions may well go by different logic – which re-
main normative even though they contest the traditional liberal 
universalistic model of which the EU has been not only a fun-
damental hub and an active local agent, but also the advocate 
on an (inter-)regional and global scale. When observed from an 
institutional perspective, the frictions in the shared neighbour-
hood area can be argued to be not only a new manifestation 
of traditional “spheres of influence”, but also the outcome of 
normative dynamics that may be shaping not only the equilib-
ria of this critical area, but the forthcoming international order 
at large. 
76 A. Acharya, The End of  American World Order, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014.
2.  Security Alliances in Eurasia 
     through the Lens of Identity
Gulshan Pashayeva
Throughout the history of humankind, security has always been 
a core issue. At the same time, national security, with the state 
embedded at its heart, undoubtedly developed with the rise of 
nation-states and continues to play a central role in the political 
structure of the modern world. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) 
established the concept of state sovereignty (Westphalian sover-
eignty), which contributed to the foundation of a new system of 
international order in Europe, where each state was able to exer-
cise sovereign power over its territory while acknowledging each 
other’s domestic structures and religious vocations as well as re-
fraining from interfering in one another’s domestic affairs.1 This 
also led to the notion of balance of power, which is one of the main 
concepts in the theory and practice of international relations. 
The balance of power theory reflects the aim of states to cre-
ate defensive coalitions in order to strengthen their own mil-
itary capacities and defend themselves against any serious ex-
ternal threat emanating from another, much stronger, state. In 
the European context, due to its naval supremacy and virtual 
immunity from foreign invasion, Great Britain played the role 
of the balancer, or holder of the balance, from the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars until World War I (WWI)2 – the so-called 
Pax Britannica. Eventually, the concept of Westphalian sover-
eignty and the principle of balance of power largely waned after 
the Twentieth century’s world wars3.  
1 H. Kissinger, World Order, Penguin Press, New York, 2014, p. 3.
2 Balance of  power, Encyclopedia of  Britannica. 
3 H. Kissinger (2014), pp. 86-87.
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After World War II (WWII), which was the deadliest mili-
tary conflict in the history of humankind in terms of total casu-
alties, with over 60 million people killed, constituting approx-
imately 3% of the total world population in 1940 (estimated 
at 2.3 billion)4, a number of multilateral organisations came 
into existence. The United Nations (UN), established on 24 
October 1945, was one of them. The UN’s remit was “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war [...] to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small”5. 
In those days, the USA played a major role in restarting the 
European economy through the Greek-Turkish aid program of 
1947 and the Marshall Plan of 1948, and, for the first time 
in its history, entered a peacetime alliance through the North 
Atlantic Treaty of 1949. 
The European equilibrium, historically authored by the states of 
Europe, had turned into an aspect of the strategy of outside powers. 
The North Atlantic Alliance established a regular framework for 
consultation between the United States and Europe and a degree 
of coherence in the conduct of foreign policy. But in its essence, 
the European balance of power shifted from internal European ar-
rangements to the containment of the Soviet Union globally, large-
ly by way of the nuclear capability of the United States6. 
Thus, the world was split into two antagonistic camps and 
the East-West order was established by the Cold War that 
brought the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the Warsaw Pact countries, two security alliances, face to face. 
However, with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
Cold War ideological barriers collapsed and the countries of 
4 World Population, Historical Estimates of  World Population, U.S. Census 
Bureau.
5 Preamble of  the Charter of  the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sec-
tions/un-charter/preamble/index.html
6 H. Kissinger (2014), p. 89.
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the former Eastern Bloc as well as newly independent states that 
emerged in the post-Soviet space began to confront a number 
of political, economic, security, and other state-building related 
challenges over the following years. 
At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union funda-
mentally transformed the geographic nature of the European 
order, giving rise to three security-related questions: 1) the 
pan-European question on how to build and maintain a secu-
rity system involving all countries of Greater Europe, includ-
ing Russia, the successor states of the Soviet Union, and the 
more westward-oriented states of Central and Eastern Europe; 
2) how to sustain a meaningful transatlantic relationship; and 
3) how to create a distinctly European defence identity within 
the European Union (EU) through the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) processes7. Unfortunately, they still remain un-
answered, despite the attempts to sort them out over the years.
Due to other priorities of the West in the early 1990s, Russia 
was seemingly taken for granted. As a result, a unique oppor-
tunity to achieve pan-European security was lost then. The 
launch of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative at 
NATO’s Brussels summit held on 10-11 January 1994, was a 
turning point in the relationship between the West and Russia. 
Subsequently, NATO enlargement – with the admission of 
Eastern European countries as members – complicated matters 
even further. 
Moreover, there were also other Western policies to which 
“Russia objected in vain, including the US-led wars in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Iraq and the unilateral US withdrawal in 2002 
from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement 
that had restricted the number of missile defence systems the 
Soviet Union and the United States could build”8. Together, 
7 M. Perrin de Brichambaut,  “The Return of  the Pan-European Security ques-
tion”, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring, 2009, p. 14. 
8 M. Mandelbaum, “Pay Up, Europe. What Trump Gets Right About NATO”, 
Foreign Affairs, 15 August 2017. 
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these initiatives persuaded Russia to assume that NATO in its 
decision to spread east has muscled in on Russia’s traditional 
turf. Meanwhile, it also believes that the USA “seeks to subvert 
the Putin regime by promoting democracy in and around the 
country”9. 
This led to Russia’s increased assertiveness and the rise of 
what might be called the Russian challenge in the following 
years. With Russia’s policies and activities in recent years, in-
cluding the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its continued 
destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, Moscow is now perceived by 
many observers as “a revisionist, neoimperialist, and expansion-
ist power determined to overturn the post-Cold War European 
security order, destroy NATO’s cohesion, and restore its sphere 
of influence throughout the former Soviet Union”10. However, 
as claimed by Putin, Russia’s actions were necessary since the 
Euromaidan revolution emerged from a Western conspiracy to 
isolate, humiliate, and ultimately destroy Russia. The Russian 
public mostly believed him11. Thus, in Russia’s view “the 
buildup of the military potential of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the endowment of it with global 
functions pursued in violation of the norms of international 
law, the galvanisation of the bloc countries’ military activity, the 
further expansion of the alliance, and the location of its military 
infrastructure closer to Russian borders are creating a threat to 
national security”12. 
In fact, this is a reality from a geographic perspective be-
cause, on the one hand, all former European members of the 
Warsaw Pact, along with the three Baltic states and Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Montenegro, have already joined NATO and, 
on the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and the 
9 R. Sokolsky, “Not Quiet on NATO’s Eastern Front. How the Alliance Can De-
escalate With Russia”, Foreign Affairs, 29 June 2016. 
10 Ibid.
11 M. Mandelbaum (2017).
12 Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 – Full-text Translation, 31 
December 2015.
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former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are currently NATO’s 
aspiring members. 
Thus, NATO, although a relic of the Cold War, is still alive 
today and its mission seems unchanged: continuation in the 
fulfilment of three core tasks: collective defence, crisis man-
agement, and cooperative security. These are fully relevant and 
complementary, and are contributing to safeguarding Alliance 
members, always in accordance with international law. At the 
same time, the greatest responsibility of the Alliance remains 
that to protect and defend the territories and populations of 
NATO members against attacks, as set out in Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty13.
However, following the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and the chaos after the intervention in Libya, Barack Obama 
has recalibrated the United States’ international role and con-
sistently encouraged allies in Europe and the Middle East 
to take on greater responsibility for their own security14. US 
President Donald Trump has also targeted the high cost of the 
United States’ overseas commitments in his comments, “com-
plaining that the country’s allies have broken their promises to 
spend more on their militaries and joint exercises”15. 
According to Jonathan Eyal, the Trump Administration’s 
complaints are largely accurate because “the Europeans can and 
must do more to support the transatlantic alliance. In 2014, 
for instance, NATO member states pledged to increase their 
defence spending to two per cent of GDP by 2024, but so far 
only Estonia, Greece, Poland, and the United Kingdom have 
reached that threshold”16.
13 Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and 
Security of  the Members of  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Adopted 
by Heads of  State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 
November, 2010, pp. 7-8. 
14 R. Niblett, “Liberalism in Retreat. The Demise of  a Dream”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 96, no. 1,  January/February 2017.
15 D. Bandow, “Ripped Off. What Donald Trump Gets Right About U.S. 
Alliances”, Foreign Affairs, Snapshot, 12 September 2016. 
16 J. Eyal, “The Real Problems With NATO. What Trump Gets Right, and 
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At the same time, the 2016 Global Strategy for the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy, Shared Vision, Common Action: A 
Stronger Europe (EUGS), confirms that “an appropriate level of 
ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability 
to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its bor-
ders”17, even though NATO remains the primary framework for 
most EU Member States when it comes to collective defence18. 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission and Head 
of the European Defence Agency (HRVP/head of agency) 
Federica Mogherini presented an Implementation Plan on 
Security and Defence (IPSD) setting out proposals to imple-
ment the EUGS in the area of security and defence for consid-
eration and ratification at the Foreign Affairs Council on 14 
November 2016. It is worth noting in particular that the plan 
envisions that, in carrying forward its actions, the EU will work 
together with its international and regional partners in security 
and defence while strengthening its own ability to take respon-
sibility and share the burden wherever possible, while being 
able to operate autonomously when and where necessary. 
Member States have a “single set of forces” which they can use 
nationally or in multilateral frameworks such as the United 
Nations, NATO, EU or ad hoc coalitions as well in support 
of regional organisations such as the OSCE. The development 
of Member States’ capabilities through CSDP and using EU 
instruments will thus also help to strengthen capabilities po-
tentially available to the United Nations and NATO. Mutual 
reinforcement, complementarity and coherence will be ensured, 
including through the implementation of the Joint Declaration 
signed by the leaders of the Institutions of EU and NATO in 
Warsaw on 8 July 2016 as well as through the framework of the 
EU-UN cooperation on crisis management19.
Wrong”, Foreign Affair, Snapshot, 2 March 2017.
17 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for 
the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016, p. 19. 
18 European Union, Countries, EU official website. 
19 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Council of  the European 
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Three core tasks – responding to external conflicts and cri-
ses when they arise, building the capacities of partners, and 
protecting the EU and its citizens through external action – 
have been identified, as well as several concrete actions such 
as: the endorsement of procedures to establish the Coordinated 
Annual Review on Defence (CARD)20; a search for incentives 
and enablers aiming at strengthening the European Defence 
Agency21; the identification of necessary capabilities to be 
pooled together by EU Member States; and the examination of 
political, technical, and financial rationales for the deployment 
of EU Battlegroups22. All these actions have been singled out 
within the IPSD in order to deepen defence cooperation23. 
The EU has also currently deployed six military and nine civil-
ian missions and operations24 in different regions of the world. 
At the same time, Military Planning and Conduct Capability 
(MPCC)25 has been established within the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS)26 of the EEAS in 2017.
A joint notification on the Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) in the area of defence security and defence policy has 
been signed by the Ministers from 23 EU Member States27 and 
handed over to the High Representative and the Council on 13 
November 2017. The notification envisages “the possibility of 
Union, 14 November, 2016, p. 17.
20 European Defence Agency, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). 
21 https://www.eda.europa.eu/
22 European Union, External Action, Common Security and Defence Policy, EU 
Battlegroups, April 2013. 
23 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Implementation Plan on 
Security and Defence, 18 May 2017. 
24 Ibid.
25 The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), https://eeas.europa.
eu/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet.pdf
26 European Union, External Action, EU Military Staff  (EUMS), “Providing 
Military Expertise & Capabilities to the EU”, Spring/Summer 2015.
27 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
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a number of EU member states working more closely together 
in the area of security and defence. This permanent framework 
for defence cooperation will allow those member states willing 
and able to jointly develop defence capabilities, invest in shared 
projects, or enhance the operational readiness and contribution 
of their armed forces”28.
On the other hand, new regional security relationships arose 
in the post-Soviet space over the years. The Collective Security 
Treaty (CST) was signed by six post-Soviet states – Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – 
in Tashkent on 15 May 1992. Azerbaijan joined CST on 24 
September 1993, Georgia on 9 December 1993, and Belarus 
on 31 December 1993. Set to last for a 5-year period unless 
extended, CST came into effect on 20 April 1994. However, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan refused to renew their 
commitments and withdrew from CST on 2 April 1999, when 
the Presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, and Tajikistan signed a protocol renewing the treaty for 
another five-year period29. 
Furthermore, on 7 October 2002, in Chisinau, Moldova, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and 
Tajikistan signed a Charter that renamed CST and expanded 
it into a full-fledged military alliance, the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO). According to Article 3 of the 
CSTO Charter, the goals of this organisation are to strengthen 
peace and international and regional security and stability; to 
protect independence on a collective basis; and to ensure the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member states, in the 
28 Defence cooperation: 23 member states sign joint notification on the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), hiip://www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/13/defence-cooperation-23-member- 
states-sign-joint-notification-on-pesco/
29 A. Obydenkova, “Comparative regionalism: Eurasian cooperation and 
European integration. The case for neofunctionalism?”, Journal of  Eurasian 
Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, July 2011, pp. 87-102 
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attainment of which the member states prefer political means30. 
Thus, this chapter seeks to contribute to a better understand-
ing of the security alliances established in Eurasia nowadays. 
In the first part of this chapter, the security and identity nexus 
will be analysed in the framework of the bipolar world. The 
second part is devoted to the security alliances developed in 
the post-bipolar world.  The key trends of security cooperation 
and/or competition in contested neighbourhood will be evalu-
ated in the third part of this chapter. Taken together, these three 
parts aim to shed light on security alliances in Eurasia through 
the lens of identity.
The bipolar world: security and identity 
through ideological lenses
Despite the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union 
were allies during WWII, after that war they confronted each 
other as superpowers. This brought about a bipolar world, 
where security and identity-driven characteristics were sharply 
divided through primarily ideological lenses. 
Thus, NATO was established by its 12 founding members31 
as a multilateral organisation based on the North Atlantic 
Treaty (NAT)32 signed on 4 April 1949 to promote liberty, rule 
of law, and democracy. “In its first 40 years, the preponderance 
of the Alliance’s multilateral activities was primarily focused on 
building/rebuilding its member nations’ militaries and making 
them interoperable. Efforts to promote the principles of de-
mocracy, individual liberty and the rule of law were reserved 
for strengthening these systems within its own membership”33. 
30 Charter of  the Collective Security Treaty Organisation dated 7 October 2002.
31  Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy,  Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States.
32 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949.
33 Colonel P.T. Warren, US Army. Alliance History and the Future NATO: What the 
Last 500 Years of  Alliance Behavior Tells Us About NATO’s Path Forward, 21st Century 
Defense Initiative Policy Paper, Foreign Policy at Brookings, 30 June 2010, p. 20.
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NATO is a collective defence alliance in line with Article 5 of 
the NAT, because this article pledges that all members defend 
the others:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an 
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of in-
dividual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so 
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with 
the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area34.
On the other hand, NATO can also be considered as a collec-
tive security alliance, which has “to settle any international dis-
pute in which [countries] may be involved by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and justice 
are not endangered, and to refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations”, in line with Article 
1 of the NAT35. 
Throughout the years, the number of NATO members has 
gradually increased. First, Greece and Turkey both joined NATO 
in 1952; West Germany36 followed in 1955. The inclusion of 
Germany in NATO came about after the decision, made at the 
34 Article 5. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949. 
35 Article 1. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949.
36 It should be underlined in this context that since 1945 Germany had been 
divided between the Cold War opponents where American, British, and French 
zones of  occupation covered Western Germany and West Berlin and the Soviet 
zone Eastern Germany and East Berlin. The Federative Republic of  Germany 
was established in 1949 due to the combination of  the zones of  occupation of  
the Americans, British, and French. On the other hand, the German Democratic 
Republic was established in the Soviet zone of  occupation in East Germany on 
7 October 1949. However, Soviet forces remained in this country throughout 
the Cold War.
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London and Paris Conferences, on the determination of the sta-
tus of West Germany (September-October 1954), on the basis 
of which full sovereignty was granted to West Germany along 
with the end of its occupation and consent for its admission to 
NATO. Thus, on 5 May 1955, after the American, French, and 
British forces formally ended their military occupation, West 
Germany became an independent country and on 9 May 1955, 
it joined NATO, the Western European defence system. 
The Soviet Union was opposed to the remilitarisation of 
West Germany and its reaction was swift. On 14 May 1955, 
the Warsaw Pact, formally the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Certain 
East European Communist Governments37, was signed in Warsaw 
to establish a mutual defence organisation (Warsaw Treaty 
Organization) comprising, originally, the Soviet Union and 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania. The pact provided for a unified military 
command and for the maintenance of Soviet military units on 
the territories of the other participating states38. 
Thus, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were established as the 
corresponding security alliances of a East-West international or-
der filtered through ideological lenses. At the same time, a cer-
tain degree of balance of power had been established between 
these two military alliances. Since NATO remained united 
and the United States maintained its commitment to defend 
Europe, conflict between the Soviet Union and the United 
States was largely avoided in the first decades following WWII, 
despite the outbreak of the Korean War of 1950 as well as the 
Berlin and Cuban missile crises of the early 1960s. 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union’s officially 
proclaimed expectations of surpassing the United States in both 
37 Treaty of  Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet 
Union and Certain East European Communist Governments, Signed at Warsaw, 
14 May 1955. 
38 https://www.britannica.com/event/Warsaw-Pact
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economic and military power had begun to look hollow, and 
strains within the Soviet Union itself – intensified by Mikhail 
Gorbachev’ s perestroika – began to mitigate Western fears that 
growing Soviet strategic power might make Europe vulnerable 
to nuclear blackmail. In that setting, both sides became more 
willing to actively explore such issues as arms control, human 
rights, and even troop reductions. By the end of the decade, the 
rapidly growing disarray in the Soviet bloc – spearheaded by 
the success of the Solidarity movement in Poland and prudently 
exploited in its final phase by NATO (and particularly by close-
ly cooperating US, German, British, and French leaders) – had 
gotten out of hand. Before long, both the Soviet Union and the 
Soviet bloc became history39. 
After Spain joined NATO on 30 May 1982, the total number 
of NATO member states became sixteen, two of which were lo-
cated in North America (Canada and the United States), one in 
Eurasia (Turkey) and 13 in Europe. On the other hand, among 
the 8 founding members of the Warsaw Pact Organisation, 
only the Soviet Union was located in Eurasia, while the other 
7 members were located in Europe. Thus, both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact Organisation, as security alliances established on 
the basis of the East-West ideological conflict within a bipolar 
framework, should have ceased to exist with the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Thus, after 40 years, the Cold War ended peacefully. At the 
same time, NATO has played an instrumental role in the pro-
cess of reconciliation with the former Axis powers, Germany 
and Italy, as well as in the termination of Franco-German hos-
tility in the European continent. “The French at first strongly 
opposed any formula for German rearmament, even within 
a common European defence community. But gradually, far-
sighted French and German leaders cultivated a political recon-
ciliation that eventually flowered into a genuine entente”40. In 
this context, the EU has also contributed to promoting peace 
39 Z. Brzezinski, “An Agenda for NATO. Toward a Global Security Web”, Foreign 
Affairs, September/October 2009.
40 Ibid.
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and reconciliation between France and Germany as well as ad-
vancing democratic governance and human rights in Central 
and Eastern Europe over the last sixty years and, as a result of 
this remarkable achievement, it was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 2012.
The post-bipolar world: security and identity 
through the complex mix of liberal values 
and post-Soviet mentality
With the end of the Cold War, the ideological lenses which divid-
ed the world on an East-West axis disappeared. Simultaneously, 
Eastern and Central European countries lost their identity-driv-
en ideological characteristics. Following the democratic revolu-
tions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact was formally 
declared nonexistent on 1 July 1991, at a final summit meeting of 
Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague41. With the gradual withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from the former member states of the Warsaw Pact 
the new post-bipolar world had become a reality.
Meanwhile, with the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 
1989, the European states, the USA, and the Soviet Union start-
ed intense diplomatic activity with an initial focus on the reunifi-
cation of Germany and its retention inside NATO. They worked 
in parallel with the activities of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in overseeing the transition to-
wards a new post-Cold War European security architecture. 
Within the CSCE, the 1990 Paris Charter and the follow-up 
1992 Helsinki Summit set forth an inclusive framework for 
pan-European security. The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) strengthened the pan-European 
trends further by limiting conventional weapons and aggressive 
postures by the members of the two security alliances, and also 
by developing political-military confidence- and security-build-
ing measures (CSBMs), which brought in all Euro-Atlantic and 
41 Warsaw Pact, Encyclopedia of  Britannica.
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Eurasian states. Thus, despite CSCE’s aim to provide a pan-Eu-
ropean security framework for the collective management of 
Europe’s problems after the end of the Cold War, these endeav-
ours did not mature sufficiently quickly for CSCE to assume 
responsibility even with the crises that emerged after the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia. This led the UN to take primary responsibil-
ity in the area, “working later after facing serious challenges on 
the ground with the support of NATO. The OSCE (as successor 
to the CSCE) came to focus on managing conflicts in the former 
Soviet Union, deploying field operations with mandates for con-
flict prevention and democracy support”42.
On the other hand, NATO’s role changed in the post bipolar 
world. First and foremost, NATO came to play a stabilising 
role in the newly-incorporated Central and Eastern European 
countries. “Although the army’s eventual withdrawal was all but 
inevitable, the uncertainties regarding regional security, border 
issues, and fundamental political identity in the former Soviet 
bloc were complex. With the emerging EU in no position to of-
fer reassuring security, only NATO could stably fill the void”43.
Throughout the years, seven former Warsaw Pact mem-
bers (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Albania) along with the three Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and three new countries 
emerging from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Montenegro) became full members of NATO. 
They did so because the Alliance offered “aggregate capabilities 
which were greater than any other potential allies (especially 
with the US as a primary security guarantor)” as well as because 
it was also seen as “a stepping stone to eventual membership 
in the European Union”44. Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Georgia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are 
aspiring members of NATO45.
42 M. Perrin de Brichambaut (2009), pp. 15-16. 
43 Z. Brzezinski (2009).
44 Colonel P.T. Warren (2010), p. 12.
45 Member countries, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm
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However, suffice to say that this was not a straightforward 
process. In the initial stages, Russia accepted NATO’s eastward 
expansion and the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, admitted in 
Warsaw in summer 1993 that Russia would have no objections 
to Poland joining NATO. But when the United States pushed 
in parallel the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program while aiming 
for pan-European security structures, the Russian Federation 
remained quite cool, only signing the PfP status of forces agree-
ment in April 200546. 
Established in 1994, the PfP programme aims at increasing 
stability, diminishing threats to peace, and building strength-
ened security relationships between NATO and non-member 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. Currently, there are 21 
countries in the PfP programme and each of them has devel-
oped an individual relationship with NATO, choosing its own 
priorities for cooperation, and the level and pace of progress47. 
The PfP program came to include political and military reform 
agendas designed for some European partners to facilitate their 
accession into the Alliance, and the majority of Europe’s former 
Warsaw Pact nations went through this programme from 1992 
through 2009, with ten ultimately joining NATO48.
Today, the number of NATO members has increased from 
16 to 29 after admitting an additional 13 European countries 
in the framework of the post-bipolar world. At the same time, 
NATO and the EU currently share 22 member states: Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
Thus, with the close integration of the former Central and 
Eastern European countries into the Western structures (EU and 
NATO), a new identity, European-ness, has emerged in the 1990s. 
46 M. Perrin de Brichambaut (2009), p.16. 
47 Partnership for Peace programme, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_50349.htm
48 Colonel P.T. Warren (2010), p.19.
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At the same time, the pan-European aspirations of former Warsaw 
Pact member states were based on the ideals of democracy, liberal-
ism, individual human rights, a rule-based security order, etc. 
On the other hand, new alliances have been established in 
the post-Soviet space since 1991, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) is the first long-running international 
organisation in this region so far. 
The CIS was established by the leaders of the Soviet Republics 
of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, which, on 8 December 1991, 
came together in the “Belovezhskaya Pushcha“ natural reserve in 
Belarus to sign the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth 
of Independent States49. According to this Agreement, the USSR 
was dissolved, and the CIS was created as a successor entity. 
On 21 December 1991, the leaders of the eight former Soviet 
Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan also agreed 
to join the organisation. Although Georgia joined the CIS two 
years later, in December 1993, three Baltic States – Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania – have never shown any interest in being 
part of the organisation.
On 15 May 1992, another regional organisation, the CST, 
was formed by six CIS member states – Russia, Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – on the 
basis of the Collective Security Treaty. Three other CIS mem-
bers, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia, joined this treaty in 
1993, which entered into force in 1994. Five years later, six of 
the nine CST members agreed to renew the treaty for another 
five years; however, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan 
withdrew from the organisation in 1999. 
In order to further develop and intensify their military and 
political cooperation, in 2002, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan agreed to establish the 
49 Soglasheniai o sozdanii sodruzhestva nezavisimykh gosudarstv (Minsk, 8 
dekabria 1991 goda), https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/agreement_establishing_
the_commonwealth_of_independent_states_minsk_8_december_1991-en-d1e-
b7a8c-4868-4da6-9098-3175c172b9bc.html 
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CSTO, setting as its goal “to continue and increase the close 
and all-round allied relations in foreign policy, military and 
technical areas, as well as in the sphere of counteraction to the 
transnational challenges and menaces to the safety of states and 
peoples”50. Uzbekistan joined again CSTO in 2006; however, it 
suspended its membership in 2012. 
To achieve these objectives, the CSTO member states agreed 
to undertake a number of joint initiatives:
to form thereunder the efficient system of collective security pro-
viding collective protection in case of menace to safety, stability, 
territorial integrity and sovereignty and exercise of the right to 
collective defence, including creation of coalition (collective) 
forces of the Organization, regional (united) groups of armies 
(forces), peacekeeping forces, united systems and the bodies gov-
erning them, military infrastructure. The Member States shall 
also interact in the spheres of military and technical (military and 
economic) cooperation, supplying of armed forces, law enforce-
ment agencies and special services with necessary arms, military, 
special equipment and special means, as well as in the spheres 
of training of military cadres and experts for the national armed 
forces, special services and law enforcement agencies (Article 7)51. 
Moreover, Article 8 of the CSTO Charter states that:
the Member States shall co-ordinate and unite their efforts at 
struggle with international terrorism and extremism, illicit traf-
ficking of drugs and psychotropic substances, weapon, organ-
ized transnational crime, illegal migration and other menaces 
to safety of the Member States. The Member States shall take 
measures to creation and getting function within the framework 
of the organisation of the system of response to crisis situations 
menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of the Member States. The Member States shall co-operate in 
the spheres of protection of state frontiers, exchange of infor-
mation, information security, protection of the population and 
territories from emergency situations of natural and technogenic 
50 Charter of  the CSTO, 7 October 2002, cit.
51 Ibid. 
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character, as well as from the dangers arising when maintaining 
or owing to the hostilities. The Member States shall carry out 
their activity in these directions, including in close cooperation 
with all the interested states and international organisations 
with UN dominating52.
According to Article 11 of the CSTO Charter, the CSTO’s bod-
ies are the Council for Collective Security (the Council); the 
Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (CMFA); the Council 
of Ministers of Defence (CMD); the Committee of Secretaries 
of Security Council (CSSC); and the Permanent Council. The 
permanent working bodies of the CSTO are the Secretariat and 
the Joint Staff of the Organization, and the body of inter-par-
liamentary cooperation is the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Organization53.
At the same time:
Resolutions of the Council, CMFA, CMD and CSSC on the 
issues, except for the procedural ones, shall be adopted by con-
sensus. When voting, any Member State shall have one vote. 
The voting procedure including on the procedural issues shall 
be regulated by the Rules of the Procedure of the Organization 
Bodies approved by the Council. Resolutions of the Council 
and the resolutions of CMFA, CMD and CSSC adopted for 
execution thereof shall be binding for the Member States and 
shall be executed in accordance with the procedure established 
by the national laws (Article 12)54.
In accordance with Article 22 of the CSTO Charter, “the or-
ganization may cooperate with the states which are not its 
members, keep in touch with the international intergovern-
mental organizations operating in the field of security, conclude 
international treaties with them focused at establishment and 
development of such cooperation”55. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.
Security Alliances in Eurasia through the Lens of Identity 71
Moreover, according to Alexander Nikitin, the CSTO is sim-
ilar in its functions to NATO and the EU. Both of these two 
major Western institutions have, to varying degrees, combined 
political and military integration. This, in turn, may lead to a 
higher degree of coordination with the CSTO56. 
However, there are no institutionalised relations between the 
CSTO and NATO so far. The CSTO has never been mentioned 
in any NATO Summit documents, as well as within the 2010 
NATO Strategic Concept. Thus, seemingly, NATO has been 
reluctant to work with the CSTO, and does not want to recog-
nize its role as a regional security organisation, which is “per-
ceived by its members as a purely ideological Cold War holdo-
ver. NATO members have also not seen significant results from 
CSTO activities and tend to think it easier to negotiate signifi-
cant issues bilaterally with Russia, which dominates the organ-
ization”57. At the same time, there are three areas where limited 
NATO-CSTO cooperation may be implemented, including 
information exchanges about general activities and collective 
forces; tackling the consequences of natural and man-made dis-
asters; and post-conflict peace-building and state-building58.
Certain cooperation can also be put into practice in the fields 
of crisis management and peacekeeping. However, since the 
CSTO will not let NATO participate in conflict resolution or 
crisis management on CSTO territory, cooperation could only 
occur in UN-mandated out-of-area peacekeeping operations, 
upon an official request from conflicting parties. Afghanistan 
is the most obvious example in which cooperation between the 
CSTO and NATO would be feasible, but neither organisation 
has rushed to work together.
56 A. Nikitin, CSTO and NATO: From Rivalry to Dialogue to Regional Security 
Integration Structures.
57 Y. Nikitina, How the CSTO can (and cannot) help NATO, PONARS Eurasia 
Policy Memo no. 285, September 2013, p. 1.
58 Ibid., p. 4.
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NATO prefers bilateral negotiations with individual CSTO 
members for military transit and bases. For a long time, the 
same was true for the CSTO. Only in 2011 did CSTO mem-
bers agree that the deployment of non-CSTO military bases on 
the territory of CSTO members requires collective approval. For 
its part, Russia prefers to cooperate with NATO and the United 
States on Afghanistan on a bilateral basis. In general, CSTO po-
litical declarations tend to mention Afghanistan separately from 
other possible spheres of cooperation with NATO59.
Current relations between NATO and Russia are quite com-
plicated due to the policies pursued by Moscow in recent years, 
mostly relating to the crisis in and around Ukraine, which is 
“the first topic on NATO’s agenda. At the same time, a mod-
ernisation of the Vienna Document should be negotiated be-
tween Russia and the OSCE in order to improve stability and 
security in the Euro-Atlantic area”60.
At the same time, it should also be underlined that, on the 
one hand, since the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the NATO’s 
Baltic and Eastern European members are ostensibly more 
preoccupied with a potential Russian aggression (due to their 
proximity to Russia) compared to NATO’s Western European 
members. Even before the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, these 
countries believed that a belligerent Russia was replacing the 
Soviet threat. In particular, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and 
Poland all view Russia’s bellicose behaviour as motivated by a 
desire to reclaim great power status, discredit NATO in the eyes 
of its neighbours, and use the Baltic countries to divide the EU 
and NATO61. 
Meanwhile, the majority of NATO’s Western European and 
North American nations opposed this view, preferring to main-
tain an island of détente with Russia, and the majority of NATO 
59 Ibid., p. 3-4
60 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of  State and Government 
participating in the meeting of  the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 
2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
61 Colonel Patrick T. Warren (2010), p. 29.
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members viewed attempts to vilify Russia as counterproductive 
to the stability and security of Europe62.
Some analysts have also differentiated between the situ-
ation in Ukraine and that in the Baltic countries: according 
to Richard Sokolsky, for example, the Kremlin takes NATO’s 
Article 5 very seriously and does not envisage the same fate 
for the Baltic States as the one it reserved to Ukraine. In fact, 
Russia considers the Baltic states “lost” because they are already 
NATO members63.
Nevertheless, it is impossible not to agree that currently
NATO and Russia are trapped in a classic security dilemma: each 
side sees the other side’s efforts to improve security as coming at 
its own expense. Meanwhile, each interprets its own measures 
as defensive. And so, both sides build up their forces along their 
shared border, each assuming it will have a deterrent effect on 
the other and thus stabilize their standoff. In reality, the opposite 
is true. The situation has become less rather than more stable, 
and tensions will continue to grow unless both sides find ways to 
climb down from the escalatory ladder they are on64.
Security cooperation and/or competition 
in contested neighbourhood 
Quite recently a new term, intermediate Europe65, has been 
introduced to define the region that lies between the Baltic 
and the Caspian Sea. It covers six post-Soviet states (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), all of 
which have restored their independence in 1991. 
62 Ibid.
63 R. Sokolsky (2016).
64 Ibid.
65 W. Schneider Deters, P.W. Schulze, and H. Timmermann, “Die Eurapaische 
Union, Russland and Eurasien: Die Ruckkehr der Geopolitik”, BWV - Berline 
Wissenschafts - Verlag GmbH, Berlin, 2008; P. W. Schulze, Die EU, Russland und 
die GUS, Auseinandersetzungen uber das nahe Ausland, IPG 3/2005, p. 153.
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From a geopolitical standpoint, these six sovereign states 
are close to both the West (EU and NATO) and Russia. 
They are participants of the NATO’s PfP programme and 
the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) programmes. Armenia and Belarus are cur-
rently also members of the Russia-led CSTO. On the opposite, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are not involved in 
any above-mentioned security alliances in Eurasia so far. 
Tbilisi officially declared its intention to join NATO at the 
Prague Summit in 2002 and, since then, it has been steadily 
advancing its standing with the alliance. NATO leaders agreed 
at the 2008 Bucharest Summit to admit Georgia into the club. 
However, “despite the country’s growing contribution to global 
security and its progress toward military and political reform, 
NATO member countries have remained reluctant to issue a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP), a standard mechanism for 
aspirant countries to prepare for membership”66.
The latest developments in Ukraine show once more the de-
gree of vulnerability of countries that experience a breach in 
their territorial integrity. The crisis in and around Ukraine is 
also a reminder that one fifth of the internationally recognised 
territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia are currently not under 
the control of the respective countries, and that over one mil-
lion people have become refugees and internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) as direct consequences of these conflicts. At the 
same time, these unresolved conflicts create constant security 
risks, which can destabilize the immediate neighbourhood of 
both the EU and Russia. 
According to Mr. Elmar Mammadyarov, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, it is also important to 
single out political stabilisation as the most urgent challenge 
in many parts of the European Neighbourhood, because “to-
day the sovereignty and territorial integrity of four out of six 
66 T. Zurabashvili, “Let Georgia Join NATO. Tbilisi’s Case”, Foreign Affairs, 12 
April 2016.
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EaP countries continue to be undermined due to the existing 
conflicts. Failure to eliminate consequences of the ongoing vi-
olation of the principles of international law, as well as mis-
interpretation and selective application of these principles in 
the context of the conflict resolution undermines rules-based 
European order”67.
On the one hand, NATO strongly condemns Russia’s aggres-
sive actions against Ukraine and supports not only Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally 
recognised borders, but also the territorial integrity, independ-
ence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the 
Republic of Moldova. It continues to support “efforts towards 
a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the South Caucasus, as 
well as in the Republic of Moldova, based upon these principles 
and the norms of international law, the UN Charter, and the 
Helsinki Final Act”68. 
However, the EU’s inconsistent approach towards the un-
resolved conflicts in the internationally recognised territories 
of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine has been coun-
terintuitive so far, in terms of the principles of both sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity. The EU should use unambiguous, 
clear, and concise wording in all its official documents and 
statements in regard to the above-mentioned four states by 
expressing full respect towards the resolution of the protract-
ed Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, 
the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the 
Transnistrian conflict, and the prolonged crisis in Ukraine. 
Such statements should be based on the principles of respect 
for territorial integrity and sovereignty of states within interna-
tionally recognised borders, as enshrined within the EUGS69.
67 F.M. Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan has been reliable EU partner and growing 
number of  strategic partners among EU member states, Azertag.az, 31 August 
2017.
68 Warsaw Summit Communiqué…, cit.
69 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for 
the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), 28 June 2016, p. 33.
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Mr. Elmar Mammadyarov, has also noted in one of his 
speeches that
it is already third decade that Armenia – a member of the EaP 
has been using force against the sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of another member of the EaP and continues to keep 
the one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognised territo-
ries under military occupation. Armenia carried out notorious 
ethnic cleansing on all seized lands of Azerbaijan which totally 
contradicts to the code of conduct adopted in Europe and the 
world. The unlawful presence of the armed forces of Armenia in 
the territories of Azerbaijan remains the main cause of violence 
in the conflict zone and is the major impediment to political 
settlement of the conflict70.
In this context, a comprehensive and coherent approach to 
the settlement of conflicts, such as that included in the lat-
est Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, held 
in Brussels on 24 November 2017, was highly appreciated in 
Azerbaijan. According to this document,
the Summit participants call for renewed efforts to promote 
the peaceful settlement of unresolved conflicts in the region on 
the basis of the principles and norms of international law. The 
resolution of conflicts, building trust and good neighbourly re-
lations are essential to economic and social development and 
cooperation. The Summit participants welcome efforts and the 
EU’s strengthened role in conflict resolution and confidence 
building in the framework or in support of existing agreed nego-
tiating formats and processes, including through field presence, 
when appropriate71.
Due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its continued dest-
abilisation of eastern Ukraine, multiple rounds of economic 
sanctions against Moscow have been imposed by the EU and 
the US. These have mainly targeted Russia’s energy, defence, 
70 F.M. Mammadyarov (2017).
71 Joint Declaration of  the Eastern Partnership Summit, Council of  the European 
Union, Bruxelles, 24 November 2017, 14821/17. 
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and financial sectors. In addition, penalties were imposed on 
individuals, including government officials close to Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. It is envisaged that Ukraine will re-
gain control over its entire territory, including Crimea, through 
such measures.
Although little progress has been made so far in this con-
text, it is obvious that some cooperation between the West and 
Russia is urgently needed to overcome current disagreements. 
At the same time, NATO and the EU need to define new ap-
proaches and long-term strategic goals to rekindle relations 
with Russia. 
Conclusion
Today, NATO and Russia may or may not be locked into a new 
Cold War, but in order to get out of the escalatory spiral,
NATO may need to go beyond the narrow, military-centric ap-
proach to bolstering deterrence and defence on its eastern flank. 
As Breedlove has recommended, the alliance needs to reopen a 
line of communication with the Kremlin. Both sides also need to 
show more mutual and verifiable restraint in their military ac-
tivities and exercises along their shared borders. Toward this end, 
NATO and Russia should launch serious exploratory discussions 
on the negotiation of new arms control and confidence-building 
measures to limit and reduce the risk of war in Europe72. 
At the same time, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine remains 
the biggest threat to European security. NATO allies stand firm 
and support Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
On the other hand, some diplomatic work has been go-
ing on around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to 
deploy a UN peacekeeping contingent to eastern Ukraine to 
protect the OSCE monitoring mission. German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel has expressed her support, adding that “the 
72 R. Sokolsky (2016).
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peacekeeping mission should not be limited only to the con-
tact line separating Kiev’s forces from the Donbass rebels, but 
that they should be empowered to accompany members of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
monitoring mission to every region in which they operate”73. 
Vladimir Putin agreed that the international force could be de-
ployed not just along the contact line but within the conflict 
zone as well, something which gave Western governments con-
fidence that a genuine negotiation with Moscow was possible. 
At the same time, a true UN peacekeeping plan would be the 
best hope to return to Minsk II, a peace agreement that both 
Ukraine and Russia pledged to follow74.
A new constructive approach to conflict resolution should 
be developed further by the EU/ NATO and Russia to resolve 
protracted and new ethno-territorial conflicts in intermediate 
Europe. If a genuine rapprochement between EU/NATO and 
Russia were achieved, it could also enhance cooperation between 
security alliances and build trust in their future relationship. Thus, 
avoiding exclusionary tactics and adopting inclusive policies by 
the two main regional blocs may transform intermediate Europe 
from a “contested” region into an area of effective cooperation75. 
73 “Merkel welcomes Putin’s initiative on sending UN peacekeepers to Eastern 
Ukraine”, Rt.com, 11 September, 2017.
74 J. Rogin, “Putin’s proposal for Ukraine is another trap for Trump”, Washington 
Post, 26 November 2017. 
75 G. Pashayeva, “Security Challenges and Conflict Resolution Efforts in the 
South Caucasus”, in The South Caucasus Between Integration and Fragmentation, 
Bruxelles, SAM, pp. 43-44.
3.  The New Development Bank 
     and Traditional Multilateral 
     Development Banks: 
     A New Level of Competition
Orkhan Baghirov
After the Bretton Woods system was established, international 
financial institutions (IFI) such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) began to be the main drivers of global 
economic development and reconstruction of economies after 
World War II (WWII). The Soviet Union decided not to ratify 
the Bretton Woods Agreement and accused the newly formed 
institutions of serving mostly the interests of the USA and oth-
er powerful European countries1. This difference in views on 
the international order between the West and the Soviet Union, 
stemming from the divergence on Bretton Woods, shaped the 
bipolar environment for decades. In this period, the liberal or-
der strengthened, supported by the ideal of the Washington 
Consensus, spreading its influence not only in Europe but also 
in the Asian continent. During the cycle of poor economic 
performance and high poverty accompanied by the post-war 
restoration of European economies, accepting the liberal order 
was the only option for many developing countries, including 
those in the East and South-East Asian region, in order to get 
financial support for development from the West: the doors of 
Soviet Union were closed to them. 
1 O. Stone and P. Kuznick, The Untold History of  the United States, New York, 
Simon & Schuster, 2012, p. 112.
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The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War created a vacuum in newly independent countries, ena-
bling liberal ideas to be spread more broadly and strengthening 
the position of the United States as global power2. This post-bi-
polar international order increased the influence of Western-led 
development institutions, making them a lender last resort for 
the developing world. The increasing role of these institutions 
also stemmed from the fact that in the first years of the bipolar 
order, many regional players in the non-Western world  did 
not have sufficient power not to agree with the Washington 
Consensus, for fear of being prevented access to international 
financial resources. 
However, the development strategies promoted by the IMF 
and the World Bank – based on liberal economic ideas – did 
not help many newly-independent post-communist and devel-
oping countries to solve their economic and social problems 
and develop efficient market economies. Hasty actions and rec-
ommendations by the IFIs for these countries, whose economic 
structures were not ready for this kind of rapid transition, led 
to undesirable results. Therefore, attempts of fast capitalism in 
Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, the failure of the neo-
liberal experiment in Latin America and the highly circumspect 
nature of the evidence on global growth, inequality and poverty 
have turned out to be influential in restraining the rise of neo-
liberalism which made policies of IFIs inefficient3.
Failure of Washington Consensus policies was related to the 
false assumption that only liberal powers can provide sustaina-
ble growth and development. Advocates of this idea celebrated 
the end of Cold War as an everlasting victory of liberal order. 
One of these advocates in his famous article wrote that “What 
we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War or 
the passing of a particular period of post-war history; that is the 
2 A. Wenger and D. Zimmermann, International Relations: From the Cold War to the 
Globalized World, New Delhi, Viva Books, 2004.
3 M. Beeson and Iy. Islam, “Neoliberalism and East Asia: Resisting the Washington 
Consensus”, Journal of  Development Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, 2005, pp.197-219. 
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end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universal-
isation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government”4. However, next decades accompying by financial 
crises and social problems that resulted from capitalist policies 
proved this traditional assumption wrong paving way to the rise 
of illiberal powers. 
Nonetheless, not all the countries fully followed policy recom-
mendations of IFIs. Some East-Asian countries including China 
and South Korea cooperated with them. At the same time, they 
never gave up their national interest on rapid liberalisation pol-
icies, which enabled them to get high economic growth figures. 
Within the framework of the development of the South-East 
Asian region, in a short period of time, South Korea became an 
industrialised country, and China gradually became the second 
economy in the world. The high rate of economic growth in 
these countries was made possible by the patient approach and 
the effective control of governments while liberalising domes-
tic markets and foreign trade. Despite these effective strategies, 
these countries were not able to fully avoid the negative effects 
of liberal economic policies, as they all faced financial crises 
in 1997. Because of crisis IMF was criticised by some scholars 
for its neoliberal conditionality which allegedly built upon on 
one-size-fits-all principles and aggravated the situation by disre-
garding the fundamentals of “Asian capitalism”5. However, high 
savings rates and effective investment policies helped them over-
come each crisis and return to their previous growth rate. 
Development of South-East Asian region without full liber-
al policies, Asian financial crisis, 2008 financial crisis, increased 
inequality and other factors weakened position and credibil-
ity of Washington Consensus policies creating efficient envi-
ronment for rise of illiberal powers such as Russia and China. 
Rise of them along with other developing countries challenges 
4 F. Fukuyama, “The End of  History?”, The National Interest, no. 16, 1989, pp. 
3-18.
5 P. Clemens, “Between ‘Washington Consensus’ and ‘Asian Way’”, Journal of  
Contemporary Japan, vol.15, no. 1, 2004, pp. 281-314.  
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traditional global governance. Even though big rising states has 
its own national interests they also sees itself as a defender and 
promoter of the collective concerns of the global South and as 
a bridge between the top tier, to which it has now moved, and 
the bottom rungs which such represents a serious limitation to 
collaborative global governance6. It seems that Russia’s entrance 
to the global stage as revisionist force attempting not only to 
destabilize the system of international governance, but also to 
discredit Western principles and norms during a time when the 
liberal democracies have lost their normative mission7 can be 
applicable to other emerging countries. Unlike the Russia China 
implementing this strategy for its empowerment ambitions more 
cautiously and less aggressively without being noticeable spoiler 
of global order as it excessively benefited from globalisation.
The formation of BRICS and New Development Bank 
(NDB) of this association was the result of this global process-
es. Focusing mostly on sustainable development and renewable 
energy in member countries, the NDB aims to bolster its in-
vestments and become a powerful regional financial institution. 
The launch of the NDB spurs questions such as whether the 
NDB will be a complement or a substitute to traditional IFIs 
and multilateral development banks (MDB), and whether it 
will be able to compete with these institutions. This study aims 
to answer these questions and determine the future relations 
between development organisations. On this purpose descrip-
tive approach is used. This will enable us to understand the rise 
and fall of Bretton Woods system and Washington Consensus 
policies that created environment for the creation of NDB. 
Afterwards comparing action strategies of NDB with the strat-
egies that have been used by traditional IFIs we will try to find 
answers to the before mentioned questions.   
6 A.S. Alexandroff  and A.F. Cooper, Rising States, Rising Institutions, Washington, 
D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 7.
7 L. Shevtsova, What Should the World Fear: The Rise or Decline of  Illiberal 
Powers?, Brookings, 2 December 2014.
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The development and collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system 
and the Washington Consensus policies 
The Bretton Woods system 
and the formation of development institutions
The Establishment of the Bretton Woods system was meant 
to solve the problems that were experienced in the period of 
the gold standard and the Great Depression and to rebuild the 
global economy after WWII. To reach these goals, the system 
aimed to increase cooperation between countries on monetary 
and development issues in order to maintain global economic 
stability and prosperity. The Bretton Woods system was created 
after the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference 
was held in July 1944 at the Mount Washington Hotel in 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, where delegates from for-
ty-four nations created a new international monetary system8. 
Even though the Bretton Woods system was established close 
to the end of the Word War II, the reasons that called for the 
existence of such system go back to the interwar period. After 
World War I, when the global economy and monetary systems 
were damaged, countries rushed to restore financial and eco-
nomic stability and saw gold standard as a best option. During 
the 1920s the vast majority of the major countries succeeded in 
returning to gold standard9. To achieve these goals, after many 
discussions the gold standard was re-established in many lead-
ing economies, requiring countries to back their circulating 
money by reserves of gold and foreign currencies. However, the 
gold standard became inefficient as the main currencies were 
overvalued or undervalued. This volatile situation disrupted the 
8 S. K. Ghizoni, Creation of  the Bretton Woods System, Federal Reserve History, 22 
November 2013.
9 R.G. Hubbard, Financial Markets and Financial Crises, Chicago, University of  
Chicago Press, 1991, p. 35.
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global economy and financial relations and paved the way to 
the Great Depression, which began in 1929. In order to reduce 
the balance of payment deficit and increase export potential, 
countries began to deflate their currencies. The countries that 
used this strategy earlier than the others were able to get some 
benefits. However, after some time, when many countries be-
gan to adopt the same strategy, this led to high levels of unem-
ployment and inflation, which resulted in bankruptcy of finan-
cial institutions and enterprises. After the Great Depression, 
the economic situation forced many countries to abandon the 
gold standard. 
Creation of a new international monetary order at Bretton 
Woods was predicated on the belief that the mistakes related to 
wildly fluctuating exchange rates after World War I and the col-
lapse of the short-lived gold exchange standard of the interwar 
period were to be avoided10. Along with international monetary 
system two important financial institutions were established: 
the IMF and the IBRD (which later became part of the World 
Bank Group). To make the monetary system efficient, the ex-
change rate targeting system allowed for parities with a maxi-
mum deviation of 1%. All countries were required to peg their 
currencies to a reserve currency (the US dollar). They had to 
buy and sell US dollars in order to keep the 1% plus-and-minus 
parity in their exchange rates. The aim of using this exchange 
rate targeting was to avoid the exchange rate volatility that was 
experienced during the gold standard era, which was the main 
barrier to the development of international trade. Therefore, 
the US dollar came to play the role of gold in this new mone-
tary system. As all other currencies were pegged to the dollar, 
the dollar itself was the only currency to be pegged to the value 
of gold11.
10 M.D. Bordo and B. Eichengreen, A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: 
Lessons for International Monetary Reform, Chicago, University of  Chicago Press, 
1991, p. 28. 
11 Ibid., p. 37.
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To maintain the efficiency of this new monetary system, the 
IMF implemented a regulatory function, supervising and con-
sulting member countries on monetary problems. The main 
goal of the establishment of the IMF was to safeguard the stabil-
ity of the system of exchange rates and international payments, 
in order to avoid a repetition of the competitive devaluations 
that had contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s12. 
Therefore, the IMF began to offer financial support to Bretton 
Woods countries. By supporting the lift of global trade restric-
tions, the IMF also supported growth in world trade relations. 
The other institution created within the Bretton Woods system, 
the IBRD, was responsible for the post-war reconstruction of 
Europe and for supporting the development of international 
trade. Using its own capital, the IBRD made loans to countries 
in need and helped accelerate the recovery process in European 
countries. Even after becoming part of the World Bank, the 
IBRD carries on its development strategy by helping countries 
eliminate poverty and raise their living standards. For many 
decades after its establishment, the IBRD was a main financial 
source for developing countries.       
Despite its ambitious goals and important role in maintain-
ing the international monetary system, the Bretton Woods sys-
tem did not last long and began to collapse at the beginning 
of the 1970s. The announcement by US President Richard M. 
Nixon of a  new economic policy, the so-called “Nixon Shock”, 
marked the beginning of the end of the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates13. The collapse of the system resulted 
from the overvaluation of the US dollar. By the 1960s, be-
cause of the US’s large foreign investments and its high military 
spending, the Bretton Woods system crumbled as gold reserves 
were not enough to back printed US dollars. Despite efforts by 
previous US Presidents to restrict foreign lending, decrease the 
volume of foreign aid, and implement reforms in the  domestic 
12 IMF, Why the IMF was created and how it works. 
13 D.A. Irwin, “The Nixon shock after forty years: the import surcharge revisit-
ed”, World Trade Review, vol.12, no. 1, 2013, pp. 29-56.  
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monetary system, the dollar remained overvalued. As a result, 
in August 1971, Nixon announced a new economic policy 
whose main pillars were the suspension of the convertibility of 
the US dollar to gold and a 10% import tariff. The monetary 
agreement that was adopted afterwards, called “Smithsonian 
Agreement” lasted only 15 months. In March 1973, the six 
members of the European Community tied their currencies to-
gether and jointly floated against the US dollar, a decision that 
effectively signalled the abandonment of the Bretton Woods 
fixed exchange rate system in favour of the current system of 
floating exchange rates14. Despite the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, its development institutions survived.  
The development of the Washington Consensus 
policies and MDBs in the post-bipolar period
The end of the Bretton Woods system went hand in hand with 
the rise of neoliberal, pro-market ideas and policies. During the 
Bretton Woods era, the level of intervention of countries in their 
own economies was high. At that time, this was crucial because 
the “Great Depression” and WWII necessitated government in-
tervention in order to reconstruct wrecked economies. However, 
by the mid-1970s, the Keynesian approach, which supported 
government intervention began to lose prominence due to 
the high level of unemployment and economic stagnation15. 
Neoliberal ideas and policies came to dominate the global eco-
nomic order. The Washington Consensus framework itself was 
based on “neoliberal” policies, promoted by Washington-based 
international institutions and MDBs. Working closely with de-
veloping countries, MDBs supported their economic develop-
ment process by offering financial capital and policy recommen-
dations. In most cases, developed countries in MDBs played 
14 D. Dongsheng, W. Coats and Z. Yuxuan, “Why Does the World Need a 
Reserve Asset with a Hard Anchor”, Frontiers of  Economics in China, vol.12, no. 4, 
2017, pp. 545-570.
15 T.I. Palley, “From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism: Shifting Paradigms in 
Economics”, Foreign Policy In Focus, 5 May 2004.
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the role of donors and developing countries became borrowers. 
MDBs mostly finance long-term projects through favourable 
interest rates16. While the IBRD (World Bank) was the first and 
biggest MDB to be established during the Bretton Woods years, 
several other MDBs were established afterwards. Examples 
abound: the European Investment Bank, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the Islamic Development 
Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF).
The term “Washington Consensus” was  coined by John 
Williamson in 1990 and included ten main policy recommen-
dations17: avoidance of large fiscal deficits; redirection of public 
spending to education, healthcare and infrastructure invest-
ment; broadening of the tax base; market-determined interest 
rates; application of competitive exchange rates; trade liberal-
isation; foreign direct investment liberalisation; privatisation 
of state enterprises; market deregulation; security of property 
rights. These policy recommendations mostly encouraged to 
reduce the role of government in the economy and to push for 
a market-based economy.
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, its financial 
institutions became the main promoters of the liberal economic 
order. Therefore, the MDBs were urged to provide advice and 
lending to a large number of new countries following the fall of 
the Soviet Union18 which increased the influence and power of 
MDBs both geographically and economically. In the post-bi-
polar era, the number of countries that cooperated with MDBs 
and used their liberal economic prescriptions in transition pro-
cesses increased. That, in turn, strengthened the influence of the 
Washington Consensus policies on the global economic order.
16 V. Bhargava, Global Issues For Global Citizens, Washington, D.C., The World 
Bank, 2006, p. 394. 
17 J. Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, 1 November 2002, online edition.
18 J.A. Gurria and P. Volcker, The Role of  the Multilateral Development Banks in 
Emerging Market Economies, Washington D.C., Carnegie, p. 6. 
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Despite its good intentions, MDBs’ policy recommenda-
tions within the Washington Consensus framework did not 
help most of the developing countries. Economic liberalisation 
left most of the developing countries depending on MDB fi-
nancing as they faced difficulties in repaying significant debts. 
As Joseph Stiglitz, an American economist, discussed in his 
book titled Globalization and Its Discontents, the failure of the 
Washington Consensus policies was related to the fact that the 
economies of most developing countries were not ready to such 
rapid liberalisations19. Their unpreparedness was related to the 
fact that they did not have competitive markets and credible 
financial systems. Urging the same prescriptions in all develop-
ing countries without accurate prior analysis led to the ineffi-
ciency of the Washington Consensus policies. 
On the contrary, developing countries in Asia such as China and 
South Korea, which did not follow the policy recommendations 
of the Washington Consensus, thus maintaining government in-
tervention in the economy, had more successful development sto-
ries. This contradiction significantly affected the reputation of the 
Washington Consensus policies, highlighting the importance of 
government regulation. The financial crises experienced by many 
Asian countries, such as the one in 1997 and the global financial 
crisis in 2008 also showed the inefficiency of the liberal economic 
order. With the beginning of 2008 financial crisis, the worst since 
the Great Depression, the dream of global free market capitalism 
died20 which also marked the end of the Washington Consensus 
era. To prevent a worsening in the crisis, governments intervened 
in economies by bailing out banks and financial institutions. 
These crises proved that, even though liberal economic policies 
promote economic growth, they also increase risks that may lead 
to crises. It is not a coincidence that the economies of Asian coun-
tries which did not follow liberal prescriptions were more resilient 
during crisis periods, managing to keep their growth rate. 
19 J.E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents, New-York, W.W. Norton & Company, 
2002, p. 89.
20 M. Wolf, The shifts and shocks, London, Penguin Books, 2014, p. 16.
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The inefficiency of the Washington Consensus and the pro-
longed influence of the financial crisis on Western countries 
created an opportunity for developing countries, especially 
China, to thrive and become financially self-sustainable. The 
increased economic power of developing countries also raised 
their demands to control MDBs that were, until then, seen as 
serving only the interests of Western countries. However, de-
veloping countries were met with a resistance and were forced 
to launch new associations like the BRICS and development 
organisations like the NDB that can serve the interests of the 
developing world. Just like the fact that government-oriented 
and successful development models of East Asian countries 
now coexist in parallel with fully liberal market economies in 
the West, new development banks have now joined the ranks 
of traditional MDBs. Their aim is not to repeat the same mis-
takes of traditional MDBs, opting for a fairer approach toward 
member countries.    
The establishment of the NDB and its goals
The creation of the NDB and the focus of its strategy
The NDB was created by BRICS countries. BRICS is an as-
sociation of some of the main developing countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) with growing na-
tional economies and an important role in regional affairs. In 
2015, these countries accounted for 26.5% of the world’s land 
area, 42.6% of the world population and 22.6% of the world 
GDP, contributing to more than 50% of the world econom-
ic growth during the last 10 years21. The idea of creating the 
NDB was first discussed in 2012, during the fourth BRICS 
Summit in New Delhi. In 2014, during the sixth BRICS 
Summit in Fortaleza, the leaders signed the Agreement 
21 BRICS, What is BRICS.
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establishing the NDB and, in February 2016, with the signing 
of the Headquarters Agreement with the government of China 
and the Memorandum of Understanding with the Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government, the NDB became fully op-
erational22. In the same year, the Bank approved loans of over 
US$1.5 billion to finance renewable energy and transportation 
projects. The members of the Bank hold an equal share both in 
equity and voting. The NDB’s Articles of Agreement also noted 
that any member of the United Nations could get membership 
in the bank. However, the BRICS countries’ voting power could 
never be lower than 55%. The creation of the NDB is an ex-
pression of the growing role of BRICS and other emerging mar-
kets and developing countries (EMDCs) in the world economy, 
and their greater willingness to act independently in matters 
of international economic governance and development23. The 
NDB will rely on the proven financial model of other MDBs 
to contribute to the investment needs of the founding mem-
bers and other EMDCs. Several partnership agreements have 
already been signed with international development organisa-
tions, national development banks, and commercial banks. The 
NDB is mandated to mobilize resources for infrastructure and 
sustainable development projects in EMDCs, complementing 
existing efforts of MDBs. According to the NDB’s “General 
Strategy: 2017 – 2021”, the Bank focuses on three broad areas:
New relationships. Equality, mutual respect, and trust will 
be the main features these relationships. The NDB supports 
development projects in order to fulfil the needs of countries, 
while respecting their development strategies and sovereignty. 
While the NDB’s membership is open to advanced countries as 
well, it will remain governed by EMDCs. Despite big variations 
in the economic size of its member countries, the NDB was 
established on an equal share basis, which is 20% of shares for 
each of its five members. 
22 NDB, ABOUT US.
23 NDB, NDB’s General Strategy: 2017 – 2021, p. 3.
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New projects and instruments. Financing sustainable de-
velopment infrastructure constitutes the core of the NDB’s 
operational strategy and, according to the General Strategy, 
the bank is planning to devote about two-thirds of financing 
commitments in this area between 2017-2021. The NDB is 
also planning to fill the gap in technical expertise financing in 
sustainable infrastructure development. The NDB is planning 
to use numerous financing instruments such as guarantees, syn-
dicated loans with private investors, equity investments, project 
bonds, and co-financing arrangements with IFIs. One of the 
key components of the NDB’s financing strategy is the local 
currency financing, which will decrease risks for borrowers, in-
stead supporting their capital markets.  
New approaches. The NDB will rely on new approaches 
in reviewing and implementing its projects. The NDB aims to 
be fast, flexible, and efficient by designing a more streamlined 
project review and implementation oversight without unnec-
essary bureaucracy24. A lean and flat organisational structure 
will result in lower administrative costs and more efficient de-
cision-making. A non-resident Board of Directors also reduces 
administrative costs and allow the bank to focus on complex 
projects, rather than routine day-to-day operations.
Analysing the current economic situation and the main 
points of the NDB’s strategy, we can outline several main rea-
sons for creating the NDB: 
Lack of Investments. There is a significant lack of invest-
ments in the maintenance of existing infrastructure and in 
financing new infrastructure projects around the world. The 
capabilities of current MDBs are not sufficient to meet the 
rapidly growing demand for large-scale infrastructure invest-
ments, especially in developing countries. According to a 2013 
McKinsey Global Institute report  based on projected GDP 
growth, US$57 trillion in new infrastructure investment would 
24 NDB, NDB’s General Strategy: 2017 – 2021, p. 4.
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be required globally in the period 2013-203025. This amounts 
to US$3.2 trillion per year. That’s nearly 60% more compared 
to the US$36 trillion spent over the previous 18 years until 
2013. This substantial increase in demand for investments cre-
ates a huge financial gap that cannot be closed by the financing 
of traditional MDBs. The investment scarcity confronted by 
MDBs is linked to high economic growth in developing coun-
tries and a lack of investment by developed countries after the 
2008 financial crisis. The creation of the NDB is part of a pro-
cess undertaken by developing countries to fill the investment 
void left by developed countries.
Position imbalances. Voting rights of the BRICS countries 
in the IBRD and IMF do not reflect their share of global GDP 
(Table 1). For example, with a share of 14.83% in global GDP, 
China only owns 4.53% of votes in the IBRD and 6.09% in the 
IMF. On the opposite, countries such as the United Kingdom, 
France, and Japan have a share of total votes in the IBRD and 
the IMF that is higher than their share of GDP. If we com-
pare the size of the population, the imbalance is even larger. 
Together, China and India are home to 36.4% of global popu-
lation but their voting share in the IBRD is 7.5% and 8.73% in 
the IMF. This implies that any decision taken by the IBRD and 
the IMF serves the interests of a small part of the world popu-
lation who could be unaware of social and economic problems 
in other countries.
 
25 R. Dobbs, H. Pohl, D-Yi Lin, J. Mischke, N. Garemo, J. Hexter, S. Matzinger, 
R. Palter, and R. Nanavatty, Infrastructure productivity: How to save $1 trillion a 
year, McKinsey, January 2013.  
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Tab. 1 - Share of GDP, population, and votes in the IBRD and 
the IMF for BRICS and a selection of developed countries
Source: IBRD subscriptions and voting power of member countries, 
World Bank database, and IMF
Reforms aimed at addressing imbalances between the grow-
ing weight of developing countries and emerging economies 
in the global economy and their disproportionately weak po-
sitions in the MDBs are implemented very slowly26. This un-
fair approach pushed developing countries into creating new 
26 A. Shelepov, “Comparative Prospects of  the New Development Bank and 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, International Organisations Research Journal, 
vol. 11, no. 3, 2016, pp. 51-67.
Share in global 
GDP 
(2016)
Share in world 
population 
(2016)
Share of votes 
in the IBRD 
(2017, Oct)
Share of votes 
in the IMF 
(2017, Oct)
Brazil 2.38% 2.78% 1.82% 2.22%
Russia 1.72% 1.94% 2.84% 2.59%
India 3.05% 17.8% 2.98% 2.64%
China 14.83% 18.55% 4.53% 6.09%
South Africa 0.40% 0.74% 0.77% 0.64%
Total BRICS 22.38% 41.80% 12.94% 14.18%
United States 24.64% 4.34% 16.28% 16.52%
Germany 4.64% 1.1% 4.11% 5.32%
United 
Kingdom 3.44% 0.89% 3.85% 4.03%
France 3.31% 0.90% 3.85% 4.03%
Japan 6.50% 1.69% 7.02% 6.15%
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development banks. For decades, developing countries turned 
a blind eye to this unfair approach because they were depend-
ent on the financial resources of MDBs. Nevertheless, those 
developing countries that decided to use the MDBs’ financial 
support more cautiously, preventing financial bubbles, achieved 
high growth rates which, in turn, enabled them to significant-
ly increase their role in the global economy. This growth path 
gradually decreased their dependence on MDBs’ financing. The 
accumulation of large reserves in developing countries, espe-
cially in China, has given further impetus to the creation of 
new institutions. In 2015, BRICS countries possessed 53% of 
foreign exchange reserves globally27. 
Ineffective approach to social problems. The creation of 
the NDB is also linked to the fact that the prescriptions of tra-
ditional MDBs were not successful in healing social problems 
such as poverty and inequality. Their macro-level approach 
toward ailing economies was not able to solve the problems 
that lead to political instability and social discontent. The 
Washington Consensus policies at the core of the traditional 
IFIs strategies have allowed some countries to develop and in-
crease their economic size. However, these developments were 
accompanied by  increasing levels of inequality. In most cases, 
high levels of inequality led to high poverty, worsening social 
problems. Many of the countries, both developed and develop-
ing, that strictly followed the rules of the liberal order and of 
globalisation ended up with a system that enables the rich to 
get richer and makes the poor poorer. According to the Credit 
Suisse Research Institute’s Global Wealth Report, 0.7% of the 
global population (365 million) owned 45.6% of total global 
wealth, while 73.2% of the world population (3.5 billion) in 
the bottom owned only 2.4% of total global wealth in 2016. 
Therefore, the NDB aims to address these social issues by us-
ing its operational focus on basic infrastructure to give urgent 
responses in order to reduce poverty and inequality, improve 
27 NDB, Investor Presentation, p. 5.
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quality of life, and expand economic opportunities for billions 
of people in EMDCs. 
The NDB against traditional MDBs 
Analysing the areas in which the NDB aims to offer ‘new’ re-
sponses, one notes that the NDB focuses on the very issues that 
traditional MDBs are blamed for and which damaged their rep-
utation. Being among the main drivers of liberal economic pol-
icies in developing countries, MDBs began to lose their impor-
tance as their policies were not enough to overcome economic 
and social problems. Especially after the financial crisis in 2008, 
the consequences of which were the process of creation of mas-
sive fictitious financial wealth, that began in the 1980s, and of 
the hegemony of a reactionary ideology (neoliberalism) based 
on self-regulated and efficient markets28, liberal economic order 
become main target of criticism. As a result, the current eco-
nomic situation called for a change in the structure of MDBs. 
This necessity was not taken into account by MDBs and the 
small changes in their structure were not enough to restore con-
fidence in these organisations. The weak reaction of MDBs is 
partly related to the unequal power held by member countries 
within these organisations. Countries that have more voting 
rights turn their own interests into a priority, as the liberal eco-
nomic ideas dictate, and they show an unwillingness to adopt 
the new changes that could be beneficial mostly to EMDCs. 
Therefore, the NDB was launched to address these existing and 
unresolved problems through its new strategy and structure.
In most cases, the high voting share held by big powers, such 
as the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, led 
to the acceptance of policies that, on some level, undermined 
the sovereignty of the other members29. On the one hand, as 
28 L.C. Bresser-Pereira, “The 2008 financial crisis and neoclassical economics”, 
Brazilian Journal of  Political Economy, vol. 30, no. 1, 2010, pp. 3-26.
29 M. Davies and R. Woodward, International Organizations: A Companion, 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014, p. 249.
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the main lenders of financial resources, it is natural that big 
powers would be willing to dictate policies over other coun-
tries, advancing their own interests, on the other hand, the aim 
of the launch of traditional MDBs was different than it ap-
pears to be. As the big powers are the main supporters of the 
Washington Consensus, their interests tend to converge as all 
of them promote trade liberalisation, opening up of the finan-
cial markets, and privatisation. This overlap in interests was the 
main driver for giving up sovereignty, and this environment 
within MDBs fostered mutual respect and trust between mem-
bers. Therefore, NDB intends to address these issues by form-
ing new relations with the members based on mutual respect, 
trust and  non-interference to the sovereignty and democracy 
of member countries30. This new strategy keeps the door open 
to the involvement of developed countries within the organisa-
tion: they can join any time, by declaring that they are willing 
to leave the governance of the NDB in the hands of EMDCs31. 
This requirement is evidence of the concern that developed 
countries would try to gain power over developing countries 
and implement their self-serving strategies. By employing this 
new strategy, the NDB aims to prevent the destructive results 
of self-serving strategies.
The NDB targeted its operational strategies on current eco-
nomic and social demands rather than income maximisation 
through free-market policies. Formation of this focus is related 
to the fact that developing countries are likely to suffer most 
from the negative impacts of climate change. This is due to 
the economic importance of climate-sensitive sectors for these 
countries, and to their limited human, institutional, and finan-
cial capacity to respond to effects of climate change32. Based on 
the acknowledgment that environmental problems and pov-
erty create threats for the citizens of developing countries by 
30 NDB, NDB’s General Strategy: 2017 – 2021, p. 3.
31 Ibid., p. 10.
32 R. Goldberg, Understanding Contemporary Social Problems Through Media, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2015, p. 71.
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spreading a number of health and malnutrition problems, 
members of the NDB strongly support projects that tackle 
these issues. Since the late 1980s, during a period of economic 
growth supported by liberal market policies and globalisation, 
developed countries began to rely on cheap labour and weak 
environmental legislations in developing countries, especially 
in China, which enabled them to reduce production costs. In so 
doing, developed countries utterly disregarded the dangerous 
by-products of this strategy, ultimately leaving millions of poor 
people without access to clean air and water. As  promoters of 
liberal economic policies, traditional MDBs took part in this 
process. On the opposite, the member states of the NDB are 
concerned about these issues, as they relate to their own land 
and citizens. As a result, sustainable development and poverty 
reduction became two main pillars of the NDB’s development 
strategy.            
Another feature of the NDB according to officials is that, 
unlike the traditional MDBs, it is not going to be linked to any 
ideological doctrines such as the Chinese model or the Beijing 
consensus, even though China is the most powerful member of 
the bank both from an economic and a political point of view33. 
Given that traditional MDBs have proven to be inefficient, the 
Bank takes a neutral stance towards ideological tenet. The NDB 
is not willing to replicate MDBs’ old models, understanding 
that the dominance of one country’s ideology within the or-
ganisation ends up bolstering the hegemony of that country on 
the decision-making process. This aspect again proves that the 
bank’s aim is to provide a level playing field to members, given 
that an a unequal treatment hampered BRICS countries’ role 
for many years in traditional MDBs. That is why they are not 
willing to repeat the same mistakes that led the organisation 
to become ineffective in implementing their determined goals. 
33 L. Maasdorp, What is “new” about the New Development Bank?, World Economic 
Forum, 26 August 2015. 
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Given that the General Strategy of the NDB reaffirms this 
new approach in the bank’s management, it is fair to assume 
that the decision-making and the evaluation processes of the 
bank will enable borrowers to get access to financial resourc-
es in a shorter period of time, which is an important factor 
in supporting the efficiency of the projects. This approach also 
originated from the fact that in traditional MDBs high levels of 
bureaucracy lengthened the lending process. High levels of bu-
reaucracy and politicisation are two of the main reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of MDBs’ policies and decisions. For example, 
it has been argued that “IMF lending is not a technocratic pro-
cess; rather, the Fund is a highly political institution whose pol-
icies depend on the interests of not only its largest shareholders 
but also its bureaucrats, both of whom exercise partial incom-
plete control over IMF policymaking”34. As a result, rather than 
implementing its main goals and objectives in a timely manner, 
the IMF is subject to bureaucratic and geopolitical ambitions of 
its more powerful members. Acknowledging the negative effects 
of high levels of bureaucracy in MDBs, the governance strategy 
of the NDB aims to avoid cumbersome procedures that would 
slow down the pace of the various projects. 
All the differences between the NDB and the traditional 
MDBs stem from the NDB’s enthusiasm towards innovation 
in almost all aspects of  its activities. The NDB declares that 
the bank’s novelty will be its strength, as it will allow it to avoid 
the existing problems in MDBs that negatively affect their rep-
utation in the global economy. Treating old problems with a 
new approach will enable the NDB to trace the developing 
world’s social and economic problems at their core, which, in 
turn, will contribute to the effectiveness of its financing process. 
Relying on new technologies, methods, and tools in support-
ing the development process of borrower countries, the NDB 
will be able to create new business models that could serve the 
34 M.S. Copelovitch, The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, 
Bonds and Bailouts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 6.
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specific interests of different countries. An increase in the level 
of comprehensiveness, both in offered financial tools and busi-
ness models, will help meet the needs of countries that have a 
wide range of demands in different economic and social sectors. 
If the NDB will be able to effectively pursue all aspects of its 
strategy, the bank will become a key development organisation 
with a large number of members and supporters, and its pol-
icies will make a substantial contribution to the development 
of EMDCs.     
Competition or complementarity? 
The creation of the NDB sparked debates about the main goal 
of this organisation and the role it will play in the realisation of 
future development projects. These discussions necessitated to 
answer questions such as whether the NDB would be a com-
plement or a substitute of traditional MDBs, and whether the 
NDB would be able to compete with these financial institutions. 
For some in the West, the launch of the bank by the BRICS was 
nothing short of a declaration of war35. Regardless of critical or 
welcoming approaches by different countries, commentators all 
agree that the creation of new development banks is evidence of 
the decline of the Western-dominated global order, for which 
Western countries themselves should be blamed. 
Disagreeing with the mainstream opinion on the NDB, 
Leslie Maasdorp, Vice-President of the bank, mentioned that 
there are misconceptions about the bank and its strategy36. 
The first misconception is related to the idea that the bank 
was founded as a rival to the World Bank and the IMF. In his 
speech, the President of the NDB, K.V. Kamath, has stated that 
the objective of the bank is not to challenge or replace the ex-
isting system of development finance – it is instead to improve 
35 J. Techau, Why the West Need Not Fear the BRICS Development Bank, Carnegie, 
16 April 2013.
36 L. Maasdorp (2015).
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and complement it. The NDB will aim to learn from the cu-
mulative experiences and best practices developed over many 
decades by all the existing MDBs.
The second misconception is the notion that the NDB is 
a China-dominated organisation and will serve China’s inter-
ests. Some critics argue that the NDB is part of a grand vision 
referred to as “One Belt, One Road” – a vehicle to broaden 
Chinese influence. The third misconception is the claim that 
the NDB will not uphold the highest standards of good govern-
ance and that the bank’s social and environmental policies will 
be set aside. On the contrary, according to the Vice-President, 
sustainability is core to the bank’s approach, and the bank will 
not compromise on social safeguards. 
Taking into account the reactions of NDB officials to the 
mainstream opinion, the Articles of Agreement that state that 
the NDB will complement existing efforts of MDBs, and agree-
ments signed between the NDB and MDBs, we can conclude 
that the NDB does not aim to rival the existing MDBs. Its 
purpose is to close the financial gap, complementing the efforts 
of the World Bank and the IMF. However, as we noted in the 
previous sections, the focus of the NDB’s strategy is significant-
ly different from traditional MDBs as it aims to be innovative 
and focus on projects and economic sectors which were not 
efficiently financed. The aspects of the NDB’s strategy which 
are new in the framework of traditional MDBs’ operational 
strategy will gradually change the bank’s position in the global 
economy and create a huge distinction between their ideas and 
approaches. As the NDB intends to be new, it cannot achieve 
this “newness” by using the same old strategies, which proved 
not efficient and even led to the creation of the new develop-
ment banks. The breeding ground for the establishment of the 
bank is the product of an unequal approach and incorrect in-
vestments. This distinction between the NDB and MDBs will 
naturally make them competitors even if it is not their goal. If 
the NDB will be successful in implementing its strategy and 
will manage to solve the problems in EMDCs that formed as 
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a result of the mistakes of MDBs, this will increase the role of 
the NDB in the global economy and will become a last resort 
for the EMDCs, lowering these countries’ needs for the devel-
opment banks of the Bretton Woods system. If it happened, it 
would be obvious that the Western countries with the largest 
shares in MDBs, and who, for many years, did not allow devel-
oping countries to increase their voting shares in these organ-
isations, would get jealous and this would create competition 
between the NDB and MDBs.  
Competition between the NDB and MDBs is more of a fu-
ture possibility, given that, at the moment, NDB is too small 
to present an actual challenge to the IMF and the World Bank, 
given its limited capital base compared to the US$232 billion 
of the World Bank37. Taking this situation into account in the 
first stage of its development, it is important and inevitable for 
the NDB to cooperate with traditional MDBs and, at some lev-
el, to rely on their experience. In order to do so, the NDB has to 
declare that it is going to complement the efforts of traditional 
MDBs. Indeed, complementing MDBs at first creates the op-
portunity for the NDB to develop and increase its share in the 
global economy. The current situation also reassures Western 
countries and Western-dominated MDBs. All in all, the finan-
cial capabilities of the NDB are weak and the bank cannot real-
ly be a threat when it comes to competing in the development 
sector. Furthermore, the Western world also believes that the 
NDB will not be successful. 
Another factor that positively affects the relations between 
MDBs and the NDB is the current state of financial affairs. Due 
to the continuous recessions that followed the financial crisis 
in Western countries traditional sources of long-term finance 
are strained, and alternatives have not been able to adequately 
compensate38. At the same time, demand for investment in de-
37 J. Manning, Can The BRICS New Development Bank Compete With The World Bank 
And The IMF?, International Banker, 3 September 2014.
38 O. Canuto, “Development Banks and Post-Crisis Blues in Investment Finance”, 
Huffingtonpost, 2013. 
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veloping countries is growing, calling for new players that can 
help meet this demand39. In this situation, the complementari-
ty efforts of the NDB satisfy both sides. On the one hand, for 
the NDB it is important to complement the efforts of MDBs 
as a way to grow and become part of the global development 
sector; on the other hand,  the lack of investments makes it dif-
ficult for MDBs to meet growing demand, so that it is efficient 
for MDBs to cooperate with the NDB. It is a rational move 
by BRICS, as they founded the NDB right when they had the 
chance to make their bank important for global development 
processes. Therefore, for the time being the economic demands 
and development goals of the NDB overlap with the interests 
of MDBs, creating the environment for a close cooperation. 
There are also some political factors which are important 
in determining the future NDB-MDBs relations. As we men-
tioned, in the West there is a belief that China will dominate 
the NDB and that the bank will serve the interests of a China-
led geopolitical strategy40. To the contrary, the equally-divided 
voting share of the bank also proves that it intends to use a 
fair approach towards its members. However, there are some 
factors that should be noted. First of all, while the NDB is a 
new organisation, China’s economic enlargement strategy has 
a history of decades. Within this enlargement strategy, most of 
the developing countries, especially in the East-Asian region, 
are cooperating with China both voluntarily and compulsorily 
(as the geopolitical situation dictates). Being the most power-
ful player in determining the development path of developing 
countries, China will play a substantial role in the operations 
of the NDB, even though members have equal shares. This is 
linked to the fact that China has the power to pressure member 
countries in other projects or organisations, and can encourage 
countries to agree with its decisions over investment projects. 
On the other hand, this satisfies some developing countries as 
39 R. Dobbs et.al (2013).
40 M. Schiavenza, “How the BRICS New Development Bank Serves China’s 
Interest”, International Business Times, 18 July 2014.
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their interests are aligned with China’s. While these facts do not 
necessarily imply that the NDB will serve China’s interests, it is 
undeniable that room for pressure exists, and that China has a 
willingness to control the bank. It is also common knowledge 
that in many other cases China has shown ambitions to influ-
ence and control other countries in the name of self-serving 
interests. It is possible that, for now, China might not interested 
in exerting influence, because the NDB is in the first stage of 
development and has less importance for China. In the long 
term, should the NDB become a successful and powerful devel-
opment bank, China could consider to use its economic power 
to take over the bank. 
It should also be noted that similarity of development goals 
of NDB links it to the “Beijing Consensus” the concept that 
claims China is marking a path for other nations around the 
world to develop their countries and  fit into the international 
order in a way that allows them to be truly independent and 
to protect their way of life and political choices41. The “Beijing 
Consensus” as a concept has been utilised to distinguish China’s 
economic development experience from the policy toolkit of-
fered to developing countries by Washington-based IFIs42. As 
the one of the main goals of NDB is promote development 
based on equal approach and non-interference to political de-
cisions of countries, this overlaps with main idea of Beijing 
Consensus. However, “Beijing Consensus” attributes to the 
China itself and it does not necessarily mean that ambitious 
China’s approach to other developing countries going to be 
same and they can resist the influence of China using same 
strategies. If we consider members of NDB we can already 
see that dependence on China in some level already exists as 
the Foreign Exchange Reserves of China (US$3.1 trillion43) is 
41 J.C. Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, The Foreign Policy Centre, May 2004. 
42 M. Yağcı, “A Beijing Consensus in the Making: The Rise of  Chinese Initiatives 
in the International Political Economy and Implications for Developing 
Countries”, Journal of  International Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2, 2016, pp. 29-56.
43 J. Cai, “China’s forex reserves hit 11-month high of  US$3.1 trillion”, South 
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bigger than Russia, India and Brazil combined and it has big-
gest proportion in funds of the NDB. Refusal of China’s plans 
to place the NDB headquarters in Shanghai by India and for 
members which have commodity-driven economies China’s ex-
istence as a top trading partner allows us to say that NDB will 
probably not be able to put itself apart from Chinese influence. 
Another important factor is related to the bank’s statement 
in its general strategy that, even though the bank is open for 
membership to all members of the United Nations, BRICS’ 
share may never be lower than 55% and, in any case, the gov-
ernance of the NDB will remain in the hands of EMDCs. These 
statements show that, in the future, the members of the NDB 
are going to use their dominance in the bank just as much the 
developed countries did in traditional MDBs. This shows that 
even though cooperation efforts exist, the hidden competition 
between the two country groups in the governance of MDBs 
is continuing, and may become open if the size of the NDB’s 
financing grows substantially. 
All this shows that the governance ambitions of different 
countries and country groups played a crucial role in the es-
tablishment and operations of MDBs. This very trend is con-
tinuing, with new players and powers aiming to improve their 
geopolitical and economic influence in the global arena. For 
now, it is hard to predict the future relations of the bank with 
traditional MDBs, as we are not sure how successful the bank 
will be. Playing a new and small part in the global economy, 
to some Western big powers the NDB does not appear to be 
such an influential organisation and a promoter of China’s am-
bitions. The same holds true for China, as Beijing either does 
not see the NDB as an influential organisation, at least for now. 
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether the NDB will 
be a complement or a competitor of traditional MDBs depends 
on its future success.
China Morning Post, 9 October 2017, [last accessed on 21 December 2017].
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Conclusion
The current approach to development issues begins in the 
Bretton Woods years, when the IBRD was established as a de-
velopment institution to support the development processes of 
those European countries that were suffering from the results 
of WWII. However, after the rapid recovery of these countries, 
the IBRD widened its geographical influence sphere, support-
ing countries in other continents. Along with the IBRD, oth-
er MDBs were founded, especially during the 1970s, when 
Washington Consensus policies began to dominate the glob-
al economic order and the Bretton Woods System came to an 
end. Over the next decades, with the dominance of liberal ide-
as, MDBs expanded their role in the global economy, becom-
ing a main source of finance and policy recommendations for 
developing countries on development issues. The shift to the 
post-bipolar period after the collapse of the Soviet Union al-
lowed MDBs to expand their influence and spread liberal ideas 
even wider, as the newly independent countries were in need of 
financial support and policy recommendations. 
However, the neoliberal policy recommendations of MDBs 
failed to deliver sustainable economic development and pros-
perity to developing countries, leaving some of them with huge 
debts and economic volatility. This failure was related to the 
high levels of bureaucracy within MDBs, the prioritisation of 
the goals of developed countries, the unfair approach towards 
developing countries, and an underestimation of social prob-
lems among others. As a result, being frequently accompanied 
by financial crises, liberal market policies began to lose their in-
fluence, as they began to be recognised as volatile prescriptions 
for developing countries. The traditional ideas that become 
popular especially after the collapse of communism implying 
that only liberal policies can bring prosperity and development 
failed in next decades showing that even these policies along 
with growth can have disastrous economic and social results. At 
the same time, some developing countries carefully evaluated 
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the shortcomings of these policy recommendations and main-
tained a role for government in the domestic economy. As a 
result using financial resources of MDBs in the first stage they 
were able to get better results which enabled them to have high 
growth rates. These processes also enabled rise of illiberal powers 
such as Russia and China. Failure of liberal order gave chance 
for them to enlarge the sphere of their political and economic 
influence changing geopolitical picture of different regions.
Despite the fact that neoliberal policies are losing their rele-
vance, the declining developed members of MDBs are not yet 
willing to cede more voting shares to developing countries. This 
unfair approach towards developing countries and their in-
creased financial capabilities called for the establishment of new 
economic associations and MDBs that could serve the interests 
of all members, not just powerful ones. The formation of the 
BRICS bloc and its development bank were the part of these 
process. Along with all this, a lack of investments for develop-
ment projects and the ineffective approach to social problems 
by traditional MDBs are also important reasons for the launch 
of the NDB. After the 2008 crisis, the financial capabilities of 
developed countries for financing development projects de-
creased, accompanied by increasing needs in developing coun-
tries, leaving room for new players that could fill this vacuum. 
For this reason, the BRICS established the NDB in order to fill 
the financial gap and support sustainable development projects 
in EMDCs and help them solve their social problems. 
Taking into consideration mistakes and ineffective policies of 
traditional MDBs, the NDB intends to bring something “new” 
in three areas: relationships, projects and instruments, and new 
approaches. Using a fair approach with its members, the NDB 
would mostly finance those development projects that were giv-
en less attention for many years. The NDB would also use new 
approaches in management that would lead to the elimination 
of high levels of bureaucracy, which were a barrier for the effec-
tive use of development strategies in traditional MDBs.     
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All these raises questions about the future relations between 
the NDB and traditional MDBs.  Even though the bank’s of-
ficials insist on the idea that the NDB is going to complement 
the efforts of traditional MDBs and rely on their experience, 
some in the West think that the NDB is going to be a rival to 
Western financial institutions and serve China’s’ interests. We 
can only assume that a close cooperation in the future might 
not be possible. It will depend on how successful the NDB is 
going to be. For now, as the capabilities of the NDB are low, 
IFIs do not see it as a rival and they do not believe that the NDB 
will be successful. Another important fact is that, for now, co-
operation satisfies both sides as there is a need for new players 
to fill the gap in financing development projects, and the NDB 
needs to learn from the experiences of traditional MDBs. Any 
shift in balance could also change the character of the NDB-
MDBs relations.
Given that, for now, Western countries do not perceive the 
NDB as a rival because of its low financial capabilities com-
pared to MDBs, China also does not perceive the NDB as a 
powerful platform for its own geopolitical ambitions. However, 
despite the fact that all members of the NDB have an equal 
share, China retains its levers on other members in case the 
NDB is successful in the future. This could lead to strong com-
petition between the NDB and MDBs. Therefore, it is not yet 
possible to say whether the NDB will be complement or rival 
to the traditional MDBs: it will depend on its future success. 
If it will be successful enough, it will attract the attention of 
China and Western countries as a powerful institution. This 
will necessarily lead to competition, as cooperation would be 
impossible under these circumstances.

PART II 
 
THE SUPER-NATIONAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

4.  South Caucasus as a Regional 
     Security Complex: 
     Divergence of Identity 
     and Interdependence of Security
Farhad Mammadov, Azad Garibov
Three former Soviet states, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, 
are widely perceived as a single region – the South Caucasus 
(SC), located at the juncture of Asia and Europe. However, 
a closer look reveals that the South Caucasus has never been 
a true “region”, as it lacks the common features that would 
qualify it as such. In fact, despite being called a region, they 
have three different foreign policy identities; the three coun-
tries have neither developed common and inclusive economic 
and security cooperation, nor established any kind of regional 
integration framework. Nor do they share a common culture, 
language or religion, and have never been a part of the same 
civilisation. Two of the three countries of the region – Armenia 
and Azerbaijan – are at war with one another, due to Armenia’s 
occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognised 
territory. Separatist sentiments in the Georgian Samtskhe-
Javakheti region, supported by nationalists in Armenia, have 
from time to time generated fears of an additional inter-state 
conflict within the region. The three countries have also made 
divergent and sometimes conflicting foreign alliance and align-
ment choices, further deepening divisions within the “region”. 
Armenia is a close Russian ally and CSTO member; Georgia 
orients its foreign policy towards the United States and Europe; 
while Azerbaijan is allied to Turkey, and cooperates with both 
Russia and the United States pursuing a multi-vector, pragmat-
ic and balanced foreign policy. 
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While foreign policy identities so notoriously diverge in the 
South Caucasus, there is one key common denominator that 
ties the regional counties together – the interconnectedness of 
security risks. The SC can only reasonably be described as a re-
gion from the security perspective. The major security threats as 
perceived by these states emanate from within the region or its 
immediate neighbourhood. Any security dynamic significantly 
affecting one of the three countries has clear implications for 
the other two.  Thus, as the article argues, in terms of security 
studies, the SC qualifies as a distinct regional security complex 
(RSC). As small countries with limited capabilities, interests 
and agendas, the major security environment of the South 
Caucasus states is the region itself and its close neighbourhood. 
Based on the tenets of Buzan and Waever’s RSC theory, the 
paper examines the security dynamics in the South Caucasus 
Regional Security complex in order to uncover why and how 
the security of three countries is both interconnected as well as 
linked to the region and its neighbourhood. It also looks at the 
foreign policy identities that the three countries have developed 
since independence, in order to uncover the reasons behind so 
divergent foreign and security policy. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. First part provides 
overview of the major features of the foreign policy identities 
of the SC states, focusing on how differences in identities drive 
divergent foreign and security policy choices in the region. The 
second part examines the interconnected and interdepend-
ent nature of security in the South Caucasus, focusing on the 
major threats from within region itself, which strongly affect 
(even shape) security and foreign policies across all three south 
Caucasus countries. The third part focuses on the regional co-
operation frameworks that South Caucasus states managed to 
establish among themselves and their neighbours despite osten-
sible divergence of foreign policy identities and foreign/security 
policies. 
South Caucasus as a Regional Security Complex 113
Geopolitical and foreign policy identities 
in the South Caucasus
Multifaceted and multilayer geopolitical identity 
of Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan has a complex and multilayered geopolitical iden-
tity that includes geographical, historical, religious and cul-
tural components. Azerbaijan is a European country fitting in 
with Western values while simultaneously adhering to Islam 
and associated traditional values, while also having the iden-
tity strongly influenced by the country’s Turkic origin, com-
mon history with Russia and post-Soviet space1. Identity has 
traditionally played an important role in shaping foreign policy 
of the country, including its relations with the neighbouring 
countries and global partners. 
Geographically, Azerbaijan is located in Europe and joined 
the Council of Europe in 2001. Although it decided against 
signing an association agreement with the EU in 2014, the 
EU is Azerbaijan’s biggest trade partner. It accounted for 35% 
of Azerbaijan’s foreign trade turnover and 43% of exports in 
20162. Both parties are interested in promoting energy and 
transport cooperation. The parties are partnering in realisation 
of the Southern Gas Corridor to deliver Azerbaijani gas to the 
EU and a railway line from Baku to Kars via Tbilisi, Georgia. 
Azerbaijan is a predominantly Muslim country, howev-
er, with strong traditions separation of state and religion and 
long habit of state secularism. Islam has always been one of 
the key defining factors of national identity of Azerbaijanis. 
The country is an active member of Organization for Islamic 
1 I. Murad, “Postcolonial Hybridity, Contingency, and the Mutual Embeddedness 
of  Identity and Politics in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Some Initial Thoughts”, 
Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 77, September 2015, p. 7.
2 Ministry of  Economics, Foreign Trade Relations, 2016, hiip://economy.gov.
az/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4056:ai-xt-2016&cat
id=129:xarici-ticaret-2016&lang=az.  
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Cooperation, and cooperates with many major Muslim coun-
tries such as Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and etc.  In 2017, 
Baku hosted the Islamic Solidarity Games, which is evidence of 
Azerbaijan’s intention to work towards Islamic unity.  
Culturally and linguistically, Azerbaijan is a part of the 
Turkic World and as such it joined the process of Turkic in-
tegration in the 1990s. Azerbaijan, together with other Turkic 
neighbours have established several cooperation platforms 
such as Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries, 
TURKSOY and most importantly, in 2009, Azerbaijan, Turkey, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan met in Nakhchivan (Azerbaijan) to 
create the Turkic Council (the Cooperation Council of Turkic-
Speaking States or CCTS). 
For the past 200 years, Azerbaijan was part of the Russian 
Empire and the Soviet Union and is now a member of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Azerbaijan val-
ues the CIS as a platform of political and economic interaction 
with the former Soviet republics. Visa-free travel and econom-
ic incentives, which go together with CIS membership, help 
Azerbaijan maintain stable trade and also develop mutually 
beneﬁcial military-technical and cultural cooperation with 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The CIS countries 
accounted for 16% of Azerbaijan’s trade in 20163, most of it 
non-resource trade, which is strategically important and highly 
promising for Azerbaijan in light of low oil prices. 
The complex geopolitical theatre of the South Caucasus has 
significantly influenced Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. The country 
adheres the principle of pragmatism in its foreign relations, re-
jects “ideologisation” of external policy and pursues multi-vec-
tor foreign policy and at the same time trying to distant itself 
from confrontations of big and regional powers. 
Unlike its neighbours, Georgia and Armenia, which have 
made a clear and binding choices in terms of their geopolitical 
orientation – Georgia making Euro-Atlantic integration with 
3 Ibid.  
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membership of the European Union (EU) and NATO a pri-
ority, and Armenia joining the Russian-led Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) and more recently the Eurasian 
Economic Union – Baku pursues a balanced multi-vector for-
eign policy4. It is not surprising that to advance its pragmat-
ic and balanced multi-vector foreign policy, on 25 May 2011, 
Azerbaijan became the fourth former Soviet republic (following 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Belarus) to enter full member-
ship in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)5. Thus, the coun-
try has never limited itself to a one certain foreign policy direc-
tion and cares about having positive relations as many countries 
as possible to increase its opportunities for mutually beneficial 
cooperation with them, to keep its options open in case crises 
and to have more secure neighbourhood.
One more guiding principle of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is 
projecting the image of Azerbaijan as a responsible partner in 
all its international relations. For a country seeking a balanced 
foreign policy, it is very important to maintain a stable position 
on global and regional issues. A related principle is thus that 
of being a “responsible partner” in its foreign relations. Indeed 
to achieve an effective and balanced foreign policy, Azerbaijan 
needs to act as a stable and predictable actor6. Respecting the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and non-inter-
ference in their internal affairs are the important features of 
Baku’s interaction with other countries in this regard7.  
Principled position in its external relations and commit-
ment to international law has paid off. Azerbaijan became the 
4 M. Heydar and I. Korobov, “Pragmatic Policies And Interplay of  Forces – 
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Amidst Turkey And Iran”, in F. Mammadov and F. 
Chiragov (Eds.), Trilateral Dimension Of  Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy, Baku, Center for 
Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 85.
5 J. Strakes, “Azerbaijan and the Non-Aligned Movement: Institutionalizing the 
‘Balanced Foreign Policy’ Doctrine”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working 
Papers 15, 2015, p. 2. 
6 K. Makili-Aliyev, “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy: Between East and West”, Istituto 
Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers 1305, January 2013, p. 3.
7  M. Heydar and I. Korobov (2015), p. 85. 
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first country to be elected as a non-permanent member of the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council in the South Caucasus 
and Central Asia region, and only the second in the CIS region. 
Azerbaijan took its seat at the UN Security Council in early 
January 2012 and chaired the Council during May 2012. In his 
address to the Security Council on 4 May 2012, President Ilham 
Aliyev underlined in particular that “this is a big responsibility, 
and we are ready to assume that responsibility. Azerbaijan will 
defend the ideas of justice, international law and peaceful coop-
eration between all countries”8. 
 An objective view on all aspects of its geopolitical identity al-
lows Azerbaijan, which is a relatively small country territorially, 
to pursue a constructive and pragmatic policy and to strength-
en its independent position of a full member of internation-
al relations. The opportunities offered by its chosen path and 
the variety of instruments for implementing its foreign policy 
clearly show that there is no alternative to this effective and 
constructive approach. In the next decade, Azerbaijan will be 
working to achieve fundamentally different goals, including 
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict with Armenia, di-
versifying the national economy and increasing non-resource 
exports, enhancing the quality of life in the country, and im-
plementing large East-West and North-South projects. Given 
its multilayered geopolitical identity, Azerbaijan has the capa-
bility to achieve these goals, protect its territorial integrity and 
strengthen its real independence in new conditions.
Foreign policy identity 
and “European” choice of Georgia
Georgia’s foreign policy identity emerged as a product of clas-
sic geopolitical factors, where geographic location remains one 
8 Statement by the President of  the Security Council (S/PRST/2012/17), UN 
Security Council, 4 May 2012, p. 24, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ 
[last accessed on 26 September 2017].  
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of the central features for the country’s political development9. 
As a small, weak state facing with challenges of survival and 
a choice of strategic orientation, its foreign policy identity is 
closely linked to different conceptions of sovereignty and state-
hood. As Jones argues: “as in most of the former Soviet repub-
lics, Georgian foreign policy – at least in the first few years after 
independence – became part of the re-ideologisation of politics, 
and an instrument for asserting the legitimacy of the new elite 
and the identity of the new state”10. 
History and geography strongly influences and shapes 
Georgia’s geopolitical identity, which in its own turn defines 
Tbilisi’s political choices and foreign policy behavior. Georgia’s 
location between the Black Sea, Russia and Turkey, gives it 
strategic importance far beyond its size. Moreover, being a one 
of the important routes for access to the sea for land-locked 
Caspian countries, particularly for energy-rich Azerbaijan sig-
nificantly increases geopolitical importance of Georgia. As a 
Black Sea and southeastern European state, the country con-
siders itself historical geographic, political, and cultural part of 
greater Europe and has identified itself with European civili-
sation through Christianity, cultural values and civilisational 
background11.   
Since early years of Georgian independence the country’s 
foreign policy identity was strongly influenced by its history, 
particularly that of the first Georgian Republic (1918-21). 
When Georgia adopted the declaration on the “restoration” of 
independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991, the idea 
of “restoring rather than declaring independence was based on 
9 K. Kakachia, “European, Asian, or Eurasian? Georgian Identity and the 
Struggle for Euro-Atlantic Integration”, in K. Kakachia and M. Cecire (Eds.), 
Georgian Foreign Policy. The Quest for Sustainable Security, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
2013, p. 42.
10 S. Jones, “The Role of  Cultural Paradigms in Georgian Foreign Policy”, in R. 
Fawn (Ed.), Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies, London, 
Frank Cass, 2004, pp. 83-110.
11 K. Kakachia (2013), p. 44.
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the historical revivalism promoted by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
the first president of Georgia”12. According to this idea inde-
pendence represented the righting of historical wrongs perpe-
trated against Georgia by Russia. Thus from very beginning of 
independence Georgia’s foreign policy identity started to being 
built up on the notion of “otherness” of Russia. Faced with 
the recurring dilemma of Georgian political alignment – Russia 
or the West – the Gamsakhurdia government’s choice was 
“not Russia”, which, by extension, meant alignment with the 
West13. This choice also coincided with the popular idea among 
Georgians about the country’s historical belonging to European 
civilisational and political space. 
However, with an inherited political culture lacking a strong 
democratic tradition, an inexperienced foreign policy elite, 
scarce financial resources, and poorly defined competing social 
forces, initially Georgia was unable to develop a viable foreign 
and security policy towards the West14. Moreover, the West 
was overburdened by other problems and almost completely 
ignorant about the South Caucasus; and consequently Russia 
enjoyed a free hand to deal with Georgia15. Thus, new president 
Eduard Shevardnadze stepped in re-building partnership with 
Russia while still adhering the strategic “European” choice. 
Nonetheless, Georgia’s alignment with Russia was shallow and 
would be relatively short-lived. Between 1994 and 1999, band-
wagoning with Russia was followed by a “step by step” realign-
ment of Georgian policy away from Russia and towards the 
West, described by one former cabinet official as “a strategic 
shift from the politics of survival and necessity to the emer-
gence of our true orientation”16. 
12 J.C. MacDougall, “Post-soviet strategic alignment: The weight of  history in the 
south Cauca sus”, Georgetown University, 2009, p. 118.  
13 Ibid. p. 188.  
14 K. Kakachia (2013), p. 46.
15 A. Garibov, Alignment and Alliance Policies in the South Caucasus Regional Security 
Complex, SAM Comments, Baku,  vol.  XV, December 2015, p. 34.  
16 J.C. MacDougall (2009), p. 127. 
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“Europeannes” in Georgian foreign policy identity signifi-
cantly strengthened with government change in the country 
in 2003. Georgia increased emphasis on the alliance with the 
West and tried to strengthen institutional relations with NATO 
and EU in order to achieve much-needed security guarantees 
against the perceived Russian threat. Russia-Georgia relations 
further deteriorated, while Georgia was unable to obtain a for-
mal alliance treaty and/or security guarantees from the West. 
Subsequent Russian military intervention in August 2008 and 
failure of West to provide any meaningful support to Tbilisi was 
a serious blow to the West/Europe in the eyes of Georgia, but the 
country and majority of people continued to see “Europennes” 
a logical destiny for Georgia. The Georgian Dream coalition 
which came to power in 2012 also introduced certain changes 
to the country’s policy towards Russia, and initiated gradual 
and careful rapprochement with Moscow. However, Georgia 
still pursues an openly Western-oriented foreign policy and 
is reluctant to fully restore relations with Moscow as long as 
Russian troops are stationed in Georgian territory and it con-
tinues to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. 
Armenia: Pro-Russianism and aggressive policy 
toward neighbours
Armenia’s geographical predicament is similar to that of Georgia 
and Azerbaijan. In contrast to Georgia, however, Armenia faces 
the added challenge of being land-locked. Reliance on Russia 
as protector has, since the late XVIII century, entrenched 
Armenia’s Russia-centric foreign policy orientation. Along with 
historical reliance on Russia, collective memory of the so-called 
1915 “genocide” along with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
have become the fundamental elements of modern Armenian 
national identity formation, as well at the key determinants of 
the country’s threat perception and alliance choices17. 
17 A. Garibov, Alignment and Alliance Policies..., cit., p. 38. 
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Similar to Azerbaijan and Georgia, the history of the post-
World War I independent republic was a primary focus of this 
historical reassessment of the country’s fate when the national-
ist movement galvanised support for independence at the end 
of the 1980s18. As mentioned, the collective memory of the 
1915 events in Turkey exerted a major influence on Armenia’s 
perception of past mistakes and goals for the future. In fact, 
contrary to the natural interests of the country, independent 
Armenia, has viewed Turkey as an eternal threat, a dangerous 
enemy. “Turkey” appeared to represent everything that opposed 
the essence of “Armenia”19. On the basis of collective historical 
memory, Armenian conventional wisdom also views Russia as a 
savior, protector and friend. 
Along with the inspiration of 1918 and memory of 1915, 
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was the third key pillar of modern 
Armenian national consciousness and foreign policy identity. 
With the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, the so-called 
“Karabakh Committee”, an extremist nationalist organisation 
demanding the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, 
gained prominence. This group later evolved into the Armenian 
National Movement (ANM), and took on the leadership of the 
whole country20. Levon Ter-Petrosian, who led the movement 
and served as parliamentary leader, was elected the first presi-
dent of independent Armenia in October 1991. As the inde-
pendence process unfolded, leaders who comprised the core of 
the Armenian National Movement outlined a new agenda for 
Armenia’s foreign relations.
18 N. Dudwick, Memory, identity and politics in Armenia, University of  Pennsylvania, 
1994, pp. 410-411.
19 A. Terzyan, “The Evolution of  Armenia’s Foreign Policy Identity: The 
Conception of  Identity Driven Paths. Friends and Foes in Armenian Foreign 
Policy Discourse”, in K. Kakachia and A. Markarov (Eds.), Values And Identity 
As Sources Of  Foreign Policy In Armenia And Georgia, Publishing House Universal, 
Tbilisi, 2016, p. 147.
20 J.C. MacDougall (2009), p. 173-177. 
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This foreign policy was pro-Russian from its very beginning. 
Though this foreign policy identity evolved and has experienced 
certain changes, pro-Russianism has always remained as its cen-
tral column. While Ter-Petrosian attempted to present Armenia 
as the bridge between Europe and Asia, rather than demon-
strating an overly pro-Russian position or acting as protagonist 
of integration with Europe, his policy ostensibly failed as it was 
in opposition to popular “genocide” recognition efforts and 
against of the position of the hardliners in Armenia-Azerbaijan 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite generally negative attitude 
towards Turkey, he at times called it an indispensable neighbour 
and possible natural ally of Armenia, and even viewed resolu-
tion of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as the key to development 
of Armenia21.  
During the leadership of the next two presidents of Armenia, 
Robert Kocheryan and Serj Sargsyan, Armenia’s structural po-
litical, security and economic dependency on Russia continued 
to grow, which was accompanied with more hard-line foreign 
policy and more hostile attitude toward its neighbours. The 
country’s strategic alignment remained fundamentally defined 
by membership in the CSTO and the “strategic partnership” 
with Russia. Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia kept 
mounting. The country also continued to deepen its integra-
tion into Russia-led regional organisations. Though Yerevan 
had initially been engaged in negotiations on a free-trade deal 
with the EU, following talks with Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, Armenian President Sargsyan in 2013 abruptly decided 
to switch to the Russian-led Customs Union, a precursor to the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Armenia officially joined 
the EEU on 2 January 2015, banding together with Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus in a Moscow-led project meant to 
counterbalance the European Union22.
21 A. Terzyan (2016), p. 147-148. 
22 “Armenia Joins Russia-Led Eurasian Economic Union”, The Moscow Times, 2 
January 2015 [last accessed on 29 September 2017].  
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As a land-locked state with a deteriorating economy and 
shrinking population, Armenia needs to engage in broad co-
operation with all its neighbours in order overcome its geo-
graphical challenges and develop its economy and improve 
public welfare. However, due to its aggressive policy towards 
Azerbaijan and Turkey, along with the problems generated by 
Armenian creeping irredentism in Georgia, Armenia is left 
with very little room for maneuver in its alignment policies. 
At this juncture, Armenia’s strategic orientation, while official-
ly described as multidirectional complementarity (avoiding 
the dependence on a single partner), appears to tend towards 
overdependence on its “strategic partner” Russia23, notwith-
standing the recent signing of a Comprehensive and Enhanced 
Partnership Agreement with the EU.   
Interconnected and interdependent security 
in the South Caucasus
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus 
region found itself caught in a web of self-sustaining conflicts, 
making it one of the most volatile regions in Europe’s neigh-
bourhood. As Soviet Union collapsed, the countries in the re-
gion became embroiled in intra and inter-state conflicts, almost 
all of which remain unresolved. These ethno-territorial conflicts 
and intra-regional enmities closed the way to possible peace and 
cooperation, hindering the emergence of a cooperative regional 
environment, or any kind of security community in the South 
Caucasus. 
Security and survival were among the primary challenges 
of statehood for the newly independent states of the South 
Caucasus. The most important security threat for the region-
al countries is the armed conflicts in which they are current-
ly involved. This small region is host to two frozen separatist 
23 L. Delcour, Faithful But Constrained? Armenia’s Half-Hearted Support for Russia’s 
Regional Integration Policies in the Post-Soviet Space, London Schools of  Economics 
Publications, 2015.  
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conflicts (in Georgia), and has witnessed two interstate wars 
(between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russia and Georgia). 
None of the three enjoys highly developed strategic cooperation 
with both of the other two countries. While Azerbaijan has a 
strategic partnership with Georgia, it is locked in a protracted 
conflict with Armenia. Despite Georgia’s formal cooperation 
with Armenia, relations suffer from Armenia’s function as a 
Russian “outpost” and military base, and the strong separa-
tist sentiments in the Armenian populated Javakheti region of 
Georgia. 
The region’s relations with its immediate neighbours are also 
problematic. Georgia does not have direct diplomatic relations 
with Russia, and despite some recent improvements, Tbilisi still 
holds the position that Moscow has violated Georgian territo-
rial integrity. Armenia does not have diplomatic relations with 
Turkey; it claims that Ankara has committed a so-called “gen-
ocide” against Armenians, and also formally holds territorial 
claims against Turkey. Ankara closed its borders with Armenia 
in 1993 due to Armenia’s occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh 
(Dağlıq Qarabağ in Azerbaijani) and other adjacent regions of 
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, is the only country in the region that 
has developed cooperative relations with all the neighbours 
(except Armenia) of the South Caucasus, including a strategic 
alliance with Turkey. 
Among the regional conflicts, the Armenia-Azerbaijan 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – stemming from Armenia’s oc-
cupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts 
(roughly 20% of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognised terri-
tories) – is no doubt the most serious security threat in and for 
the region. The conflict began at the end of the 1980s, when 
Armenia sought to annex the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Oblast of Azerbaijan (NKAO), moving to fill the power vac-
uum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The conflict 
gradually evolved into a full-scale war between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan once they gained independence, leaving approx-
imately 30,000 dead and over a million IDPs and refugees, 
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majority of them being civilian Azerbaijanis24. In contrast to 
the other ongoing separatist conflicts in the region, this is clear-
ly an interstate war, where one regional country (Armenia) 
has occupied a significant portion of the territory of anoth-
er (Azerbaijan), with tremendous investments by both sides 
in terms of manpower and arms. The conflict has resulted in 
the securitisation of almost everything related to Armenia in 
Azerbaijan and vice versa. Thus, anything that is seen as pos-
ing an advantage to Azerbaijan is perceived as to the detriment 
of Armenia, and vice versa, leading to zero-sum bilateral rela-
tions25. The conflict is not frozen, although international ex-
perts have described as such. 
Though this oldest and bloodiest war in the post-Soviet space 
has never been truly frozen, the increased intensity of clash-
es since the April 2016, more commonly known as the “four-
day war”, demonstrated once again that the conflict can flare 
up at any time, destabilising this already fragile region. As no 
peaceful solution is visible on the horizon, the Line of Contact 
(LoC) between the armed forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia has 
become the most militarised area of the former Soviet Union. 
Azerbaijani and Armenian societies have also seemingly grown 
more nationalistic as fighting intensifies and casualty rates on 
the frontline increase26.
Thus the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict represents the key se-
curity threat for Azerbaijan. The conflict has dominated for-
eign policy and national security discourse in Baku ever since 
independence. The country’s leadership repeatedly hails the 
restoration of territorial integrity as Azerbaijan’s top priority. 
Azerbaijan has made clear its preference for resolving the issue 
24   A. Garibov, “OSCE and Conflict Resolution in the Post-Soviet Area: The Case 
of  the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Caucasus International, 
Istanbul, vol. 5, no. 2, 2015, p. 76.
25  S. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of  Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus, RoutledgeCurzon, 2001, p. 385.
26  A. Garibov, A Year After The “Four-Day War”, Guns Continue to Speak Louder than 
Diplomats in Nagorno-Karabakh, CACI Analyst, 2017.  
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diplomatically, and if this is not possible, using military means 
to restore its territorial integrity. Azerbaijan and Turkey have 
also imposed trade bans – closing their borders with Armenia 
until the conflict has been resolved, or at least until there has 
been a significant improvement in the peace process, which 
is the only international effort to coerce Armenia to peace. 
Accordingly, Azerbaijan also tries to isolate Armenia as much 
as possible from regional economic projects. As the result of 
Armenia’s territorial aggression towards Azerbaijan, Yerevan 
has been excluded from large-scale economic projects such the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail-
way – all of which have changed the economic landscape of the 
region. In the absence of this conflict, Armenia would offer the 
most economic route for these oil, gas and rail transportation 
projects. 
The conflict has also dominated and shaped Armenian for-
eign and security policy since the collapse of the USSR. In a 
quest for military and economic support, Armenia approached 
Russia, and has now become dependent on Moscow for its se-
curity and economic wellbeing. Armenia’s isolation due to its 
occupation of Azerbaijani territories has further deepened the 
Yerevan’s dependence on Moscow, as well as leading Armenian 
politicians to seek opportunities for cooperation with Iran. 
Currently, Russia is not only the Armenia’s sole provider of nat-
ural gas, it also controls the country’s railway network, elec-
tricity distribution and production facilities, as well as many 
other strategic sectors of Armenia’s economy27. Armenian state 
borders are jointly protected with Russia within the framework 
of the Moscow-led CSTO, and Russia has one of its largest 
military bases abroad in Armenia. Armenia also joined Russia-
led EEU in the beginning of 2015. Armenia’s unique situation 
is that despite having Russia and Iran as its key regional allies 
27 V. Socor, “Armenia’s Economic Dependence on Russia Insurmountable by the 
European Union”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 10, no. 221, 10 December 2013.  
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and partners, it has managed to maintain positive relations with 
the US and the West. In this regard, the existence of a wealthy 
and politically active Diaspora in the United States and Europe 
has enabled Armenia to sustain these relations, despite the oc-
cupation of Azerbaijani territories and its alliance with Russia. 
Moreover, it also succeeded in achieving the adoption of section 
907 of the Freedom Support Act in the US Congress in 1992, 
which prohibited all US state assistance to Azerbaijan due to 
its blockade of Armenia, ignoring the fact that Armenia has 
blockaded the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan and occupied 
Azerbaijani territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, fac-
tors which render the Act highly misleading28.  Moreover, due 
to the lobbying efforts of the Diaspora, Armenia has become 
one of the top per capita recipients of US aid. 
For its part, Georgia has been put in a difficult position 
by the Armenian-Azerbaijani zero-sum relationship. While 
Georgia has an interest in maintaining good relations with 
both states, it has, for a number of reasons, developed better 
relations with Azerbaijan than Armenia. First of all, Baku is 
without a question the economic hub of the Caucasus, and 
arguably the economic centre of the entire southern rim of 
post-Soviet states29. By virtue of its oil resources and its ge-
ographical position on the Caspian shore, Azerbaijan holds a 
central position in the various transport corridor arrangements. 
Georgia, on the other hand, is one of the two possibilities for 
transport and other links between Azerbaijan and Turkey and 
the West, the other being Armenia. Due to the impossibility 
of any Armenian-Azerbaijani cooperation, Georgia’s role in oil 
and gas transportation, TRACECA, and other transportation 
projects has dramatically expanded. In this sense, Georgia has a 
vested interest in Armenia’s economic isolation30.
28 S. Cornell (2001), pp. 259-260
29 S. Cornell, “Geopolitics and strategic alignments in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia”, Perception, June-August, vol. IV, no. 2, 1999.  
30 S. Cornell (2001), p. 388.
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Similar to its regional neighbours, Georgia’s security threats 
come from its immediate neighbourhood. The country’s main 
problem is the internationalised separatist conflicts. The country 
has two separatist entities – Abkhazia (Apkhazeti in Georgian) 
and South Ossetia (Samxret’ Oseti in Georgian), which have 
been de facto independent since the beginning of the 1990s. 
In addition, the situation with separatism in Javakheti, the 
Armenian majority region of Georgia, is difficult due to sup-
port for separatist groups by both Russia and Armenia.31 From 
this perspective, both Georgia and Azerbaijan must deal with 
separatists who have gained control of parts of their respective 
territories. As a result, Tbilisi and Baku have a common stance 
with regard to separatism and minority questions; both support 
the preservation of territorial integrity and vehemently reject 
separatism and secession32. At the same time, efforts towards 
cooperation among these unrecognised entities – Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia – also pose a shared 
concern for Georgia and Azerbaijan.
The separatist conflicts also create fertile ground for foreign 
influence and intervention in Georgia. Georgia-Russia relations 
would not face the problems they currently do if these conflicts 
were not live. The conflicts were not, in fact, created by Russia 
as many argue, and primary responsibility lies within domestic 
dynamics. However, Russian intervention prolonged the con-
flicts, and led to Georgia’s loss of military control over the re-
gion. The conflicts also resulted in a spillover of security dynam-
ics in the Northern and Southern Caucasus due to support by 
the “Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus” 
for Georgia’s separatist entities in the early 1990s33. The separa-
tist conflicts and the Russia’s resulting military intervention in 
31 N. Chitadze “Samtskhe-Javakheti as a Potential Flash Point in Georgia: Ethnic-
Confessional Composition and Integration Challenges”, Caucasus International, 
Istanbul, vol. 5, no. 3, 2015, p. 113.  
32 S. Cornell (2001), p. 386.
33 International Alert, The North Caucasus factor in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict con-
text, July 2012.  
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the country in 2008 have indirectly, but significantly, affected 
Georgia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The conflicts 
massively increase the incentives for Tbilisi to foster its alliances 
with Baku and Ankara. 
Georgia’s conflicts with separatists and Russia have also cre-
ated a dilemma for Armenia, as a country which hosts major 
Russian military base and is a staunch Russian ally. Its isola-
tion by Azerbaijan and Turkey means that Georgia’s territory 
and ports are vital for Armenia’s foreign trade. According to 
the official Armenian sources, almost 70% of Armenia’s foreign 
trade goes through Georgian ports and railway/motorway net-
works34. Therefore, while Armenia remains committed to its 
alliance with Russia, it faces challenges in maintaining good 
relations with Georgia. However, Yerevan is seen by Georgia 
as siding with Russia, a sort of Russian Trojan horse in the 
Caucasus. At times this has led to strained relations between 
Yerevan and Tbilisi35. Despite being irritated by Armenia’s func-
tion as a Russian “outpost” as well as the situation in Javakheti, 
Georgia also needs to maintain relations with Armenia. Due to 
Armenia’s significant influence in Javakheti, the deterioration 
of relations with Yerevan could exacerbate the relationship be-
tween the Georgian central government and the Armenians of 
Javakheti with potentially dire consequences, a danger that is 
seen as clear and present in Tbilisi36.
Moreover, the region’s separatist conflicts have produced 
(or at least served as a pretext for) the second interstate war in 
the South Caucasus – the August 2008 war between Georgia 
and Russia, making the region even more volatile than before. 
Along with Armenia, Azerbaijan also faced serious challenges 
during the war between Russia and Georgia. Azerbaijan had 
advanced cooperation with both Moscow and Tbilisi. But de-
spite Moscow’s irritation, understanding the importance of 
independent and friendly Georgia for its security, Azerbaijan 
34 N. Chitadze (2015) p. 113. 
35 S. Cornell (2001), p. 385.
36 Ibid. p. 387.
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stepped in as an alternative supplier when Russian gas exports 
were cut after Tbilisi rejected a dramatic increase in price in 
2007. At the same time, Azerbaijan opened up its market to 
Georgian goods for which Russia used to serve as the chief ex-
port market, and these actions effectively halted Moscow’s eco-
nomic “choking” of Tbilisi. 
Azerbaijan’s economic security is also closely linked to its re-
gional allies, Georgia and Turkey. These two countries are the 
transit countries of the BTC and the Baku-Supsa oil export 
pipelines as well as the South Caucasus and Trans-Anatolian 
(TANAP) natural gas pipelines, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail-
way, which is scheduled for completion this year. These major 
projects form the backbone of Azerbaijan’s energy and trans-
portation strategy, and are responsible for the lion’s share of 
Azerbaijan’s export revenues. For Georgia, the pipelines are 
major source of economic revenue due to the significant trans-
portation fees they bring. They also help guarantee Azerbaijani, 
Turkish, and Western support for Georgian independence. Any 
threat of conflict inside or involving Georgia threatens to create 
security implications for Azerbaijan and Turkey. During Russia-
Georgia war in 2008, Russian military jets dropped bombs near 
the BTC and Baku-Supsa pipelines37. Though the pipelines 
were not hit, Azerbaijan was still forced to temporarily suspend 
oil delivery, as well as its maritime oil exports from Georgia’s 
Black Sea ports of Poti, Batumi and Kulevi, which resulted 
in the loss of considerable projected incomes38. Additionally, 
“re-borderisation” attempts by South Ossetia – moving forward 
the de facto borders inside Georgian territory - left the 1.6 km 
section of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline under separatist control 
in 2015, generating significant concerns in Baku39. 
37 S. Levine, “Targeting the Pipeline”, Steve LeVine, 14 August 2008.
38 C.K.J. Daly, “Turkey and the Problems with the BTC”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
The Jamestown Foundation, 13 August 2008.  
39 Д. Гамцемлидзе, “Почему Грузия разочаровывается в прозападном 
курсе”, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 23 July 2015.
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Strategic partnership frameworks in the South 
Caucasus 
Despite strong divergence in foreign policy and alliance choices 
of the three South Caucasus states, strategic multilateral part-
nerships have also developed within the region and with the 
region’s immediate neighbours such as Turkey, Russia and Iran. 
However, it is important not underscore it once more that, due 
to its aggression towards Azerbaijan, and informally held ter-
ritorial claims against neighbours such as Georgia and Turkey, 
Armenia has been excluded from such partnerships. 
One of such partnerships is Azerbaijan’s trilateral coopera-
tion with Georgia and Turkey. After active development of for 
the last two decades this cooperation has reached to the level 
of strategic partnership that can be characterised as a trilater-
al alliance. The development and consolidation of the energy 
cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (AGT) 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s marked the beginning of 
trilateral cooperation that has since developed into a strategic 
partnership in various fields among the three countries. When 
the first joint grand projects, the BTC oil pipeline, and the 
BTE gas pipeline were realised and redrew the contours of the 
geopolitical map of the South Caucasus, the talks started about 
the necessity for cooperation to provide security for them. Joint 
initiation and realisation of several regionally important pro-
jects strengthened perceptions that the three countries were 
closely aligned in terms of their foreign, economic and security 
policies40.
This partnership gained new momentum after the 2008 
Georgian-Russian War, which blatantly demonstrated the need 
for more comprehensive cooperation scheme to stabilize the re-
gion, including that in the field of security. The trilateral part-
nership started to be institutionalised since the beginning of 
40 J. Valiyev, “Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Triangle: The Main Features of  
Cooperation”, Caucasus International, Istanbul, vol. 5, no. 3, 2015, p. 27. 
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the 2010s, in the form of annual meetings of leaders and for-
eign ministers of the participant countries. Key current projects 
among these are the TANAP and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP) to export Shah Deniz II gas to European markets by 
the beginning of 2020s. Beyond the energy sector there is also 
the 846-kilometer (525 miles) long Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway 
project that was inaugurated on 30 October 2017 and linked 
railway systems of across Eurasian continent, starting from 
China, passing Central Asia, South Caucasus and reaching 
Europe through Turkey. The railway is expected to transport 5 
million tons of cargo per year initially, rising to 17 million tons 
over time41. As president Ilham Aliyev highlighted in the open-
ing ceremony of the railway, this shortest and reliable corridor 
between Asia and Europe is set to become the crucial part of 
the Eurasian transportation infrastructure and will increase the 
inflow investment to the countries located across its pathway42. 
Most recently, the military dimension of this cooperation was 
launched with meetings of the defense ministers in Nakhchivan, 
Azerbaijan (2014), Tbilisi, Georgia (2015), Gabala, Azerbaijan 
(2016) and Batumi, Georgia (2017). High-level meetings 
among the top military/defense officials resulted in initiation 
of cooperation in military education and organisation of joint 
seminars, while the parties also discussed the partnership op-
portunities in the development of military technologies, cyber 
security and etc. The three defense ministers agreed on annual 
joint military drills to enhance the combat capability of their 
armed forces. 
Trilateralism, a new phenomenon in Baku’s foreign policy, 
has also emerged in the form of Azerbaijan-Turkey-Iran and 
Azerbaijan-Turkey-Turkmenistan relations. In general, Turkey 
– Azerbaijan’s key ally plays a crucial role in all three mentioned 
trilateral cooperation efforts of Azerbaijan. Ties with Turkey 
41 Bloomberg, A New Asia-to-Europe Railway Route Is Opening Up, 30 October 2017.
42 Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the opening ceremony of  Baku-Tbilisi-Kars rail-
way, President.az (in Azerbaijani: İlham Əliyevin Bakı-Tbilisi-Qars dəmir yolunun 
açılış mərasimində nitqi), 30 October 2017.
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strengthen Azerbaijan’s position in negotiations on regional en-
ergy and transit projects. In particular, together with Turkey’s 
participation in the triangles, Azerbaijan has much more to offer 
Georgia, Iran, and Turkmenistan43. While pressure is mounting 
on some of Azerbaijani neighbours to join to big supra-nation-
al economic and political integration projects, namely the EU 
and the EEU, Baku’s accent on trilateral cooperation with its 
regional neighbours helps to avoid the systemic constraints and 
limits imposed by such supra-national platforms.
The most recently initiated trilateral regional cooperation 
that Baku attaches significant importance is Azerbaijan-Iran-
Russia framework. The format was launched in 2016, first 
with the trilateral meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Baku in 
April which was followed by presidential summit in August of 
the same year at the initiative of Azerbaijan. The presidential 
summit was mostly devoted to regional economic integration 
projects, particularly the North-South International Transport 
Corridor, a proposed land-and sea-based trade route linking 
India to Europe via Iran, the South Caucasus, and Russia44. The 
cooperation among the three does not only cover the economic 
and transportation issues, but the countries also discuss region-
al security issues such as Syria and resolution of the Armenia-
Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at their first meeting in 
Baku. 
The most recent meeting of presidents Ilham Aliyev, Vladmir 
Putin and Hassan Rouhani took place on 1 November in 
Tehran, where the key issue of discussion, along with many 
other fields, was the realisation of North-South transportation 
corridor. Ilham Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan has already com-
pleted its portion of the railway construction, the bridge has 
been built over the Astarachay – the border between Azerbaijan 
43 R. Weitz, “Caspian Triangles: Azerbaijan’s Trilateral Diplomacy - A New 
Approach for a New Era” in F. Mammadov and F. Chiragov (Eds.), Trilateral 
Dimension Of  Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Baku, Center for Strategic Studies, 2015, p. 7.
44 A. Vatanka, “Baku’s Choice: How Iran and Russia are wooing Azerbaijan”, 
Foreign Affairs, 8 November 2016.
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and Iran, and the first train crossed the Azerbaijani-Iranian 
border in March 201745. Considering the importance of the 
project, Azerbaijan allocated finances to Iran for building their 
portion of the corridor – the Astara-Rasht railway46.
Conclusion
At first glance, the South Caucasus seems to be ideally located 
as a region of cooperation, with every chance of becoming a se-
curity community where internal conflict is unthinkable, to use 
Karl Deutsch’s words47. The region is small, comprised of na-
tions that can benefit significantly from economic and security 
cooperation to strengthen their sovereignty, protect themselves 
from the negative influences of neighbouring powers, and build 
a firm regional stability conducive to sustainable development. 
However, the reality is the opposite – the South Caucasus is a 
conflict-riven region which has experienced a number of sepa-
ratist conflicts and interstate wars; there are multiple intra-re-
gional contradictions and enmities; and the regional countries’ 
relations with their neighbours are problematic. Due to the in-
tra-regional conflicts, the region is exposed to the influences 
of its larger neighbours, which play a significant role in shap-
ing the regional security dynamics and the course of hostili-
ties. Membership within or orientation towards the conflicting 
alliances strengthens intra-regional rifts, further decreasing the 
chances of peaceful conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. 
Thus, the South Caucasus region can be best characterised 
as a region if viewed through the lens of security. The most 
important commonality for the South Caucasus countries is 
45 Presidents of  Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia made press statements, President.az 
(in Azerbaijani: Azərbaycan, İran və Rusiya prezidentlərinin mətbuata bəyanat-
ları), 1 November 2017.
46 Ibid.
47 H. Ulusoy, Revisiting Security Communities after the Cold War: The Constructivist 
Perspective, Center for Strategic Studies of  the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  
Turkey, January 2012.  
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interconnected nature of their security. The source of key se-
curity threats is the same, namely the South Caucasus region 
and its immediate neighbourhood. This area forms a distinct re-
gional (in)security complex – an area where the security of each 
regional state cannot realistically be considered separately. Most 
of the security threats are located within this security complex, 
and the responses to these challenges should also be formulated 
from inside this space.
Militarisation and confrontation tendencies persist across 
the region. Armenia continues to host a major Russian military 
base and Moscow is not expected to withdraw from this country 
anytime soon. Armenia seems unlikely to abandon its so-called 
“genocide” recognition campaign against Turkey, or to make 
tangible compromises in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. 
Thus, Armenia serves as a source of instability in the region, 
and its policy opens the way to foreign penetration to the re-
gion. This non-reconciliatory position also ensures the contin-
uation of Yerevan’s conflict with Baku and confrontation with 
Ankara, as well as the continuation of Armenia regional isola-
tion and the closure of its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
Re-opening these borders would boost Armenia’s failing econo-
my and counter the rapid depopulation of the country. 
Georgia remains committed to its NATO and EU aspira-
tions, despite its failure to achieve formal membership. Georgia 
also faces challenges resulting from its foreign alignment choic-
es. Russia will likely maintain its grip over Georgia’s separa-
tist regions and put pressure on Georgia in regard to its Euro-
Atlantic aspirations Thus, while integration to Euro-Atlantic 
structures brings certain benefits in the form of institutional 
reform, democratisation, and economic development, it does 
not provide the much-needed security guarantees against the 
threat of Russian backlash. At the same time, Russia holds the 
key to Georgia’s most important challenge – the resolution of 
the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Among the three countries of the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan 
is most open to cooperation with regional countries and bigger 
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neighbours, contributing to the overall stabilisation of the re-
gion. Accordingly, Azerbaijan enjoys cooperation with all three 
of the neighbouring big powers, and partners with Georgia with-
in the region. Due to Armenia’s aggression against Azerbaijan, 
there are no political or economic relations between the two 
countries. Indeed, this conflict is currently the key obstacle to 
region-wide cooperation in the South Caucasus. Both Armenia 
and Georgia are keen to host foreign military bases that can pro-
vide national security guarantees at the risk of broader region-
al security. By contrast, Azerbaijan refuses to host any foreign 
military presence. Baku has repeatedly declared that its territory 
cannot be used against any regional or neighbouring country. 
However, such a divergence in foreign policy identities and 
foreign/security policies does not preclude intra-regional part-
nerships and joint cooperation of the South Caucasus countries 
with their immediate neighbours. Only one regional country 
– Armenia has been left out of such multilateral cooperation 
frameworks due to its aggression and territorial claim towards 
neighbours. Over the course of the last decades, several tri-
lateral partnership has been established in the region such as 
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey, Azerbaijan-Turkey-Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan-Turkey-Iran, Azerbaijan-Russia-Iran, in all of which 
Baku played very crucial, if not the central role to bring its re-
gional neighbours together. 

5.  The Light and Ancillary Regionalism 
      in Central Europe 
Serena Giusti 
The end of the bipolar paradigm gave many countries that were 
previously entrenched in one of the two spheres of influence 
the opportunity to set their own political and economic course. 
This process of emancipation affected the reorganisation of 
spaces and regions across the world. In Central Europe, states 
found themselves without any usual points of reference and 
with the hard task of redefining themselves while undertaking 
painful political, economic, and social reforms concomitantly. 
Furthermore, inter-state tensions due to borders disputes and 
minorities settlement were surfacing, while Russia’s revanchism 
was still considered feasible and dreadful. In this context, re-
gionalism was seen as a remedy to tensions, centrifugal forces, 
and external “attacks”. Regionalism became an existential ne-
cessity, a way of defending sovereignty and integrity and thus 
to survive. 
Within regionalism studies, a new brand that had emerged 
in the mid-1980s, the so-called new regionalism, strengthened 
and diffused exactly in the early 1990s. By taking account of the 
dramatic changes derived from the end of the bipolar system 
and the growing globalisation of the economy, it tried to un-
derstand and interpret new forms of aggregations in a regional 
context1. The post-bipolar regionalism moves from the assump-
tion that regions are the best level to address most of the security 
1 F. Söderbaum, Rethinking Regionalism, Palgrave, 2016, p. 27.
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concerns2, providing order and stability3. It also highlighted 
that there are many regionalisms with a multidimensional and 
multi-layered nature and many regional agencies. Furthermore, 
emerging regionalisms were not the outcome of the “growth of 
societal integration within a region and the often-undirected 
process of social and economic interaction” but rather the result 
of a political project set in motion by other actors (states, in-
ternational/regional organisations, etc.) with an interest (either 
in terms of power politics or security concerns) in the region4. 
The importance of an external intervention for inducing 
regional cooperative dynamics, even in the form of an exist-
ing attracting and entrepreneurial regional organisation as the 
European Union (EU), shows that regions are not natural enti-
ties but rather “artificial” constructions in which political will, 
economic dynamics, and identities are blended in an ever-varia-
ble mix. Söderbaum explains that there are no “natural regions, 
but these are made, remade, and unmade – intentionally or 
non-intentionally – in the process of global transformation, by 
collective human action and identity formation”5. 
It is under this light that this chapter will approach regional-
ism in Central Europe with the aim of highlighting its features 
and set-up. For Central European countries (CECs) regional-
ism was mainly intended as the possibility to join the European 
Community (EC), a powerful regional organisation, rather than 
as the opportunity to engage in the process of regionalisation, 
understood as an active process of change towards increased 
cooperation, integration, convergence, coherence, and identi-
ty6. Post-communist CECs were not willing to participate in a 
2 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of  International Security, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
3 See L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995; D.A. Lake and P.M. Morgan, Regional Order: Building 
Security in a New World, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 
4 A. Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of  Regionalism in World Politics”, 
Review of  International Studies, vol. 21, no. 4, 1995, pp. 331-58. 
5 F. Söderbaum (2016), p. 27. 
6 On “regionalisation” see M. Schulz, F. Söderbaum and J. Ojendal (Eds.), 
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regional process of cooperation/integration among themselves, 
as they believed that only through membership in the EC they 
could achieve at once economic recovery, democratisation, and 
security. The reconnection to the Euro-Atlantic community 
(EU + NATO) epitomised the end of the previous regime and 
the beginning of a new political course. 
Joining the EC/EU, viewed as a form of regional coopera-
tion heading to a growing and widening integration among its 
Member States that had provided a lasting period of peace in 
Western Europe and many economic benefits to its members 
became, therefore, the CECs’ top priority. That choice entailed 
the rejection of any process of autochthonous regionalisation. 
The CECs accepted to cooperate and to coordinate their pol-
icies and actions in order to smooth their accession to the EU 
and further their position within the organisation. 
The rediscovery of Central Europe that, in the late 1980s, 
stirred a lively debate on its geographical, historical, and cultural 
contours7, did not give rise to any political project of regionali-
sation. On the contrary, the CECs emphasised their geograph-
ical and ontological “centrality” as a distinctive feature from 
other countries (e.g., Eastern Europe and the Balkans) in order 
to gain a rapid inclusion into the EU. The Visegrad Group, 
created in 1991 by Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, was 
exactly conceived as a format where the CECs could discuss 
EU’s related issues and align positions in order to smooth their 
accession to the organisation. 
The reluctance to the idea of Central Europe as a common 
ground for building regional institutions was primarily the re-
action to the EU’s attempts to transform the Visegrad Group 
in a “propaedeutic” form of regional cooperation/integration. 
The EU considered the CECs’ ability to cooperate as a prereq-
uisite for membership. In doing so, the EU sought to avoid 
importing conflicts. Existing or potential tensions should have 
Regionalization in a Globalizing World, Chicago, University of  Chicago Press, 2001. 
7 G. Schöpflin and N. Wood, In Search of  Central Europe, Barnes & Noble Books, 
1989. 
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been resolved and settled before accession. In this perspective, 
regional cooperation was presented as an opportunity to learn 
together (as a regional group) about “Europeanisation”. The 
EU did not probably exclude turning regional cooperation 
into an interim solution had the enlargement been postponed 
or even failed. However, this eventuality was never explicitly 
prospected.  
As the EU membership became a feasible option, the CECs 
have tended to downsize their belonging to Central Europe 
while rather emphasising national roots and individual merits. 
In this way, they hoped to gain a first position in the queue 
for joining the organisation. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia 
can be interpreted in this perspective: at the time, the Czech 
Republic performed very well both economically and political-
ly and was ready to divorce from Slovakia (seen as a burden) in 
the hope of a rapid accession to the EU. 
Having gained membership to the EU, the CECs started 
referring to a still vague idea of Central Europe to defend or 
endorse certain positions within the organisation as a group. 
Therefore, a common regional background helped reinforce a 
group dynamic and create a sort of regional lobby meant to 
work as a regional engine for neighbouring countries with mod-
est chance to become members of the EU in the near future. 
Poland, in particular, has tried to play a leading role within 
the group, showing that Visegrad cooperation has been differ-
ently “exploited” over time according to the external circum-
stances and national ambitions of its members. Despite a ren-
ovated interest in their potential as a group, the phenomenon 
of regionalisation in Central Europe remains ancillary to the 
process of European integration either when the first was meant 
as “propaedeutic” to the latter or when the CECs have used 
their regional convergence as a tool to count more in the EU 
or to play a critical role within it or to impose a certain vision. 
It seems that only one condition could have enacted a pro-
cess of regionalisation: the EU refusal of the CECs’ member-
ship, in which case they could have decided to create a robust 
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and ambitious regional organisation to shield their new democ-
racies and counteract or counterbalance external powers. The 
CECs could still consider furthering regional cooperation only 
in a post-EU scenario as a consequence either of a decision to 
abandon the EU or in case the EU implodes.  
The chapter reconstructs the origin of regionalism in Central 
Europe, looking at the intertwining of identity and power fac-
tors and showing its innate limits. It also looks at the evolution 
of regional cooperation after the CECs’ accession to the EU. 
Such a cooperation has been marked by ups and downs in line 
with members’ commitment or detachment from it. Recently, 
the Visegrad Group has been active in promoting projects of 
transregional cooperation aimed at improving the stabilisation 
of close countries and functionally connecting them with both 
the group and the EU. Temporary alignments as that on the 
issue of refugees are accompanied by different positions on the 
nature and scope of the EU. This also affects the relations the 
CECs develop with the other EU Member States. 
Central Europe’s  “Europeanness”  
In 1989, the main aim of the CECs and other former com-
munist countries was to reconnect to the Euro-Atlantic com-
munity as a way to put an end to the Soviet tutelage and set 
a new path of transformation and modernisation. Any polit-
ical and social experimentation, including the invention of a 
third way beyond capitalism and socialism, dictatorship and 
democracy, was rejected. The 1989 changes were liberal and 
non-utopian, they were “rectifying revolutions” or “revolutions 
of recuperation”8. They were simply designed “to remedy, to re-
cover, to restore, and not to discover new principles of state and 
8 J. Habermas, “What does Socialism mean today? The Revolutions of  Recuperation 
and the Need for new Thinking” in R. Blackburn (Ed.), After the Fall: the Failure of  
Communism and the Future of  Socialism, London Verso, 1991, pp. 25-46. 
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society”.9 This position aligns with the idea supported by many 
central European intellectuals who, by reviving the so-called 
Mitteleuropa, wanted to stress the “Europeanness” of Central 
Europe, as a Soviet legacy10. 
Milan Kundera (1984) described Mitteleuropa as a “piece 
of the Latin West which has fallen under Russian domination 
[...] which lies geographically in the centre, culturally in the 
West and politically in the East”. Likewise, Poles felt a “natu-
ral” part of the Western civilisation (Michnik 2003, p. 128). 
The emphasis on “Europeanness” was also instrumental to dis-
tance Central European countries from those placed in Eastern 
Europe (e.g., Bulgaria and Romania) which were seen as an ob-
stacle to a rapid accession to the EU. In other words, the whole 
idea of Central Europe was used as a criterion for establishing 
different levels of “Europeanness” that would have justified a 
phasing out of the enlargement. 
Since the beginning of these countries’ new course, it was 
clear that the revival of the idea of Central Europe could not 
constitute the backbone for the creation of a regional political 
experiment. On the contrary, it helped discrediting that kind of 
project. Regionalisation, the process of setting up new common 
institutions, is time-consuming and requires great political re-
sources. The CECs had no experience of supra-national insti-
tutions building and the only form of power beyond the state 
they were familiar with was the Soviet Union. These are the 
main reasons why the CECs did not embark on the establish-
ment of a new regional multilateral organisation. But above all, 
the CECs wished for an external anchor of modernisation and 
they could not avoid dealing with the existence and hegemonic 
status of the EU and NATO. 
9 K. Kumar, “The Revolutions of  1989 in East-Central Europe and the Idea of  
Revolution”, Political Studies, vol. XL, 1992, pp. 439-461. 
10 A.G.V. Hyde-Price, The International Politics of  East Central Europe, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1996, pp. 51-52; I.B. Neumann, Uses of  the Other, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 111. 
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The CECs considered the EU’s initial support for regional 
cooperation as a means to delay or rather avoid enlargement. 
That is the reason why the Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, 
judged the failure of regional cooperation as a success for the 
region’s future: “We managed to resist the recommendations of 
some of our western friends to create in Central and East Europe 
a special sub-regional institution because it would separate us 
from Europe instead of leading us to it”11. When the CECs 
were recognised as EU candidates, they became more relaxed 
on regional cooperation. Nevertheless, in security terms, the 
CECs believed that only NATO could deliver a reliable protec-
tion, while regional cooperation could eventually be useful for 
conflict prevention. The CECs, with their obsolete armaments, 
would be unable to counteract an armed attack while lacking 
the resources to devolve to armaments12. 
The realisation of an integrated regional area was instead 
hindered by the negative experience of the CMEA (Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance)13 and the Warsaw Pact. Under 
11 V. Klaus, “Evropy a My”, Lidové Noviny, 13 May 1994. 
12 The CECs initially also referred to the CSCE as the preferred structural de-
sign for the future European security architecture. In February 1990, for exam-
ple, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel called for all foreign troops to leave 
Eastern Europe and favored the replacement of  NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
with a pan-European organisation. At that time, Poland also thought a new 
European security structure would replace both Cold War alliances – and agreed 
with Gorbachev’s request that the Warsaw Pact should be preserved, since it 
was needed, in Poland’s view, during the turbulent revolutionary transition years 
to guarantee its borders. See V. Mastny, “Germany’s Unification, Its Eastern 
Neighbors, and European Security”, in F. Bozo et al. (Eds.), German Reunification: 
A Multinational History, London, Routledge, 2016, pp. 202-226, pp. 210-213.
13 The CMEA was established in 1949 to coordinate the economic development 
of  the Eastern European countries belonging to the Soviet bloc. The original 
members were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
and Romania. Albania joined in February 1949 but ceased taking an active part 
at the end of  1961. The German Democratic Republic became a member in 
September 1950 and the Mongolian People’s Republic in June 1962. In 1964, an 
agreement was concluded enabling Yugoslavia to participate on equal terms with 
CMEA members in the areas of  trade, finance, currency, and industry. In 1972, 
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the Soviet Union, horizontal relations were poorly developed 
because of the centralised system of power and economy’s man-
agement. Therefore, the CECs had neither direct experience 
nor appealing models to follow for developing regional inte-
gration. Furthermore, when the Soviet system collapsed, the 
CECs were absorbed by domestic changes and quite sceptical 
of the possibility of adopting similar reform patterns or to reach 
a common strategy for achieving the shared object of entering 
the EU. 
The ancillary role of the Visegrad Group
As mentioned in the introduction, despite initial reticence, the 
CECs started an embryonic form of regional cooperation in 
1991, when the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Václav 
Havel, the President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Wałęsa, 
and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary, József 
Antall, met in Visegrad (Hungary). This high-level meeting 
was reminiscent of a similar meeting, which took place in the 
same city in 1335 and was attended by John of Luxembourg, 
King of Bohemia, Charles I of Anjou (Charles Robert), King 
of Hungary, and Casimir III, King of Poland. Both meetings 
were meant to enhance mutual cooperation and friendship 
among the three Central European states. The Group was 
established again with the main aim of overcoming tensions 
among the participants and coordinating efforts for reaching 
their post-communist goals but without any intent of starting a 
process of regionalisation. 
Counting on the power of conditionality, the EU pushed for 
the further formalisation of this group. Events such as the “vel-
vet” break-up of Czechoslovakia (1993), Slovakia’s problems 
with democracy, tensions between Bratislava and Budapest over 
the regulation of minorities, and the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Cuba and in 1978 Vietnam joined the organisation. After 1989, the organisation 
largely lost its purpose and power and dissolved in 1991. 
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dam conflict, hindered from within the development of the 
regional project. The Czech Republic saw the other less-devel-
oped countries as a drag on its ambitions and favoured indi-
vidual relations with Brussels. Czech Prime Minister Klaus, in 
particular, believed that the Czech Republic had better chances 
of joining the EC/EU without Slovakia and the other Visegrad 
countries. At that moment, the Czech Republic’s economic 
performance was very promising. Only after the 1998 econom-
ic crisis, the Czech Republic reviewed its “go-it-alone” and min-
imalist approach. Hungary, instead, took a more pragmatic po-
sition using Visegrad as a framework for settling tensions with 
neighbouring countries. The Poles have been the most enthusi-
astic, with their policy of participating in and, possibly, leading 
different sub-regional initiatives. Slovakia, after Meciar’s defeat, 
used the Visegrad framework to present to the West a new im-
age of the country14. 
The strongest argument against transforming regional coop-
eration into integration and make it an alternative to joining the 
EU, was economic. Geremek exemplified this position: “People 
aren’t interested in alliances with poor neighbours. They want 
to be with the rich countries”15. First of all, the CECs wanted 
to quickly move closer to the so-called “modernisation poles”. 
Secondly, the collapse of the CMEA further reduced the al-
ready poor interregional trade. Thirdly, the development of an 
infra-regional market was deterred since every country used to 
produce and export similar goods and depend on similar im-
ports. The shift from a centralised market to a market economy 
required adequate know-how which could only by hastened by 
contacts with Western and international markets. 
14 On the Visegrad countries competition as for joining the EU see G. 
Kolankiewicz, “Consesus and Competition in the Eastern Enlargement of  
the European Union”, International Affairs, vol. 70, no. 3, July-August 1994, pp. 
483-484. 
15 Quoted in F. Lewis, “Bringing in the East”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 4, 
September-October 1990. 
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Visegrad cooperation resulted instead in a valuable scheme for 
the removal of protectionist measures by the establishment of 
the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), signed 
in 1992. This, besides resting on bilateral agreements rather 
than on a multilateral arrangement, succeeded in liberalising 
almost 90% of trade and industrial goods. These arrangements 
contributed to the re-establishing of normal levels of trade that 
also had a positive impact on production, employment, and 
incomes. Trade development increased regional efficiency and 
industry specialisation on the basis of comparative advantages. 
Those economic actors who were ready to penetrate CECs mar-
kets rather than EU markets mostly benefited from CEFTA. In 
some cases, competition within CEFTA was even stronger than 
the EU market pressure. Competition of steel products from 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, for instance, swept Hungary 
products off the market. CEFTA accelerated the occurrence of 
the adjustment costs that the CECs would have to face anyway 
once in the EU. 
Although the EU was a major trading partner, the total vol-
ume of trade among CEFTA members became significant too. 
The EU-CEFTA relations were characterised by a consistent 
trade deficit for the CECs proving that CEFTA was not a com-
petitive trade bloc for the EU while Visegrad could not aspire to 
replace the role of the EU for the development of the region16. 
Regional trading blocs could not be considered as alternatives 
to multilateral trade liberalisation and to global free trade. 
After the 1998 economic crisis, the Czech Republic became 
more cooperative and the defeat of Meciar in Slovakia contrib-
uted to the revitalisation of the Visegrad Group. The group used 
the CECs’ ability to smooth competitive positions and over-
come possible conflicts. The CECs backed Slovakia’s accession 
16 Trade became a structural problem after reaching peaks in 1993 and 1996. In 
1993, imports from the EU grew by 75% while exports only grew by 53% com-
pared to the previous year. In 1996, the deficit grew further when imports from 
EU countries increased by 20% and exports lagged behind at a growth of  only 
6% compared to 1995.
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to both NATO and the EU17. Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán underlined that: “The most important objective 
of the V4 was to help each other to become part of the integra-
tion process”18. The Slovak Foreign Minister, Jan Figel, on the 
occasion of the Visegrad Group meeting in Bratislava (14 May 
1999) emphasised that “Slovakia is returning where it naturally 
belongs […] and this new beginning can help Bratislava in its 
quest to be included with the EU fast track candidates as well as 
promoting its candidacy to NATO and the OECD”.
Beside these economic achievements, the Visegrad Group 
has been generally reactive rather than proactive in relation to 
Brussels. In the table below, we have synthesized the V4 evolu-
tion on the basis of their reaction to the EU approach towards 
the group.
17 Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were admitted to NATO in 1999 while 
Slovakia only in 2004. In December 1997, the Luxembourg European Council 
agreed to open accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus but not with Slovakia. Finally, the Helsinki 
European Council in December 1999 took the decision to open negotiations 
with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Malta. 
18 “V4 embraces new Slovakia”, The Slovak Spectator, vol. 5, no. 20, pp. 24-30, 
May 1999. 
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Especially in the early 1990s, the Visegrad Group was more a 
projection of the EU’s expectations regarding the region rath-
er than a group with a clear stance and strategy, as countries 
preferred an individual approach towards the EU. Even in the 
final round of negotiations with the EU, when a group strate-
gy could have strengthened the countries leverage, each mem-
ber fought for itself. Poland, for instance, adopting a free-rider 
position, succeeded in winning the most. Nevertheless, during 
their first meeting (13 January 2003), following the closing of 
the accession negotiations, the V4 agreed to continue group 
cooperation post-accession. The representatives also agreed to 
back the quick ratification of Slovak membership in NATO 
and to participate in each other’s referendum campaign for EU 
membership. Moreover, under the new voting rules and powers 
under the Treaty of Nice, broad coalitions are necessary; there-
fore the V4 started to be considered as a political opportunity 
since the CECs represent 60 million people within the EU. 
In response to French President Chirac’s rebuke for having 
rallied behind the Anglo-American position on Iraq, Czech 
Prime Minister, Cyril Svoboda, already pointed out that “[…] 
after the enlargement the votes of the V4 will carry as much 
weight as those of France and Germany”. He went on to state 
that cooperation among the V4 should continue to ensure that 
their voices are heard and to guarantee equality in the EU19. 
In the early 1990s, besides the Visegrad cooperation, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and the former Yugoslavia es-
tablished another consultation platform, the Pentagonal, which 
Poland joined in 1991, with the aim of developing wide politi-
cal, technical, economical, scientific, and cultural collaboration. 
Through this, Italy sought a way of exerting a certain influence 
in the region but the war in Yugoslavia undermined the whole 
19 Austria, for instance, formally invited the Foreign Ministers of  the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland to discuss (6 June 2001) a 
proposal for the creation of  a Central European Strategic Partnership aimed at 
defending the joint interests of  the region and of  smaller states in the EU model 
of  the Benelux.
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plan. The cooperation was open to different members and it 
was transformed into the Central European Initiative (CEI) 
that has generally dealt with the development of cross-border 
infrastructures thanks also to the support of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The CECs also 
took part in other forms of regionalism as a way to play a role in 
the whole post-communist era, to reaffirm their aspiration to be 
a bridge between the West and the East and, to further increase 
their international leverage. Poland, for instance, has been very 
active in the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), especially 
while holding the presidency of the group (2015-2016)20. 
Regional cooperation, 
a versatile political resource
After the CECs joined NATO in 1999 (apart from Slovakia 
that joined in 2004) and the EU in 2004, the Visegrad Group 
became an important forum for keeping mutual contacts at 
all levels: from high-level political summits, to diplomat and 
expert meetings, to individual, think tanks, research centres, 
and regional non-governmental organisation (NGOs) activi-
ties. The group also started to deal with issues, such as climate 
and energy, that are strategic for the region. In recent years, 
the sharing of internal and external security challenges (espe-
cially “new ones”  – suffice here to recall the common position 
achieved rejecting migrant quotas21) has probably turned out to 
be the main reason behind improved cooperation among part-
ners, a case in point being energy needs and thus the necessity 
to achieve energy security. Moreover, cross-border energy infra-
structure and transportation, together with considerable trade 
20 For more information about the Polish presidency, please go to www.baltic.
mfa.gov.pl.
21 See for example Euractiv, “Visegrad Summit Rejects Migrant Quotas”, 7 
September 2015.
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relations, have further increased the need for cooperation22. 
If terrorism is not listed among the top challenges, organised 
crime, originated both by internal inefficiencies and new exter-
nal phenomena and pressures, is a prominent challenge exhib-
iting common features in all states and requiring coordinated 
actions. Their status as “transit countries”, as well as main gates 
into the EU, urges these states to put forward fitting measures, 
as well as to shape regional approaches to face, among others, 
illegal flows, while properly managing regular migration. These 
and other “new” challenges affecting all Visegrad partners may 
be the most important trigger for the definition of common 
security objectives in the EU and NATO23. 
In 2009, the Visegrad members decided to meet before every 
European Council to reach a common position on a varied set 
of issues to be proposed to other Member States24. An example 
of this commitment has been the two meetings held in 2013 to 
discuss a new European Security Strategy proposal to be sub-
mitted to the incoming European Council25. By actively con-
tributing to the EU’s security and strategic updating, the group 
was contributing to build regional and global security. 
Within the group, Poland has shown clear ambitions of lead-
ership, if only for its more relevant position in the economic 
and security spheres, something which in turn is expected to 
increase its negotiation power and its influence within the EU 
context. In recent years, and especially thanks to the running of 
22  D. Kałan, “Towards a new North-South Axis: Poland’s Cooperation with 
Czech Republic and Slovakia”, Bulletin, vol. 79, no. 412, Polish Institute of  
International Affairs, Warsaw, 23 August 2012. 
23  I. Samson, J. Hamberger, G. Horváth, V. Tarasoviè, A. Molis, and M. Samus, 
“Assessment of  Visegrad Cooperation from a Security Perspective: Is the 
Visegrad Group still Vital in the ‘Zeros’ of  the 21st Century?”, in C. Törő (Ed.), 
Visegrad Cooperation within NATO and CSDP, V4 Papers, no. 2, Polish Institute of  
International Affairs, Warsaw, 2011.
24 Council of  Ministers, Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016, Warsaw, March 
2012, p. 18.
25 National Security Bureau, “V4 Members Work on the Proposal of  the New 
European Security Strategy?”, Meeting in Jurata., 2013.
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the Visegrad Presidency from July 2012 to June 2013, Poland 
has used this forum for strengthening the “North-South” di-
mension of its foreign policy26 – that is, a “vertical” axis of co-
operation compared to a horizontal one, which sees Poland en-
gaging with France and Germany. 
The “North-South” dimension acquired a particular rele-
vance during the Arab Springs. Poland immediately mobilised 
to share lessons from its transition with the Arab countries, es-
pecially Tunisia and Egypt. Generally, the new EU members 
from Central Europe, which have successfully accomplished 
transition, display important comparative advantages in de-
mocracy promotion with regard to the Middle East and North 
Africa because they were not colonial powers in the region (in 
comparison to other EU Member States, e.g., France and Italy). 
After the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, these countries 
promptly funded experience-sharing conferences, seminars, 
study visits, and training sessions covering a range of issues, 
from economic and security sector reform to election monitor-
ing and transitional justice27. 
Poland is also increasingly investing in the so-called “Weimar 
Triangle”, with the aim of enhancing the reach of its intra-Eu-
ropean action. Established in Weimar in 1991 as an informal 
meeting, the format was mainly conceived to ignite coopera-
tion, overcome past divisions within Europe, and help the tran-
sition of Poland towards a fully-fledged democracy among the 
European community of states. The partnership with Germany 
and France, especially sustained by the Civic Platform party, 
has been conceived to spur coordination with key “political and 
economic” partners, and to set the country close to the “engine” 
of the European integration process. This has contributed to 
26 D. Kałan (2012). 
27 This important aspect, among others, regarding the CEEC democracy assis-
tance in the Arab countries has been underlined in the paper by K. Mikulova and 
B. Berti, “Converts to Missionaries: Central and Eastern European Democracy 
Assistance in the Arab World”, Paper, Carnegie Endowment for Democracy, 30 
July 2013. 
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make Poland a stronger country among the new EU members. 
The relevance attached to this forum has waxed and waned, 
following different political positions towards Germany. The 
difficult past characterising these countries has inevitably im-
pacted on their relations; and yet, both seem to have progres-
sively recognised the importance of overcoming past suspicions 
and mistrust. In fact, it was Germany who mostly supported 
Poland’s membership in the EU. Moreover, from an economic 
standpoint, it is important to recall that Germany is Poland’s 
main trade partner, although to a lesser extent than two decades 
ago. Even in the security field, cooperation seems to have im-
proved in recent years, including the use of interoperable and 
integrated armaments, joint training, and naval missions in the 
Baltic Sea.
The forum offers the opportunity to discuss common posi-
tions and advance core European and Polish interests such as 
the promotion of the common defence policy and the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP)28. Recently, the idea has been re-proposed by 
Poland to create EU Battlegroups29 that would ensure a rapid 
reaction in crisis situations (a Weimar Triangle Battlegroup30 
and a Visegrad one31 have, for a long time, been the subject 
of discussions among partners). A constant dialogue between 
three great powers would prove increasingly relevant also for 
influencing the pace and reach of the EaP. The V4 has progres-
sively extended its relations to the EaP partners and the Balkan 
countries too. The V4 countries have decided to use their col-
lective leverage, as successful new members of the EU, to help 
the Western Balkans to become a true region in political, eco-
nomic, and security terms. They have pledged the EU to accel-
erate ongoing accession talks with Montenegro and Serbia and 
28  Council of  Ministers (2012), p. 16.
29 Ibid., p. 15.
30 T. Bunde, D.P. Jankowki and M. Michelot,“Reassurance First: Goals for an 
Ambitious Weimar Triangle”, Center for European Policy Analysis, 10 June 2014.
31 Atlantic Council, Visegrad Countries may turn EU Battlegroup into Permanent 
V4 Rapid Reaction Force, 3 July 2014.
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to open membership negotiations with the other countries in 
western Balkans as well. 
The refugee crisis has led to a revitalisation of the V4 as the 
threat of an increasing number of migrants from the South-East 
has required a coordinated response. The Hungarian Prime 
Minister Orbán has opposed the EU’s refugee relocation policy 
and promoted the building of a border fence. He has also called 
for opening up migration reception centres in Africa and for 
adopting a tough line on NGOs, especially foreign ones. In 
February 2016, the states of the Visegrad Group made a joint 
declaration concerning a common security policy. While sup-
porting the measures adopted by the EU with the aim of a more 
effective protection of the external borders, including reinforced 
cooperation with third countries, they reiterated their negative 
stance on automatic permanent relocation mechanisms. They 
also discussed possible next steps and practical actions to sta-
bilize the situation on the Western Balkans migration route: 
increasing communication among the concerned countries, 
strengthening security, and preventing regional tensions32.
The Visegrad Group and, in particular, the Polish President 
Andrzej Duda, have drawn attention to the area between the 
three seas – the Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea33. This 
region accounts for 28% of EU territory, 22% of its population 
but only for 10% of its GDP. In the occasion of the Three Seas 
Initiative (Dubrovnik, 28 August 2016), it has been proposed 
to improve the infrastructure of the whole region, and in par-
ticular energetic cooperation, mainly to promote the plurality 
of energy sources and reduce energy dependence. During the 
32 See http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-on
33 The Three Seas Initiative has been a priority of  the Polish foreign policy es-
pecially since the Law and Justice Party came to power. Between the two World 
Wars, Poland sought to establish a great “Międzymorze”, a federation of  the 
countries of  Central and Eastern Europe that should have opposed the suprem-
acy of  the Soviet Union and Germany. The project was inspired to the history 
of  the Republic of  the Two Nations, the union of  the Kingdom of  Poland and 
the Grand Duchy of  Lithuania that extended to its peak (around 1600) from the 
Baltic to the Black Sea. 
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2017 Three Seas Initiative that took place in Poland (6 July 
2017) at the presence of the US President, Donald Trump, 
the Polish President stressed that: “The region has to catch 
up with the West in terms of transport infrastructure, that is, 
roads and railways, but also telecommunications and energy”. 
Duda emphasised also the importance of encouraging central 
and local governments to cooperate first and foremost on busi-
ness and proposed to create a business forum of the Three Seas 
countries34. 
Recently, Visegrad countries have taken different stances re-
garding the EU, which could bring some tension in the group. 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia reinforced relations with 
France and Germany and are committed to the strengthening 
of the EU project (e.g., the Czech Republic is set to require 
an observer status at meetings of Eurozone finance Ministers). 
On the other side, Poland and Hungary, have clashed with the 
European Commission and Western European governments for 
breaching the rule of law in disregard of the EU’s basic values. 
The European Commission has taken legal action against both 
governments for violating specific EU laws and is threatening 
to go further on Poland. The European Parliament supports 
this course of action and is preparing further action against 
Hungary. 
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the 1989 existential changes in Central 
Europe, the possibility of creating new organisations on a re-
gional basis from scratch was not only excluded for “ideologi-
cal” and economic reasons, but also because it would have re-
quired a great amount of energy and resources that the CECs 
preferred to devote to domestic reforms and accession into the 
EU. In contrast with “new regionalism” that assumed that a 
34 http://www.prezydent.pl/en/news/art,493,president-duda-many-infrastruc-
ture-projects-possible-in-cee-.html
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security consensus could generate regional or sub-regional 
forms of cooperation, the CECs accession to NATO made a 
regional agenda based on new forms of security cooperation 
inconsistent. The only security they trusted was that guaranteed 
by the US within NATO context, the pillar of the Cold War 
defence system. For the CECs, regionalism meant being part of 
the EU, as the outcome of a long and fruitful regional integra-
tion process that could fulfil their post-communist goals as the 
consolidation of democracy, accession to the common market 
and to the EU’s financial resources. Trough membership into 
the EU, CECs also re-appropriated of their European identity, 
leaving aside their Soviet past.  
As mentioned in the introduction, regionalism in Central 
Europe was not a spontaneous phenomenon being rather in-
duced by the EU as a propaedeutic platform where the CECs 
could learn to cooperate and gradually familiarize with EU leg-
islation and practices. While waiting to join NATO and the 
EU, “induced” regionalism was hoped to help the stabilisa-
tion of the countries, building a sort of security community. 
However, the CECs have tended to see this propaedeutic form 
of cooperation as an impediment towards Brussels, especially 
because they were competing for gaining a place in the EU. 
One of the positive outcomes of the Visegrad Group coopera-
tion was, at that time, the CEFTA, which actually prepared the 
participants to cope with the effects of the free trade and thus 
of the EU’s common market. 
Only as the EU membership got closer, they considered re-
gional cooperation as an opportunity for strengthening their 
position in the organisation and exerting a collective leverage 
within the EU. In other words, CEC’s committed to regional 
cooperation as much as they believed this could help them to 
achieve their national interests that happened to be quite simi-
lar as they were all coming from the experience of the Soviet tu-
telage and they all wanted to join the EU and being treated on 
an equal footing with the other members of the organisation. 
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The existence of the Visegrad Group, the most formalised re-
gional cooperation in Central Europe, seems to depend on the 
willingness of some of its members to take the lead of the group 
while the sharing of a presumed common identity has never 
proved to be a strong and enduring cementing factor. Poland, 
in particular, has been a very active member, as it aims at ex-
ploiting the group to pursue its national interests. The group 
has, time after time, converged on some relevant policies as en-
ergy, transports, and migration. Nevertheless, its credibility is 
at risk after Hungary’s and Poland’s democracies show signs of 
deterioration and regression. 
Despite these backdrops, the group has committed to sup-
port the accession of the Balkan States to the EU and to call 
for consistent policies towards their Eastern neighbours, no-
tably Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. At the same time, these 
countries were ready to share their transition experience with 
the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean. 
Furthermore, the Visegrad group has engaged in establishing 
a network of countries along the North-South dimension for 
supporting specific projects. The group is working as an engine 
of selective cooperation across a broad region at the doorsteps 
of the EU. These cross-regional activities can contribute to sta-
bilize the EU’s closest neighbours and reinforce the policies 
Brussels is already implanting. In this function, we believe, lies 
one of the greatest chances for the group in the near future: 
creating connections, reducing distances, and overcoming di-
visions starting from “functional” forms of cooperation. The 
success of these initiatives depends, however, on the Visegrad 
countries’ capacity to avoid tensions and rivalries among them-
selves while not entering in conflict with the EU. After more 
than two decades of Central European regional cooperation, 
this is still waving depending on individual states efforts and 
it is still ancillary to the EU, either when CECs support it or 
criticize it.  
6.  Identity, Security, and 
     Development Policies. The Drivers 
     behind Cooperation in Central Asia
Carlo Frappi
Central Asia – i.e. the area encompassing the five former Soviet 
“Stans” of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan – has been dubbed “the region that isn’t”1, an area 
whose post-Soviet development has been shaped by the persis-
tent inconsistency or failure of regional cooperation schemes. 
As a matter of fact, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have 
not managed to put forward efficient durable and inclusive for-
mats for institutional cooperation, either in the security or eco-
nomic realms and, in comparison with other regional environ-
ments, the area is one of the less integrated in both strategic and 
economic terms. Therefore, while Central Asia can be viewed 
as a region in purely geographic or cultural terms, apparently it 
does not behave as such in institutional ones.
The lack of inclusive formats for regional integration is all 
the more blatant in consideration of the evident proliferation of 
regional mechanisms for cooperation, which, consistently with 
a wider trend unfolding in the whole post-Soviet space, did not 
bring any concrete result in terms of integration, justifying the 
theory of a merely “ephemeral regionalism”2. The weakness – if 
1 B. Kausikan, F. Starr and Y. Cheng, “Central Asia: All Together Now”, The 
American Interest, 16 June 2017.
2 In proposing this label, Wirminghaus highlights that between 1991 and 2010 
a total of  36 initiatives of  cooperation came into being in the former Soviet 
Union area, 28 just in the first decade after USSR dissolution. N. Wirminghaus, 
“Ephemeral regionalism: The proliferation of  (failed) regional integration 
initiatives in post-soviet Eurasia”, in T. Börzel et al. (Eds.), Roads to Regionalism: 
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not the absence – of a Central Asian regionalist path appears 
blatant also because the area seems to possess all the basic mate-
rial and immaterial features that, according to the mainstream 
literature on regionalism, are conducive to the establishment of 
regional frameworks for cooperation and integration, in geo-
graphical as well as in cultural and economic terms. At the time 
of independence from the Soviet Union, and largely as a conse-
quence of its institutional peculiarities, the CARs were indeed 
bound together by the legacy of the previous economic system, 
based upon functional specialization and interdependence be-
tween its Republics3. Moreover, their productive apparatuses 
were interconnected not only in terms of economic speciali-
zations, but also in terms of infrastructural networks, which, 
notwithstanding their eminently Russo-centric nature, were 
critically important for a region shaped by a land-locked con-
dition and by its peripheral location with respect to the main 
Eurasian trade channels4. 
Genesis, Design, and Effects of  Regional Organizations, London - New York, Routledge, 
2012, p. 25.
3 In 1991, intra-USSR economic exchange between the Central Asian Socialist 
Republics and the other SSRs (excepting Russia, given its international exports 
of  energy and raw materials) accounted for a quota of  the total turnover between 
87% and 99.5%. I. Burakovsky, “Economic Integration and Security in the Post-
Soviet Space”, in R. Legvold and C. Wallander (Eds.), Swords and Sustenance. The 
Economics of  Security in Belarus and Ukraine, Cambridge and London,  MIT Press, 
2004, p. 164.
4 Although only Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are strictly land-locked 
– with the latter being one of  only two countries in the world (the other being 
Luxembourg) that are “doubly land-locked” – nevertheless the Caspian littoral 
states also share the main features of  land-lockness. As far Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan are concerned, access through the basin to the Volga River does 
not exclude them from the aforesaid category. Indeed, as Glassner noted, the 
category includes those states “which have access to the sea via internationalized 
navigable rivers […]. Such states [...] consider themselves land-locked and are 
here considered land-locked because they do not exercise ‘sovereign’ control 
over their aqueous highways to the sea”. I. Glassner, Access to the Sea for Developing 
Land-Locked States, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, p. 2.
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Besides economic and physical incentives to cooperation, the 
CARs were also bound together in security terms, given the pre-
vailing transnational character of the threats to regional stabili-
ty. First and foremost, the arbitrary Soviet drawing of Socialist 
Republics’ borders inherited by the CARs left them the peril-
ous legacy of latent ethno-territorial tensions resulting from the 
widespread presence of minorities ethnically akin to neighbor-
ing states’ “titular” nationality (see tab. no.1), as well as from 
sovereignty disputes over contested territories5. Secondly, the 
environmental hazards resulting from the Soviet over-exploita-
tion of the Aral Sea for agricultural purposes further bound 
Central Asian states together, the more so as a consequence of 
their reliance on shared water resources.  
Tab. 1 - CARs’ ethnic composition in 1989: titular 
nationalities and minorities akin to neighboring SSRs
Source: T. Atabaki and S. Mehendale (eds.), Central Asia and the Caucasus: 
Transnationalism and Diaspora, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 5.
While the above-mentioned factors naturally resulted in the 
wide range of scholars’ attention to and debate about regional 
integration trends and dynamics, interest in Central Asia grew 
5 For an overview of  the consequence of  Soviet border-drawing legacy, see: 
International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Border disputes and conflict potential, ICG 
Asia Report No. 33, Osh and Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2002.
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Kazakhs 39.6% 0.8% 0.2% 2.4% 4.0%
Kyrgyz -- 52.3% 1.2% -- 0.8%
Tajiks -- 0.7% 62.2% -- 4.7%
Turkmen 0.1% -- 0.3% 72.0% 0.6%
Uzbeks 2.0% 12.9% 23.5% 8.9% 71.3%
Russians 37.8% 21.5% 7.6% 9.4% 8.3%
Population 16,46,000 4,258,000 5,093,000 3,523,000 19,810,000
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also as a consequence of the significant role the area came to 
play in the post-bipolar environment, as a consequence of its 
peculiar geopolitical features. The latter, indeed, not only in-
fluenced local actors’ opportunity-risk perceptions and their 
attitudes towards inter-state cooperation, but also shaped a 
seeming competition for regional influence among major pow-
ers that generated abundant literature regarding the so-called 
“New Great Game”.
The main geopolitical feature of the area is its precise geo-
graphical location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass, which 
made Central Asia, at different times, a conduit for exchanges 
of ideas and commerce among the world’s main civilizations 
and empires or, alternatively, a friction point among them – i.e. 
a “land bridge role” best epitomized by the Silk Route epos, or a 
ground for confrontation as was the case at the time of the XIX 
century Russian-British “Great Game”. Ever since the dissolu-
tion of the USSR, the geostrategic value of an area occupying 
a pivotal position between the main Eurasian security chess-
boards resurfaced from the ashes of strict Soviet rule, re-ignit-
ing a competition for influence involving not only neighboring 
powers, but also global actors, first and foremost the Unites 
States and to a lesser extent the European Union. 
The second, equally important Central Asian geopolitical fac-
tor is the availability of a significant raw materials base, first and 
foremost in terms of hydrocarbon reserves. While unevenly dis-
tributed across the region, all in all sub-regional proven reserves 
of oil and gas account respectively for 1.9% and 17.8% of the 
world’s proven reserves6. Given the magnitude of these regional 
6 The regional oil reserves are concentrated mainly in Kazakhstan (30 thousand 
million barrels) and to a lesser extent in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (0,6 
thousand millions each). With reserves inferior on a world-scale only to Russian, 
Iranian and Qatari ones (17,5 Trillion cubic metres), Turkmenistan is regional 
power-house in terms of  gas reservers, while Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
possess only limited yet significant reserves (1,1 and 1 respectively). Meanwhile, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are not endowed with hydrocarbon resources. Bp, BP 
Statistical Review of  World Energy, June 2017, www.bp.com/statisticalreview 
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hydrocarbons’ reserves, it is hard to overestimate the role the 
energy sector came to play not only for the CARs’ domestic 
and foreign policy, but also for extra-regional energy-consum-
ing powers’ projection toward the area, aimed at expanding and 
diversifying their supply sources and channels. 
Making use of an eclectic analytical perspective integrating 
constructivist and neo-realist frameworks for analysis, the arti-
cle aims at appraising how the nexus between identity, security 
and economic development policies impinged upon the un-
folding of regional cooperation schemes, highlighting the rea-
sons why in Central Asia national and regional interests hardly 
align, leaving room for competition and confrontation among 
the CARs instead of fostering cooperation and interdependence 
trends. Moreover, while the appraisal of the various cooperation 
schemes involving the CARs falls outside the scope of the pres-
ent article, the latter aims at summarising the regional frame-
works’ main features, starting from the rationale behind their 
initiation or their membership. In order to do so, after intro-
ducing the peculiar nexus between the post-Soviet nation- and 
state-building processes and their repercussions on attitudes 
towards cooperation, the article will focus on regional organ-
isations’ recurring and intertwined features, here grouped for 
convenience under three main headings: the priority of secu-
rity over economic development; the balancing logic influenc-
ing regional leaderships’ choices; the prevalence progressively 
gained by externally-driven frameworks for cooperation. 
For the purposes of this article, notwithstanding all the 
afore-mentioned limitations in strictly behavioral terms, 
Central Asia is seen and referred to as a “region”, in the sense of 
a compact geographical area that shares important geopolitical, 
historical, cultural, social and economic bonds – i.e. those fac-
tors which generally lead the greater part of scholars as well as 
the main Euro-Atlantic institutions to identify the CARs as a 
natural grouping of states.
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Identity politics and inter-state relations 
in Central Asia
The USSR’s dissolution initiated in newly independent Central 
Asian states a complex and multiform transition phase, occur-
ring at the institutional level as well as at political, economic 
and, no less significantly, identity levels. That is, the need to 
construct on the ashes of the Soviet social pact a new bond 
for national belonging and for civic participation overlapped 
– and, to a great extent, mixed – with the parallel urgency 
to ensure substance to the abruptly achieved full sovereignty. 
Therefore, the processes of state and nation building not only 
chronologically overlapped, but also obviously nourished each 
other, in a context made more complex by the profound social, 
institutional and economic crises left behind by the dissolution 
of the Soviet state system. While the state-building process was 
made more complex by the rapidity of the process leading to 
USSR dissolution, by the local leaderships’ lack of previous ex-
perience and by the absence of those intellectual and nationalist 
forces that had guided countries towards independence in other 
areas of the Union7, the nation-building process was strongly 
influenced by the USSR legacy, influencing both the foreign 
policy-making process and the resulting attitudes towards a re-
gional integration process.
The spreading of a sense of national belonging throughout 
Central Asia is a relatively recent phenomenon, initiated during 
the modernisation process occurring under Russian imperial 
rule and culminating under the Soviet’s8. It was primarily the 
7 See M. Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s Catapult to Independence”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 71, no. 3, 1992, pp. 108-130; M. Beisinger, Nationalist  Mobilization  and  the 
Collapse  of   the  Soviet  State, Cambridge, Cambridge University  Press, 2002.
8 As for the main features of  Soviet nationality engineering see: F. Hirsch, 
Empire of  Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of  the Soviet Union, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 2005; T. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nation 
and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001. See also: 
A. Haugen, The Establishment of  National Republics in Soviet Central Asia, New York, 
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latter’s peculiar concept of nation that most influenced the way 
in which post-Soviet leaderships came to understand, portray 
and pursue the national project. That is, if Hobsbawn’s theory 
that “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the oth-
er way round”9 holds true, nowhere like in Central Asia does 
this process appear so evident10 and, at the same time, nothing 
proved more influential in fostering ethnic self-consciousness 
and in setting the parameters for the development of a sense of 
national affiliation among Central Asian leaderships than the 
Soviet nationality-based federal system. Accordingly, the na-
tion-building process was shaped by what has been described11 
as a three-fold process: the essentialisation and primordialisation 
of the nation, i.e. the identification of its essential traits and 
their representation as linear, continuous and singular; the his-
toricization of the nation, pursued through the rediscovery of an 
ethnic past and through a selective history generating national 
myths and symbols; the totalization of the nation, aimed at the 
“collectivization” of individuals, which turns relative differences 
into absolute ones. On this backdrop, Central Asian suprana-
tional, civilizational or regional identities proved to be much 
weaker than the national (and even sub-national) one12, with 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
9 E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, myth, reality, 2nd ed., 
New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.10. In the same vein, E. Gellner, 
Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983; B. Anderson, 
Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of  Nationalism, 3rd ed., 
London and New York, Verso, 1996.
10 W. Van Schendel and E. Zurcher (eds.), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the 
Muslim World. Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century, London and 
New York, Tauris, 2001.
11 G. Smith, “Post-colonialism and Borderland Identities”, in G. Smith et al. 
(Eds.), Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of  National Identities, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.15-16. 
12 R.G. Suny, “Provisional Stabilities. The Politics of  Identities in Post-Soviet 
Eurasia”, International Security, vol. 24, no. 3, 1999-2000, p. 165. As for the 
influence of  sub-national – i.e. local and clan – identities on the post-Soviet 
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the latter being shaped by the primordial Soviet concept, which 
contributed to the spreading of an ethno-territorial conception 
of nationalism hampering inter-state cooperation.
The ethno-territorial concept of the nation more often than 
not resulted in competing nationalisms, which, by juxtaposing 
opposing historical narratives, ended up by driving the CARs 
apart rather than bringing them closer under a common re-
gional identity. Two key elements help clarify how identity, far 
from being an impetus for regional aggregation, worked on 
the contrary as a strategic polarisation factor. First and fore-
most, national identity became a source of legitimation for the 
possession of a given territory, i.e. for the relationship between 
a nation and a territory deemed as ancestral. In a region like 
Central Asia, where the process of boundary-making had been 
highly arbitrary, the exclusionary concept of the nation nat-
urally resulted in opposing historical narratives and, thus, in 
tensions between neighboring countries. This is particularly 
the case with Uzbek and Tajik – and, to a lesser extent, Kyrgyz 
– ethno-territorial nationalisms, with the latter being the mir-
ror image of the former in building the nation’s historicisation 
process upon the same founding myths13. Secondly, the pri-
mordialisation and the  historicisation of the nation became a 
source of legitimation not only for the incumbent post-Soviet 
leaderships, but also for the “historical missions” they had and 
were interpreters of. Thus, the affirmation of national identity 
became a privileged tool for regional power competition, as ap-
pears particularly manifest in the case of Uzbekistan’s hegemon-
ic ambitions (see below). 
The indirectly proportional relationship between the develop-
ment of an ethno-territorially based nationalism and a positive 
attitude toward inter-state cooperation seems to be validated, in 
transition see Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, Cambridge 
and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
13 S. Abashin, “Nation-construction in post-Soviet Central Asia”, in M, Bassin 
and C. Kelly (Eds.), Soviet and post-Soviet identities, Cambridge and New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 163-164.
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an opposite perspective, also by the Kazakh case. Chiefly by vir-
tue of the peculiar ethnic composition of Kazakhstan – where 
in 1991 Kazakhs were only a minority of the whole population 
(see Table 1) – the newly independent republic developed a civ-
ic-based understanding of the nation. Therefore, in a de facto 
bi-national Russian-Kazakh state, the “Kazakhisation” of the 
country has coexisted with the promotion of a “multinational 
state in which all the “Kazakhstanis” would have equal civic 
rights and opportunities”14. The Kazakhstan leadership’s legiti-
mation strategies were therefore chiefly output-based rather than 
input-based15, i.e. less dependent on founding myths than on 
performance, intended in terms of domestic economic devel-
opment as well as in terms of foreign policy behaviour and in-
ternational recognition. The latter, supported by an export-led 
development strategy16, naturally resulted in a more positive at-
titude not only towards participation in international fora, but 
also towards regional cooperation and integration, with a view 
to enhancing and exploiting its comparatively greater economic 
strength to advance a leadership role in Central Asia. Astana’s 
preference for a cooperation – and, potentially, integration – 
path revolving around economic and trade arrangements re-
sulted in the formation of the rare frameworks involving exclu-
sively Central Asian actors. Such was the case, in particular, for 
the Central Asian Economic Cooperation (CAEC) established 
in 1994 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (joined 
by Tajikistan in 1998) and re-launched as the Central Asian 
Cooperation Organization (CACO) in 2002. Such initiatives, 
however, fell victim to intra-regional power competition with 
14 R.G. Suny (1999-2000), p. 174. See also: A. Del Sordi, “Legitimation and the 
Party of  Power in Kazakhstan”, in M. Brusis, J. Ahrens and M. Schulze Wessel 
(Eds.), Politics and legitimacy in post-Soviet Eurasia, Houndmills and Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 72-96. 
15 C. von Soest and J. Grauvogel, “Comparing Legitimation Strategies in Post-
Soviet Countries”, in M. Brusis et al. (2016), pp. 18-46.
16 G. Gleason, Markets and Politics in Central Asia. Structural reform and political change, 
London - New York, Taylor & Francis, 2003, pp. 52-53.
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Uzbekistan (see below), progressively shifting Kazakh prefer-
ences for cooperation from a purely regional perspective to a 
supra-regional one that included Russia. In doing so, Astana de 
facto ceased to perceive itself as a constituent part of a Central 
Asian region,  instead considering “Russia to be an integral part 
of any region or sub-region to which it belongs”17. Consistently 
with this trend, CACO – the only remaining purely Central 
Asian organisation – merged with the Russian-led Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC) and ceased to exist in 2005. 
In a broader view, supranational, civilisational or regional 
identities in no case proved to be viable drivers for enhancing 
inter-state cooperation among Central Asian states as well as 
between the latter and extra-regional kin states. This trend ap-
parently emerged in relation to the two key common identity 
features of the CARs18, which in the aftermath of the USSR’s 
dissolution many scholars and practitioners predicted – or, 
rather, feared – would have superseded the discredited Soviet 
social pact. The reference here goes, on the one hand, to the eth-
no-linguistic Turkic matrix shared by most of the CARs – with 
the only exception of Tajikistan – and, on the other, to religious 
affiliation with Islam. Indeed, since Russian imperial times to 
date Islam has been the main shared source of identification 
for Central Asian peoples and, after gaining independence, the 
CARs almost naturally sought to reaffirm their belonging to 
the Ummah19. However, while this attitude drove them to join 
the main international institutions of the Islamic community – 
namely, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which they 
all joined between 1992 and 1996 – it did not count as an 
17 A. Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order”, 
International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3,  2004, p. 493.
18 K. Gharabaghi, “New Regionalisms in Central Asia in the 1990s”, in L. Swatuk 
and T. Shaw (Eds.), The South at the End of  the Twentieth Century, London, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1994, p. 142.
19 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, Regional Organisations in Central Asia: Patterns of  
Interaction, Dilemmas of   Efficiency, Working paper no.10, Institute for Public Policy 
and Administration, 2012, p. 16.
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incentive to develop intra-regional or supra-regional alignment 
based upon shared religious faith. This has chiefly to do with the 
peculiar nature of Central Asian Islam, which bears an inclusive 
cultural and even spatial identity rather than a strictly religious 
one20. At the same time, this once again calls into question the 
relationship between state- and nation-building processes since 
post-Soviet leaderships almost unanimously perceived the risk 
associated with Islamism – in terms of both foreign influence 
and the rise of a non-state source of political loyalty21 – and, 
consequentially, downgraded the contribution given by religion 
to national identity and adopted rigid mechanisms to subordi-
nate Islam and its clergy to the state apparatus.
Cultural kinship did not account for a steady cooperation 
incentive even in the case of the shared ethno-linguistic Turkic 
bonds. While the Turkic CARs joined the Turkey-sponsored 
framework for dialogue and cultural promotion22, they did not 
subscribe to Ankara’s attempt to found upon ethno-linguistic 
kinship a political-diplomatic platform or alignment with a 
more or less latent pan-Turkic spirit. In doing so, they demon-
strated that, as the nexus between identity and foreign policy 
came to the fore, the latter had a natural priority over the for-
mer. In the specific case, the refusal to subscribe to a highly po-
liticized initiative first and foremost exposed the CARs’ reluc-
tance to curtail room for diplomatic maneuver – i.e. channeling 
20 R.G. Suny (1999-2000), p. 166.
21 P. Kubicek, “Regionalism, nationalism and Realpolitik in Central Asia”, Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 49, no. 4, 1997, p. 647.
22 Cooperation among Turkic CARs and Turkey developed within the framework 
of  the “Heads of  State Summit of  Turkish Speaking Countries”, launched in 
1992 and supported by the establishment of  the Joint Administration of  Turkic 
Arts and Culture (TÜRKSOY, 1993). In 2008, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
along with  in  Turkey and Azerbaijan, signed an agreement establishing the 
Parliamentary Assembly of  Turkic-speaking Countries (TÜRKPA). Finally, in 
2010 the Cooperation Council of  Turkic Speaking Countries was established as 
the umbrella organization for the cooperation mechanisms developed among the 
four above-mentioned countries.
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foreign relations through Ankara – as well as to antagonize two 
of their most influential neighbors, Russia and Iran, which 
viewed Turkey’s regional initiatives with suspicion23. 
The analysis of the nexus between the nation-building and 
the foreign policy-making processes occurring in the CARs in 
the aftermath of 1991 shows two crucial and interconnected 
trends. First and foremost, the regional unifying factors in re-
ligious or cultural terms neither presided over nor facilitated 
inter-state cooperation, at either the regional or supranation-
al level. Quite on the contrary, the ethno-territorial matrix of 
post-Soviet nation-building supported regional hegemonic 
projects and feeded inter-state tensions, running counter to in-
tegration and fostering centrifugal forces. Second – as will be 
seen in the next paragraph – the confusion, widespread among 
the CARs’ leaderships, between the recognition and the pro-
motion of a regional identity, on the one hand, and the pursuit 
of a regionalist agenda with supranational features potentially 
limiting countries’ sovereignty on the other, led local actors to 
deny the very existence of any shared Central Asian identity 
and to perceive nation-building and region-building as largely 
contradictory pursuits24.
The “security-first” approach to cooperation
Security needs have been paramount for the CARs. Securing 
their newly acquired independence from the multi-faceted do-
mestic and external threats endangering state structures super-
seded the other urgencies inscribed in the post-Soviet transition 
period, including the economic. In turn, the “security-first” 
approach to the state-building process has had manifest reper-
cussions on the leaderships’ preferences towards inter-state rela-
tions and cooperation.
23 For a wider account, P. Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the 
Cold War, London, Hurst, 2003, pp.270-293.
24 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, (2012); P. Kubicek (1997).
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First and foremost, the security-first approach resulted in the 
CARs’ reluctance to renounce sovereign prerogatives to supra-
national authorities in order to multilaterally tackle the regional 
and trans-national issues which would have required a deeper 
degree of coordination. Therefore the CARs’ preferences natu-
rally went to loose forms of cooperation, which did not endan-
ger national sovereignty and which were consistent with one of 
the main motivations behind the CARs’ participation in coop-
eration mechanisms, at both the regional and supra-regional 
levels. The reference here is to the legitimation and recognition 
strategies pursued through membership in multilateral organ-
isations, which can be seen as the main drivers behind the cre-
ation and the (seemingly paradoxical) conservation of the var-
ious regional and supra-regional frameworks lacking concrete 
substance or implementation strategies – thereby supporting 
the idea of mere “ink-on-paper” or “virtual” integration un-
folding in the region25. These kinds of cooperation frameworks 
– similar to the ones recently labeled “Rhetorical Integration” 
mechanisms26 – served chiefly as proxies for international rec-
ognition and were thus useful to “sovereignty-boost” strategies 
and needs27, particularly felt by nascent or weak states, as the 
CARs used to be especially during the 1990s. As such, they pur-
sue mainly expressive goals, whose “utility is derived from action 
itself, regardless of whether it leads to any specific outcome”28. 
25 See respectively: A. Libman, “Regionalisation and regionalism in the post-Soviet 
space: Current status and implications for institutional development”, Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 59 no. 3, 2007, pp. 401-430; R. Allison, “Virtual regionalism, 
regional structures and regime security in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 
27, no. 2, 2008, pp. 185-202.
26 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman, Re-Evaluating Regional Organizations. Behind the 
Smokescreen of  Official Mandates, Basingstoke - New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017, pp. 21-23.
27 F. Söderbaum, “Modes of  Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, 
Sovereignty-boosting and Shadow Networks’, Global Governance, Vol. 10, No. 4, 
2004, pp 419-436.
28 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman (2017), p.16.
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From this logic stems the CARs participation in most of the re-
gional arrangements, especially the ones joined in the first dec-
ade following independence – including the above-mentioned 
ones based upon supranational Islamic or Turkic identities.
The post-Soviet legitimation strategies unfolding in the 
Central Asian states had another yet significant repercussion on 
the CARs’ attitudes toward and expectations from regional co-
operation. Despite the obvious differences among the Central 
Asian states, a common feature of the regional state-building 
processes was a concept of national interest which, building 
upon traditional social structures and the contingent difficulties 
of the post-Soviet transition, naturally prioritised political sta-
bility and social order29. This output-based legitimation strate-
gy typically mixed with an opposite yet connected input-based 
one, resulting from the circumstance that the CARs’ post-So-
viet leaderships generally portrayed and legitimised themselves 
as the embodiment of the nation and the national will30. This 
combination, in turn, had direct and deep repercussions on the 
concept and boundaries of the national security paradigm. In 
a regional environment where the state and the nation almost 
totally coincide, the personalism-based legitimation strategies 
made national leaderships the natural linchpin between them. 
Therefore, the security of the state came to overlap with the 
security of regimes portraying themselves as the guarantors of 
stability and social order. Apart from the consequences on the 
domestic level, on the external plane the widespread tenden-
cy to participate in Rhetorical Integration frameworks resulted 
not merely from sovereignty-boost aims, but also from more 
specific “regime-boost” objectives.31
29 D. Lewis, “Central Asia: Contested Peace”, in O. Richmond et al. (eds.), The 
Palgrave Handbook of  Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace, Basingstoke and 
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp.387-397.
30 C. von Soest and J. Grauvogel (2016), pp.33-34.
31 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman (2017), p.22; See also: K. Collins, “Economic and 
Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of  
Central Asia”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.61, no.2 (2009), pp.249-281; R. Allison (2008).
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The security-first approach is also crucial to understanding 
the drivers behind the evolution of sub-regional cooperation 
in economic terms. The typical economic trade-off between 
“guns or butter”, between security needs and a commitment 
to people’s well-being was solved by the CARs leaderships’ pri-
oritising the former over the latter, thereby avoiding the risk 
associated with the reduction in national autonomy inscribed 
by definition in economic integration paths. At the same time, 
some authors have argued that it was not only the security of 
the states that hindered the economic cooperation path, but 
also the understanding of security as regime security, which 
negatively affected local leaderships’ attitudes toward economic 
liberalisation which, in turn, is a logical premise for economic 
regionalism32. 
Apart from the lack of market-oriented reforms, the Central 
Asian states’ prioritisation of security over development 
emerged from two main trends. The first, particularly visible 
in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, results from the tendency to 
build economic development upon the myth of “self-sufficien-
cy”, which led to a lukewarm propensity toward cooperation 
and, instead, to the extensive use of protectionist measures 
and limitations to the free movement of goods and persons33. 
Secondly, intra-regional competition and mistrust between 
the CARs hindered cooperation, even where it appeared to be 
pursuable in a win-win perspective. As a matter of fact, while 
regional economic integration was certainly obstructed by ob-
jective factors resulting from peculiarities in the national pro-
ductive apparatuses,34 it was definitely hindered by subjective 
ones, having to do with the CARs’ risk-opportunity percep-
tions resulting from the security-first mindset. As a confir-
mation of the security-first approach, inter-state cooperation 
32 K. Collins (2009).
33 G. Gleason (2003).
34 R. Pomfret, “Regional integration in Central Asia”, Economic Change and 
Restructuring, vol.42, no.1, 2009, pp.47-68.
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was not pursued even in those important sectors where the 
CARs displayed a significant level of complementarity, name-
ly in the exploitation of regional natural resources. Indeed the 
CARs benefiting from the availability of hydrocarbons – and in 
particular Uzbekistan – are also the poorest in terms of water 
resources, while the countries benefiting from hydropower re-
sources – i.e. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – possess no indigenous 
oil and gas reserves. However, the logic of a mutually benefiting 
exchange between energy and water never worked, hampered 
by the use of resources– especially on the Uzbek side – as a 
tool for confrontation and coercion rather than cooperation. 
Moreover, as far as Turkmenistan is concerned, the rationale be-
hind the search fo self-sufficiency in economic terms seemingly 
operated also in strategic ones. That is, the resolve to preserve 
the country’s territorial integrity and to guarantee its security 
led to a policy of “positive neutrality” which de facto resulted 
in a self-imposed isolation from cooperation at both economic 
and strategic levels, hampering in turn the development of in-
clusive regional frameworks.
On this backdrop, it is not surprising that the only economic 
integration paths involving some of the CARs which accom-
plished any result – i.e. the successive Russian-led initiatives 
heading towards Eurasian Union – were non-inclusive trans-re-
gional projects, focusing on a limited number of highly comple-
mentary economies.35 Consistently with the above-mentioned 
vision of regional cooperation, Kazakhstan, which inherited a 
national economy deeply ingrained with the Russian, has tra-
ditionally been a staunch supporter of and participant in the 
35 The reference is, in particular, to the 2003 Single Economic Space (SES) and 
to the Customs Union (CU), involving Kazakhstan but excluding Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, “non-preferential trade partners” – as they were labelled by Bohr 
(2004, p.493) – which instead had been founding members of  the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC), in whose framework both the SES and the 
CU were proposed. Kyrgyzstan, however, entered the CU in January 2015, with 
a view to joining the Eurasian Economic Union, the latest step in the Eurasian 
integration project.
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Eurasian integration project, whose current stage – namely the 
Eurasian Economic Union – also involves Kyrgyzstan.
The multi-layered power competition 
in and over Central Asia
An apparent paradox seen in the evolution of Central Asian 
cooperation is that, notwithstanding the paramount impor-
tance the CARs give to security considerations, and in spite of 
the characteristic trans-national nature of regional threats, the 
security-first approach did not result in the creation of sound 
multilateral mechanisms for cooperation. This was the conse-
quence of a complex mixture of objective limitations and sub-
jective factors, having to do with regional actors’ perceptions 
and attitudes. That is, the CARs’ leaderships lacked both the 
capabilities and the common will to set up effective multilateral 
frameworks for security cooperation. 
Lack of capabilities points first and foremost to the CARs’ 
inability to control the regional security dynamics unfolding 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and shaped, over time, 
also by the competitive engagement of external powers.36 The 
trans-regional nature of Central Asian dynamics and the relative 
weakness of its member states concurred in conceptualization 
of the area, from a security perspective, as a “weak sub-complex” 
within the post-Soviet Regional Security Complex, centred on 
Russian hegemony.37 The lack of the CARs’ common will and 
vision has, instead, mainly to do with the intra-regional compe-
tition for hegemony or dominance. From this perspective, the 
dynamics of regional cooperation closely resemble the neo-re-
alist dynamics of alliances, both being shaped by the pursuit of 
36 R. Allison, “Regionalism, regional structures and security management in 
Central Asia”, International Affairs, vol.80, no.3, 2004, pp.463-483.
37 B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of  International Security, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 423, 428–429.
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power and security.38 In the peculiar Central Asian sub-com-
plex, these dynamics are naturally multi-layered, with power 
relations impinging upon a triple yet interconnected level of 
competition – i.e. regional, supra-regional and global. That is, 
power competition at the regional level coexists with and is part 
of power competition at the supra-regional, involving major 
neighboring powers like Russia and China.39 The latter level, 
in turn, takes shape within a wider, multi-regional competition 
for power with the global hegemon – the US – shaping mul-
ti-leveled yet overlapping interactions.
Intra-regional competition for influence emerged primarily 
from the Astana-Tashkent dualism, which, with rare excep-
tions, is considered by scholars to have been a key impediment 
to integration projects in Central Asia.40 Uzbekistan considers 
itself, and is widely considered by the literature, to be the re-
gion’s “natural hegemon”, in terms of both material power re-
sources and historical legitimating factors.41 Consequently, it 
has traditionally pursued a regional cooperation agenda simul-
taneously pursing an hegemonic regionalism centered “around 
38 R. Allison (2004).
39 For the sake of  brevity, we do not mention other, non-regional actors – namely 
Japan, Turkey, India and Iran – whose projections towards Central Asia result in 
the widening of  the CARs alignment options.
40 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, (2012); A. Bohr (2004). For an opposite point of  
view, F. Tolipov et al., Five States and/or One Region? National-Regional Dualism in 
Central Asia, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Almaty, 2016,  pp.22-24.
41 Uzbekistan’s power resources result from a mix of  geographic, ethno-
demographic and cultural factors. Geographically, it lies at the core of  the 
region, sharing a border with all the CARs while lacking a common border with 
Russia. At the same time, it is the most populous and one of  the ethnically most 
homogeneous Central Asian country, while Uzbek minorities are present in each 
of  the CARs (see tab.1). Finally, the historicization of  the nation  made the county 
heir of  Central Asian key historical cultural centers, like Samarkand and Bukhara. 
See, e.g., S. Cornell, “Uzbekistan: A regional player in Eurasiangeopolitics?”, 
European Security, vol.9, no.2, 2000, pp.115-140.
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the Tashkent metropolis”42 and balancing strategies vis-à-vis 
Russian hegemony in the regional sub-complex. Conversely, and 
as already seen, Kazakhstan traditionally advanced its dominant 
regional role – which in purely economic terms grew steadily as 
a result of the exploitation of its energy potential – by virtue of 
its strategic entente with Russia, stemming from the deep links 
between the two countries and as a counterweight to Uzbek 
regional policies. Therefore, although both countries nominally 
pursue “multi-vectoral” foreign policy strategies,43 the under-
standing of the formula is quite different in Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan and, due to the peculiarities of regional coopera-
tion, in any case these were conducive to integration patterns 
in Central Asia. 
While the already-mentioned self-imposed Turkmen isola-
tionism has cut off Ashgabat from regional interactions, power 
competition and power asymmetry within the Central Asian 
region also contributes to explaining the attitudes toward co-
operation of the weakest CARs in terms of power resources, 
namely Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. That is, their participation 
in regional frameworks for cooperation resulted primarily from 
an attempt to constrain the influence of more powerful coun-
tries and, in particular, to counterbalance the perceived threat 
coming from Uzbekistan. Thus, Dushanbe and Bishkek’s par-
ticipation in regional organizations has been consistent with 
strategies of allying with Russia, hegemon within the wider 
post-Soviet Regional Security Complex, or with Kazakhstan, 
by virtue of the perceived formation of a Moscow-Astana ax-
is.44 On this backdrop, power competition ended up by also 
hindering cooperation in the economic sector, already weak-
ened by the above-mentioned protectionist attitudes. Besides 
42 A. Bohr, Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy, London, Royal Institute for 
International Affairs, 1998, p.50.
43 See: N. Contessi (2015) “Foreign and Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia: 
Issue Splitting, Co-alignment, and Relational Power”, Problems of  Post-Communism, 
vol.62, no.5, 2015, pp.299-311.
44 See, e.g., A. Bohr (2004), p.492.
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Year Organization Areas covered Members (CARs + Others)
1991 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Multi-purpose
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan
(associated since 2005), Tajikistan, Uzbekistan + Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.
1997
Central Asian Regional
Economic Cooperation
(CAREC)
Economy Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan + Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Mongolia, Pakistan.
2000-2014 Eurasian EconomicCommunity (EurAsEC) Economy
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (2006–2008) + 
Russia, Belarus. 
2001 Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO) Multi-purpose
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan + China, India 
(2017), Pakistan (2017), Russia. 
2002 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Security
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (2006–2012) + 
Armenia, Belarus, Russia. 
2002-2005
Central Asian Cooperation
Organization (CACO) – fmr Central 
Asian Economic Cooperation
Economy Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
2006 Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) Finance Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (2011), Tajikistan (2009) + Armenia (2009), Belarus (2010).
2009 Turkic Council Culture Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan + Azerbaijan, Turkey.
2011 CIS Free Trade Area Economy Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan + Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Moldova, Ukraine.
2015
Eurasian Economic
Union (EEU) – fmr. Customs Union 
and Common Economic Space
Economy Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (2015) + Russia, Belarus, Armenia (2015).
Tab. 2 - Selected cooperation schemes involving Central Asian countries
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the failed Kazakhstani attempt to involve Uzbekistan in re-
gional agreements, power competition also prevented upstream 
and downstream water-resource countries – i.e. Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, on the one side, Uzbekistan, on the other – to de-
velop consistent frameworks for cooperation fostering func-
tional interdependence.45
In the absence of shared risk-opportunity perceptions and 
goals, the CARs manifested a certain degree of convergence 
only on practical and identifiable security benefits.46 This was 
the case, for example of the negotiation on border demarca-
tion between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
which led to the establishment of the Shanghai Group in 1996, 
as well as of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
(CANWFZ), signed in 2006 by the heads of state of the CARs, 
thereby committed to not producing, acquiring, testing, stock-
ing or possessing nuclear arms.47 In both cases, however, the 
involvement of external actors, namely China and Russia – i.e. 
respectively as part of the agreement or as mere facilitator of 
the negotiations – played a crucial role in defusing traditional 
reciprocal suspicions between the CARs.
The chiefly “instrumental” nature of Central Asian region-
alism – i.e. its being respondent to power competition rather 
than to integration aims – also presided over the phenomenon 
of “revolving-door” membership in regional organizations, 
shaped first and foremost by Uzbekistan. Tashkent, the “re-
gional chameleon”,48 in fact pursued a seemingly unintelli-
45 The only exception to this rule is the International Fund for Saving the Aral 
Sea (IFAS), established in 1993 on international community’s pressure and on 
Kazakhstan’s initiative. IFAS, which brings together all the CARs, has long 
remained dormant and is still highly ineffective, having acquired a trans-national 
dimension based upon shared rules of  operation only with its “3rd Aral Sea Basin 
Programme” (2011-2015). At the time of  writing, negotiations are still underway 
for the approval of  the 4th Programme. 
46 R. Allison (2004), p.482.
47 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, (2012), p.8.
48 A. Bohr (2004), p.499.
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gible “pendulum politics” between different and sometimes 
opposing arrangements, guided by balancing needs that were 
changing along with regional circumstances – i.e. along with 
the shifting power balance between the CARs as well as with 
the degree of competitive engagement in the region by external 
powers. As a consequence, while the resolve to balance Russia 
led Uzbekistan to withdraw from the CST and to simultane-
ously join the “Western-minded” and US-supported GUAM 
in 1999, in the aftermath of the Andijan events and in the face 
of consequently growing Western criticism, Tashkent made 
another U-turn, leaving the latter in 2005 and re-joining the 
former in 2006, only to withdraw once again in 2012, mainly 
as a reaction to perceived Russian interference in its sovereign 
prerogatives.49 
The different balancing needs – coupled with the already 
mentioned tendency to support purely declarative mechanisms 
for cooperation – led to the typically variable geometry charac-
terizing the numerous regional and supra-regional frameworks 
for cooperation (See tab. no.2), a set of “spaghetti-bowl”50 ar-
rangements which more often than not tended to replicate anal-
ogous functions and prerogatives, though largely unfulfilled. 
The externally driven nature of Central Asian 
cooperation
Resulting primarily from the different and often incompatible 
priorities of the CARs, the primacy of supra-regional frame-
works for cooperation in Central Asia emerges first and fore-
most from their longevity and relative effectiveness. While not 
presiding over regional integration, nevertheless organizations 
like the CIS, the CSTO, or the SCO showed an elevated degree 
49 See M. Laruelle, Factoring the Regional Impact of  Uzbekistan’s Withdrawal from the 
CSTO, The German Marshall Fund of  the United States, On Wider Europe, 
no.24, 2012.
50 R. Pomfret (2009), p.51.
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of resilience and accomplished significant results, although 
more often than not different from their respective statutory 
goals – e.g. in terms of sovereignty- or regime-boost effects or 
in those of socialization.51
Recognizing the primacy of externally driven frameworks 
for cooperation does not imply portraying the CARs as mere 
“pawns” of a power competition unfolding among major pow-
ers. Contrary to the stereotypical image of the CARs as passive 
actors within “New Great Game”, they managed to impose 
“local rules” on international players.52 That is, the geopolitical 
competition centered on Central Asia left the CARs with sig-
nificant room for maneuver between external powers, enabling 
them to pursue, according to respective priorities, balancing 
strategies toward different actors at different times, as well as to 
employ pick-and-choose strategies and aligning-for-profit policies 
– in terms of attracting foreign aid or investments as well as in 
terms of rent-seeking activities.53 On this backdrop, the CARs’ 
“international agency” clearly benefited from systemic shifts 
impinging upon regional dynamics. This was particularly the 
case in the aftermath of 9/11 and the launch of the Enduring 
Freedom Operation by the US’ Bush Administration, which 
widened Central Asian states’ ability to extract benefits from 
51 As for the need to evaluate the efficacy of  organization taking into account 
participants’ expectations rather than declared outputs see: E. Vinokurov and A. 
Libman (2017); J. Linn and O. Pidufala, Lessons for Central Asia. Experience with 
Regional Economic Cooperation, ADB, Manila, 2009.
52 For a recent scholarly contribution dispelling the assumption of  CARs as mere 
passive pawns in the context of  regional competition among great powers, see A. 
Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2012. In the same vein, S. Cummings (2013).
53 See, A. Bohr (2004); E.  Kavalski, “Partnership or rivalry between the EU, India 
and China in Central Asia”, European Law Journal, vol.13, no.6, 2007, pp.839-856; 
S. Schiek, “The Afghanistan Conflict As a Power Resource for Central Asia?”, in 
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of  Hamburg 
(ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, pp.301-313.
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great powers’ interest in and projection toward the area.54 
However, as far as regional cooperation is concerned, the re-
sultant broadening of alignment options run counter to the de-
velopment of regional arrangements not only by decreasing the 
CARs’ interest in multilateral initiatives, but also by increasing 
intra-regional competition for distributive gains.55 Moreover, in 
a region shaped by deep power competition, the US’ power 
projection – pursued eminently on a bilateral base – ended up 
in widening the power asymmetry between the CARs to the 
benefit of its main strategic interlocutors, chiefly Uzbekistan.56
The main reason for the relative success of the externally driv-
en cooperation frameworks, and particularly of the Russian- 
and Chinese-led, has been their declarative, non-invasive na-
ture. It primarily resulted from the legitimation and “defensive” 
goals characterizing Moscow’s and Beijing’s initiatives, aimed at 
legitimately enhancing their regional power status and at pro-
jecting respective foreign policy culture abroad, so that “their 
narrative of regionalism in fact sometimes corresponds more 
to a hidden bilateralism and a strategy for an anti-American 
multipolarity”.57
Yet during the 90s the Russian-led initiatives showed the 
typical shortcomings of a so-called “holding-together” region-
alism – i.e. a cooperation path taking shape among states that 
previously belonged to a common polity.58 Apart from the al-
ready-mentioned lower propensity to renounce state autonomy 
54 A good example of  this trend is provided by Alexander Cooley’s account of  
the competition between the U.S. and Russia ignited by Kyrgyzstani authorities 
over the lease of  the Manas airbase. See A. Cooley (2012), pp.116-133.
55 A. Bohr (2004), p.492.
56 As highlighted by Bohr (2004, p.492), Uzbekistan may indeed considered 
the “primary beneficiary” of  US regional policy. Besides the high benefits 
extracted in merely economic terms, in strategic ones Tashkent signed with the 
US a Declaration on Strategic Partnership which committed the latter – though 
vaguely – to ensure the national security and territorial integrity of  the former.
57 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, (2012), p.6.
58 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman (2017), p.44.
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typical of newly independent countries, this had chiefly to 
do with the politicized nature of the initiatives, which entail 
a highly symbolic value. Consistently, the membership in or 
withdrawal from cooperation frameworks like the CIS or the 
CSTO had more to do with the CARs’ bilateral relations with 
Russia than with the institutional aims of the organizations, the 
more so as a consequence of their declarative nature. 
On this backdrop – and in the wider context of shifting 
regional dynamics – China’s increasing participation in and 
promotion of cooperation mechanisms in Central Asia made 
it possible to overcome two key shortcomings of the Russian-
led proposals put forward during the 90s. First, by reducing 
the unidirectional power asymmetry and the politicization 
inscribed in the latter, the involvement of Beijing allowed the 
CARs to counterbalance Russian dominance, facilitating the 
participation of actors traditionally suspicious of Moscow’s 
goals. This seems to be, for instance, the case with Uzbekistan’s 
participation in the SCO. Secondly, China’s initiatives – and 
particularly the institutionalization of the Shanghai cooperation 
in 2001 – helped identify previously missing common threats. 
This was the case with the so-called “three evils” threatening the 
region, namely terrorism, extremism and separatism – a combi-
nation of menaces particularly felt across Central Asia after the 
1999-2000 campaign of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU)59 and traditionally also felt in Russia and China, whose 
projections towards the region had anti-terror needs among its 
main drivers.60  
The peculiar understanding of security in Central Asia – con-
ceived as both state security and regime security – had clear 
repercussions on the risk-opportunity perceptions of the local 
59 M. Brill Olcott, Radical Islamist Mobilization in Central Asia, Carnegie Moscow 
Center, November 14, 2000.
60 The reference here is to the need to curtail the threat arising from Uyghur 
separatism, based in the northwestern Xinjiang region and benefiting from 
strong transnational connections with the CARs, with whom the Uyghur share 
religious affiliation and the ethno-linguistic Turkic background.
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leaderships and, consequentially, on the meaning and breadth 
of balancing strategies themselves. In the CARs’ leaderships 
view, balancing and alignment strategies are indeed aimed at 
contrasting not merely external threats to state survival, but 
also internal threats to regime stability, thus making applica-
ble the concept of omnibalancing developed for Third World 
countries.61 This consideration is quite important in apprais-
ing the parameters of the CARs’ security concepts as they have 
been developing since the beginning of the century, informing 
attitudes towards security cooperation and, significantly, forg-
ing a still in-a-nutshell regional security identity shared by both 
Russia and China. The peculiar CARs’ concept of security and 
the resulting omnibalancing needs stood as one of the main 
limits to Western-led sub-regional initiatives for cooperation 
and as an incentive to enhance cooperation with the neigh-
boring powers. Above all, it was the regime change impetus as-
sociated with the Bush Doctrine, on the one hand, and the 
normative essence inscribed in the EU’s regional projection, on 
the other, which openly collided with the CARs’ leaderships 
preferences and perspectives on cooperation. That is, both US 
and EU regional strategies entailed a degree of – more or less 
manifest – interference in the CARs’ domestic affairs which 
openly collided with their leaderships’ preferences and attitudes 
towards cooperation, centered upon the pillar of non-inter-
ference in sovereign states’ domestic affairs. Therefore, widen-
ing the concept of a “protective integration” working against 
Western efforts to impose external values,62 it can be argued, as 
Ziegler did,63 that the CARs’ preferences for alignment do not 
61 See C. Ziegler, “Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus after the Georgia 
Conflict”, in R. Kanet (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, Basingstoke 
and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.162.
62 R. Allison (2008).
63 C. Ziegler, “Sovereignty, Security and Intervention in Central Asia”, in M. 
Sussex and R. Kanet (eds.), Russia, Eurasia and the New Geopolitics of  Energy. 
Confrontation and Consolidation, Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015, pp.91-111.
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primarily result from analogies in authoritarian rule, but rather 
from the shared interpretation of and full respect for state sov-
ereignty, consistent with their post-colonial nature. It is from 
this perspective that the enhancement of the CARs’ security 
cooperation with Russia and China within CSTO and SCO 
should be seen in the aftermath of both the “colored revolu-
tions” and the wave of “Arab Springs”. Moscow and Beijing’s 
advancement of a “regional ownership” principle founded upon 
the non-intervention of outside powers in the region, as well as 
their adherence to the principles of near-absolute sovereignty, 
non-intervention, and non-interference in states’ internal af-
fairs – testified to by the position taken vis-à-vis the Andijan 
unrest in 2004 and the 2010 interethnic Uzbek-Kyzgyz clashes 
occurring in South Kyrgyzstan – perfectly fit with the CARs’ 
perceptions and attitudes.
The centrality of the above-mentioned principles in shaping the 
CARs’ attitude toward cooperation and toward externally driv-
en initiatives helps to shed light on the latest dynamics shaping 
the multi-layered search for security and cooperation in Central 
Asia. While over the last decade the shift in Chinese regional pol-
icy from a defensive and reactive stance to a proactive one has 
widened Beijing’s interaction with and economic grip over the 
CARs, at the same time Russia’s aggressive stance in its so-called 
near abroad backfired on its regional initiatives. Indeed, the four-
year-long and still unsolved Ukrainian crisis, besides exerting a 
negative impact on Moscow’s drive towards integration within 
the Eurasian Economic Union,64 impinged upon the CARs’ at-
titudes towards cooperation with Russia, fostering more resolute 
balancing strategies even by those countries – like, for instance, 
Kazakhstan65 – which were traditionally more inclined to coop-
erate bilaterally and multilaterally with their northern neighbor. 
64 See R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk, The Eurasian Economic Union Deals, Rules and 
the Exercise of  Power, Research Paper, London, Chatham House, 2017, pp.11-12.
65 See, e.g., D. Tynan, What does Kazakhstan’s new military doctrine reveal about its 
relations with Russia?, Eurasianet, December 7, 2017.
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In an opposite direction, China’s increasing projection to-
ward Central Asia did not come at the expense of Beijing’s 
firm adherence to the key pillars of its “peaceful rise” doctrine, 
which greatly suited national preferences and perspectives for 
cooperation in terms of balancing strategies as well as in terms 
of the economic benefits and development ensured by Beijing’s 
regional investments, directed mainly toward the energy and 
infrastructure sectors. Driven by economic as well as security 
interests and pursued mainly by boosting financial, commer-
cial and trade relations, China’s projection toward Central Asia 
has yielded impressive results in the course of the last decade. 
This trend appears evident in terms of growth in bilateral trade 
and investment inflows – which received a decisive boost as 
a result of the CARs’ involvement in the development of the 
overland component of the Belt and Road Initiative and as a 
consequence of Beijing’s strategy of energy procurement from 
the region. The results accomplished in the energy sector are 
particularly meaningful, in that they show China’s ability to 
step into a highly politicized realm and, by virtue of flexible, 
non-invasive and incentive-led policy,66 achieve notable out-
comes in a relatively limited timeframe – namely the construc-
tion of the Kazakhstan-China and Central Asia-China oil and 
gas pipelines. These infrastructures, besides breaking Russia’s 
quasi-monopoly over the purchase of Central Asian gas, deci-
sively contributed to shifting the region’s economic gravitation-
al pole eastward.
Conclusion: The main trends of cooperation 
in Central Asia 
The overlapping of and confusion between the multi-faceted 
state- and nation-building processes unfolding since 1991 in 
66 C. Frappi and M. Montanini, How does China’s thirst for oil and gas impact on EU’s 
energy policies? The Africa and Central Asia test cases, United Nations University, 
GR:EEN Policy Brief, no.21, 2014. 
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Central Asia is the single element which most influenced the 
way in which the CARs came to perceive the risks and oppor-
tunities arising from the post-Soviet transition, as well as their 
attitudes and preferences regarding bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. On this backdrop, neither supranational identity 
commonalities nor the urgent need to re-launch and partially 
reinvent post-Soviet national economic apparatus were con-
ducive to regional integration and cooperation paths. Instead, 
identity and economic policies became either the logical prem-
ise or a privileged tool for affirmation of the primacy of security 
in domestic and foreign policy realms.
In a highly competitive environment, shaped by a peculiar 
multi-layered struggle for power and hegemony, the securi-
ty-first approach to inter-state relations and the peculiar CAR 
understanding of the concept of security shaped the way in 
which cooperation came to be perceived and pursued. That 
is, balancing and alliance purposes were crucial in shaping the 
CARs’ attitude towards regional cooperation in general and 
towards participation in single arrangements in particular. At 
the same time, legitimation and international recognition aims 
were and are still determinant in shaping the attitudes them-
selves, as well as socialization goals and the possibility to use 
cooperation frameworks as mere yet important “talking clubs”. 
In this, Central Asian regionalism thus turned out to be chief-
ly instrumental. Instrumentality, in turn, has been primarily 
responsible for the main, often cited characterizations scholars 
give to Central Asian regionalism and integration – from “vir-
tual” to “ink-on-paper”, from “spaghetti-bowl” to “protective”.
Intra-regional competition and more or less overt inter-state 
tensions are key hurdles to the development of a consistent 
drive toward economic or security cooperation in Central Asia, 
thereby widening external powers’ regional room for maneuver 
and enhancing their key role in putting forward and leading 
mechanisms for regional cooperation. It is therefore not by 
chance that the latter remains chiefly externally driven, even 
if the scope and breadth of initiatives coming from major 
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neighboring powers is rapidly changing. Indeed, current dy-
namics in inter-state cooperation show two apparently oppos-
ing yet connected trends. While they manifest the persistent 
weakness of regionalist trends, at the same time a fresh impe-
tus for the enhancement of inter-state bonds seems to follow 
China’s projection into the area, on the backdrop of growing 
resistance to Russian initiatives in its “near abroad” unfolding 
among regional actors. Indeed, thanks to Chinese infrastruc-
tural initiatives the CARs are indeed not only increasingly in-
terconnected among themselves, but are also more and more 
incorporated into a burgeoning trans-regional network that 
enhances Central Asia’s strategic geographic location. Thus, be-
sides having already modified to its own benefit the economic 
gravitational pole of Central Asia, China’s initiatives are fos-
tering a trend toward “regionalization from above”, consistent 
with the declared aim of turning Central Asia’s land-locked 
countries into “land-linked economies”. Such a trend seems 
to be confirmed and enhanced also by the enlargement of the 
SCO geographical scope, achieved through the engagement of 
extra-regional actors as members, observers or dialogue part-
ners. On this backdrop, while the regional “reluctant hegemon” 
stance of China – seemingly unwilling, for the time being, to 
challenge Russia’s traditional upper hand in security terms – 
doesn’t seem to entail significant incompatibilities among the 
main major powers active in Central Asia, it remains to be seen 
if and how the security needs associated with infrastructural 
developments will incentivize a renewed understanding of se-
curity cooperation in Central Asia, fostering fresh solutions to 
the dated issues arising from intra-regional competition and 
infighting. 
While Beijing seems to possess all the potential to act as a 
“game-changer” to supra-regional cooperation schemes, a fresh 
boost to enhance inter-state and multilateral cooperation may 
also arise from within Central Asia. Indeed, if the assumption 
of the hindering role to cooperation played by intra-regional 
competition for power and personalism-based policies holds 
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true, then new impetus to cooperation may results from the 
leadership change recently occurred in Uzbekistan. As a mat-
ter of fact, the succession of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to the “father 
of the nation” Islam Karimov has the potential to break the 
regional vicious circle generated by the competition between 
Tashkent and Astana as well as by the “insecurity spiral” shaping 
Uzbekistan’s relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. While is 
too early to assess the mid- and long-term consequences of the 
Uzbek leadership change, the latter has already shown its po-
tential67 in providing a much-needed regional confidence boost 
and, simultaneously, in setting a new stage for intra-regional 
dialogue potentially conducive to the definition of regional 
solution to the trans-national issues still affecting Central Asia, 
primarily in security terms.
67 The reference goes to the hosting in Samarkand, in November 2017, of  the 
conference “Central Asia: One Past and a Common Future, Cooperation for 
Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity” under the auspices of  the UN 
and the Uzbek Foreign Ministry, on the one hand, and to the participation to the 
first consultative meeting of  the CARs leaders held in Astana in March 2018 with 
a view to institutionalize regular meeting to jointly tackle the regional problems.
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